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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TAXATION 
By 
RAUL ALBERTO PONCE RODRIGUEZ 
December, 2006 
 
Committee Chair: Jorge L. Martinez-Vazquez 
Major Department: Economics 
 
 
 In this dissertation we analyze the role of parties’ electoral competition in 
aggregating voters’ preferences over policy and its impact on tax design. The 
representation of voters’ interests is central for the analysis of public finance since the 
issue of aggregation is closely linked to the tradeoff between efficiency and 
redistribution, and the size and composition of public spending. Parties’ aggregation of 
preferences is related to the mechanism in which policy makers (parties) weigh the 
relative merits of competing goals of the tax system (in our analysis, redistribution versus 
efficiency), and reveals the welfare calculus throughout parties identify groups of 
individuals who might be beneficiated (hurt) by policy changes. 
 In the first essay we analyze the influence of voters in modifying tax policy 
through tax initiatives. In this essay we argue that the process of aggregation of 
preferences between the competition for votes in a representative democracy and the 
majority rule are different. This, in turn, might lead to the approval of a tax rate limit 
(TRL) initiative. We argue that the rationale for a TRL proposal is to substitute feasible 
tax structures rather than to constrain the government’s power to collect taxes and 
provide a model that predicts the tax structure that would arise as a result of a TRL 
 The second essay addresses the role of voters’ partisan attitudes in the 
determination of fiscal policies. We argue that partisan attitudes and its distribution 
across the electorate influence the proportion of the expected votes that different 
coalitions deliver in the election. We identify conditions in which voters’ partisan 
  xiii
attitudes affect the provision of a public good and the redistributive properties of the tax 
structure. 
 The third essay extends our previous analysis of the impact of voters’ partisan 
attitudes on tax design by incorporating parties that are policy motivated. In this setting, 
the relative merits of efficiency versus redistribution in designing the tax system are 
determined by the process of aggregation of voters’ preferences and parties’ preferences 
over policy. The conflict between parties and the electorate’s preferences over tax policy 
depends on voters’ partisan attitudes. In particular, voters’ party affiliation soft parties’ 
electoral constraints, allowing parties to advance the interests of their constituents. 
Redistribution (efficiency) will play a more prominent role for a party that represents a 
coalition of low (high) income individuals with a high (low) taste for public goods. 
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ESSAY I:  ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM AND TAX RATE LIMITS 
 
 
According to a report in 1995 by the U.S Advisory Commission of 
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), by 1995 forty-six states in the U.S had approved 
some sort of tax and expenditure limitation (TEL), tax rate limits had been the 
predominant form of state restrictions, and local governments in 33 states had been 
affected by overall and/or specific tax rate limits.1 The ACIR (1995) also reports that 
TELs did not affect the size of government but changed the composition of state and 
local spending.2 Empirical evidence also suggests that TELs modified the structure of 
state and local tax systems (see ACIR, 1995; Mullings & Joyce, 1996; Fisher & Gade, 
1991; Shadbegian, 1999; Preston & Ichniowski, 1991; Dye & McGuire, 1997; and 
Skidmore, 1999).3 Finally, the evidence indicates that TELs are long lived tax 
amendments (ACIR, 1995; Shadbegian, 1999; NCSL, 2005).  To sum up, TELs are a 
widespread phenomenon affecting state and local spending and tax structure, tax rate 
limits are the predominant form of tax restrictions, and TELs are long lived tax 
amendments. 
The objective of this essay is to examine why a tax rate limit (TRL) initiative is 
placed on the ballot, and what explains the approval/rejection of the TRL. In addition, we 
seek to explain some empirical regularities, that is, why a majority of voters would 
approve a TEL even when survey analysis revealed that voters were, in general, satisfied 
with government spending, and we seek to provide a model that can predict the tax 
structure that would arise as a result of the approval of a tax rate amendment.4 
                                                 
1 U.S Advisory Commission of Intergovernmental Relations, 1995, “Tax and Expenditure Limitations on 
Local Governments,” Center for Urban Policy and the Environment, Indiana University. 
2 Other studies analyzing the impact of TELs on different measures of government’s size find mixed 
evidence. For instance Mullings and Joyce (1996) find that TELs did not affect government’s size and 
Fisher and Gade (1991) reports no evidence that the property tax limitation in Arizona restrained the 
growth of property taxes. In contrast, Preston and Ichniowski (1991) conclude that the growth of the 
property tax revenues was lower in municipalities in which a TEL had been approved. Similar results are 
reported by Dye and McGuire (1997) for the case of limits on growth of property tax levies. 
3 The document of the ACIR also concludes that TELs over local authorities increased the dependence of 
local governments on state aid. This led to higher centralization and lower responsiveness of local 
authorities to individuals’ demands. 
4 On the issue that voters revealed in survey analysis that in general they were satisfied with government’s 
spending see Attiyeh and Engle (1979), Citrin (1979), and Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1980). 
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In this essay, we develop a probabilistic model of electoral competition (parties 
with incomplete information on voters’ preferences over policies) to analyze the design 
of tax policy. We use this framework to argue that the electoral competition between 
parties determines the tax system at the status quo by aggregating voters’ preferences for 
policy in a different way than the majority rule aggregates voters’ interests. In our 
analysis, the electoral competition aggregates the preferences of the electorate over policy 
while the majority rule aggregates the preferences of the decisive voter of the tax 
initiatives.5 The approval of the motion, however, does not necessarily imply that voters 
are unsatisfied with the size of the budget or that voters question the efficiency of the 
government to transform public revenues into services.6  
We argue that the rationale for a TRL proposal is to substitute feasible tax 
structures rather than to constrain the government’s power to collect taxes. Based on the 
tax substitution hypothesis, we characterize conditions that provide empirically verifiable 
tests on the likelihood that a TRL is approved. Finally, we provide a model that predicts 
the tax structure that would arise as a result of a TRL. Previous studies have ignored the 
information that the approval/rejection of a TRL transmits on voters’ preferences to 
policy makers. We propose a model in which, conditional on observing the approval of a 
TRL, Downsian parties update their system of beliefs on voters’ preferences for tax 
structures and accommodate the tax initiative of voters. This might explain why TRL 
initiatives are long lived tax amendments.  
 
 
Literature Review on Tax and Expenditure Limitations 
 
The literature on TELs has centered on explaining why the government does not 
provide the fiscal policies demanded by the median voter, see Shapiro, et al. (1979). In 
other words, the approval by majority of a TRL is incompatible with the hypothesis that 
the electoral competition induces parties to propose the fiscal policies demanded by the 
                                                 
5 In this context, the tax system at the status quo is a policy that maximizes parties’ expected plurality. 
Since, the tax structure at the status quo might be different to the ideal policy of the median voter of the tax 
initiatives, then the decisive voter might increase his utility by approving a TRL. 
6 As we discuss in our review of the literature (see below), these two arguments have dominated the 
discussion of the rationale for a tax rate limit. 
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median voter. Otherwise, how do we explain that a majority of voters approve a TRL? In 
fact, Densau, Mackay and Weaver (1979, 1980) depict a TEL as a mechanism to restore 
the median voter outcome (MVO). They argue that the MVO can be upset by a group of 
high demanders with the power to control the agenda.  
The apparent inability of the median voter model to explain the approval of tax 
and expenditure initiatives persuaded Brennan and Buchannan (1978a, 1978b, 1980) to 
provide a model in which a dictator rules the government. In their framework, the dictator 
has incentives to maximize the public budget. If, in addition, the dictator is not 
constrained by electoral considerations then the obvious result is a big government.7 In 
this case, dissatisfied citizens seek to limit the power of a government that maximizes the 
“Leviathan,” by approving a proposal that effectively constrains the government’s 
capacity to collect taxes. 
Two observations are worthy of notice on the hypothesis that the objective of a 
TRL is to control government’s spending or capacity to collect taxes. First, as Brennan 
and Buchanan (1978b) recognize, an isolated tax rate limitation is unlikely to constrain 
the government’s capacity to raise public revenue. Thus, in the context of government’s 
monopolistic power, what is the rationale for a single tax rate limit? Second, in the light 
of an important expansion of the public sector after the 1950s, the explanation of a big 
government as the rationale of a TEL seems appealing. However, Attiyeh and Engle 
(1979), Citrin (1979), Courant, Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1980), and Ladd and Wilson 
(1982) use survey techniques to reveal that voters were, in general, satisfied with 
government’s expenditure. This finding led Ladd and Wilson (1982) to argue that the 
approval of a TEL initiative (Massachusetts’ proposition 2 ½ ) was more an attempt to 
reduce tax burdens and obtain higher efficiency from the government rather than to 
reduce spending.  
Courant and Rubinfeld (1981) provide a model in which the government’s 
services are inefficient since public employees have monopolistic power in setting public 
wages. In this setting, a coalition of voters seeks to increase their well being by limiting 
the public budget. However, the voters’ approval of a budget limit requires that voters 
                                                 
7 For arguments along these lines see Denzau and Mackay (1980), Romer and Rosenthal (1979), Shapiro 
and Sonstelie (1982), among many others. 
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expect that public employees, in their self interest, reduce their wages after the budget 
limit is approved. In the model, however, the mechanisms that explain how public 
employees respond to a budget limit and the voters’ system of beliefs on the response of 
public employees are exogenous. For this reason, it is not clear why voters would 
approve a budget limitation. 
In summary, tax initiatives have been regarded as a mechanism of voters to 
impose a non electoral control over a big government, as an attempt to improve the 
efficiency of the government, and as a way to restore the median voter outcome that was 
initially upset by a group of high demanders with the power to control the agenda. Other 
explanations for TELs proposed in empirical analysis include: Tax initiatives might be 
explained as voters’ attempt to change the composition of tax collections and reduce tax 
burdens.8  
Although we have learned a great deal from the models surveyed above, several 
important elements that can explain the proposal-approval of TRLs have received little 
attention. First, tax rate limits have been analyzed under the assumption that policy is 
one-dimensional and hence the effects of a TRL on government’s tax structure have been 
ignored. Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests that a TRL modifies the tax systems 
of state and local governments. Furthermore, the analysis of the effects of a TRL on tax 
structure is relevant since voters will be concerned with the overall tax liability. Hence, 
the approval of a tax rate limit should be related with voters’ system of beliefs on the 
response of the government to a TRL.9 That is, from the point of view of rational voters, 
the approval/rejection of a tax motion requires the comparison of the ex-ante tax structure 
versus the tax system that would arise as a result of a TRL. 
Second, in the context of uncertainty, the government’s response to a TRL might 
be affected by the information that the approval of a TRL provides. To see the relevance 
of this point, note that a party could choose a policy that fails to represent the preferences 
of a majority if parties have imperfect information on the actual ideal policies of voters. If 
                                                 
8 To the best of my knowledge, no formal argument has been provided to show that some of the claims in 
the empirical analysis surveyed above can be characterized through the existing bureaucratic and/or 
political models. 
9 That is, when faced with the decision of voting for a tax initiative, rational voters take into account that a 
TRL imposes a constraint only in one of the tax instruments available to the government. Therefore, tax 
authorities could increase the non-constrained tax instruments as a result of a tax initiative. 
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Downsian parties know with certainty that a policy is a Condorcet winner then parties’ 
dominant strategy is to choose such a policy.10 Still, a Condorcet winner might exist but 
such a policy could be unknown for parties. Therefore, in the context of parties’ 
uncertainty on voters’ preferences, the approval of a tax initiative can be thought of as a 
mechanism that transmits information between voters and representatives since the 
approval of the initiative points out a policy with the support of a majority of voters. 
Thus, the objective of the essay is to incorporate the elements we have mentioned 
above to explain the selection, approval/rejection and the effects of a TRL on 
government’s tax policies. That is, in our analysis we incorporate: (a) The fact that tax 
policy is multidimensional; (b) The notion that initiatives are an alternative form of 
representation of preferences for policy;11 (c) The voters’ system of beliefs on 
government’s response to a TRL; (d) The information that the approval/rejection of 
initiatives provide on voters’ preferences for policy; and (e) The government’s response 
to a TRL. We proceed to present our model. 
 
Structure of the Economy and the Game of Electoral Competition 
 
Voters’ Preferences and Choices 
 
Assume the economy is constituted by voters indexed from Hh ...2,1= . In this 
economy voters delegate the activities of making and implementing proposals for tax 
policies to candidates who are nominated by their parties. Voters are engaged in two 
types of activities: The first is to vote for a candidate/party, and the second is to select 
their most preferred feasible consumption bundle. Evidence suggests that the individuals’ 
choice of the vote reflects a complex calculus of (among other things) candidates’ 
policies, voters’ preferences over candidates’ attributes, and a retrospective evaluation of 
                                                 
10 A Condorcet winner is a policy that provides a probability of winning the election that is no less than ½.  
Roemer (2001). Coughlin (1992), Roemer (2001), and many others, show that proposing a policy that is a 
Condorcet winner (if such a policy exists) is a dominant strategy for Downsian parties. 
11 In a representative democracy, the constitutional provision of an initiative can be justified as a way to 
maintain checks and balances on elected representatives, but also as an alternative mechanism for the 
representation of voters’ preferences for policies. Thus, a group of voters could propose an initiative if they 
perceive that their preferences have been misrepresented by the electoral process. 
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candidates’ performance, see Fiorina (1997). For simplicity, we assume the individuals’ 
voting behavior depends on policy issues and on nonspatial attributes of candidates (as 
candidates’ religion, ethnic identity, competence). We denote a voting choice set hCs  
h∀  that records the party that receives the vote from individual h .Thus, voter h will vote 
for party k   if: 
 
    hk Cs∈   ⇔      ( ) ( )[ ]hkkhkhkh hCs ευυ Δ≥−∀= −− tt ,           (1) 
 
Where ( )hk kυ t  and ( ),h k kυ − −t  are the indirect utility functions when parties k and 
–k propose tax policies kk −tt  and , , and khhkh −−=Δ ,εεε  where khhk −,,εε  are preference 
parameters of voter h toward nonspatial attributes of candidates k and –k.12 We assume  
khhk −,,εε  are unknown for parties. More specifically, we follow Hinich and Ordeshook 
(1969) and Enelow and Hinich (1982) and assume that candidates k and –k consider hεΔ  
as an independently distributed random variable with zero mean.  By definition, the 
indirect utility of voter h under policies proposed by party k  is: 
 
    ( ) { }{ }( ) s.t:  0hhk k hk h k hMaxυ μ= ≤xt x q x  for all Hh ...2,1=                     (2) 
 
The expression in (2) defines the preference ordering over feasible options 
characterized by a quasi-concave utility function ( )hk hμ x  where nh ℜ∈x  is the vector of 
feasible commodities.  The consumer’s price vector is k kq = p + t  where p  is the vector 
of producers’ prices and kt  is the vector of commodity taxes proposed by party k. We 
will assume that in this economy the supply of private commodity i  is perfectly elastic at 
ip  ∀ 1,2....i n= .  From the budget constraint we define the nummeraire ( )1h h hLx = −l as 
the net purchases of leisure where hl  is leisure and hL  is the labor supply of the voter, 
and 1kq  is the after tax wage. From (2) we can define the total tax contributions for 
                                                 
12 In (1), khhk −,,εε  affects the choice of the vote since voters have a preference relation over non spatial 
attributes of candidates. The label nonspatial attributes means that candidates can not affect voters’ 
perceptions on their attributes. 
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individual h  as ( )
1
n
h k k h
i i
i
c t x
=
= ∑t  which represents the amount of private commodities that 
the voter has to forgone when participating in the collective action. 
 
Electoral Competition 
 
 
The problem to be considered in this section is how the political process, 
characterized by the competition of two parties for votes, determines the tax structure that 
provides to the party winning the election with public revenue R . For the purpose of 
analyzing the formation of public policies we analyze a dynamic electoral game of 
incomplete information in which voters have perfect information on the alternatives they 
vote. Candidates, however, are uncertain on how the policies proposed by parties k and –
k will be translated into votes. Following Harsanyi (1967) the dynamic game of 
incomplete information is transformed into a dynamic game of complete but imperfect 
information. Consider then, the three stage Downsian political process shown in Figure 1. 
The stages of the game are as follows: In the first stage, nature (N) shows the 
different types and distribution of voters’ preferences for policy. In the second stage, 
candidates announce  simultaneously their tax policy proposals (a commodity tax system 
kk −tt , ). In the third stage, after observing parties’ positions, voters cast their votes 
according to (1) and the elected party proceeds to implement the tax platform in the 
fourth stage of the game.  
 
Figure 1.  Electoral Competition and the Design of Fiscal Policies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Candidates make
policy proposals
* * *k k−= =t t t
The elected party 
implements 
policies
N
Set of types of voters’
preferences
Voters cast their 
votes
{ }
yh
hc
y ∀∀ , υ
yα
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Candidates { },c k k= −  select policies that maximize parties’ expected plurality. 
The strategy set for parties k and –k is constituted by { }k kS = t  and { }k kS − −= t .  Let the 
strategy space cS  be a convex, closed and bounded set representing the tax instruments 
that might raise the amount of public revenue R  (assumed to be exogenously given). 
That is, { } ( ){ }1 1 1,  :   n Hnc c hk k c i i ii i hS S S t R t x− = = =∈ = = ∑ ∑  where hix  is the 1....i n=  Marshallian 
demand of the 1,2...h H= voters and { } 1nci it =  is the sequence of tax instruments available 
for parties. 
From the candidates’ perspective their system of beliefs on the voting behavior 
corresponds to a common cumulative distribution function (cdf) over the set of voters’ 
preferences and its distribution. That is, let nature shows 1,2....y Y=  possible states and 
[ ]0,1yα ∈  is the probability distribution function over y . Thus, for each state y , there is 
a complete specification of sequences { } 1,Hhcy h yυ =  for { },c k k= −  and  khyhkyhy −−=Δ ,εεε . 
Nature’s move is common knowledge but an individual voter knows his type 
(preferences). Parties’ uncertainty on the voting behavior leads to a system of beliefs such 
that for given ,k k−t t , [ ] yhky ∀∈   1,0Pr ,  while ∑
=
=
Y
y
hk
yyy
hkF
1
Prαα . We assume 
[ ] yhky ∀∈   1,0Pr  is a continuous cumulative distribution over ( ) ( )kkhkhkh −−−=Δ tt ,υυυ . 
In other words, from the point of view of candidate k the probability that an individual 
lh ϕ∈  votes for party k is: 
  
      ( ) ( ) ( )( )Pr ,  hk k k hk h k h ky yFα υ υ α− −= −t t t t  lh ϕ∀ ∈                    (3) 
 
 
The function [ ]1,0: →× −kkyhkF ttα  is a continuous cdf relating the policy 
proposals ,k k−t t  with the chance that a consumer h will vote in favor of party k. Parties 
partition the set of H voters into a finite number of groups indexed by lϕ  for 1,2...l M=  
satisfying 1
M
l
l
ϕ =∑ . Let lϕ  be an element of the set of groups of voters Θ  then lϕ  
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represents the fraction of voters h  in group l . The expected proportion of the vote for 
party k is: 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ), Pr , Pr ,
l l l
k k k hk k k l lk k k
y y y
h
EV
ϕ ϕ ϕ
α α ϕ α− − −
∀ ∈Θ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈Θ
= =∑ ∑ ∑t t t t t t      (4) 
 
Parties’ plurality is ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,k k k k k k k k ky y yP EV EVα α α− − − −= −t t t t t tl .13 We 
assume all voters in this economy vote then k kEV EV H−+ = , therefore the objective of 
party k can be re-written as ( ) ( ), 2 ,k k k k k ky yP EV Hα α− −= −t t t tl . Under our 
assumptions, maximizing the expected proportion of the votes is equivalent to maximize 
parties’ expected plurality. In other words parties’ objective can be stated as:14 
 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
{ } ( ){ }1 1 1
 , Pr ,
                  s.t:    ,  :      
k l l
k k k l lk k k l lk l k l k
y y
n Hn c hk k c
i i ii i h
Max EV F
S t R t x
ϕ ϕ
α ϕ α ϕ υ υ− − −
∀ ∈Θ ∀ ∈Θ
− = = =
= = −
∈ = =
∑ ∑
∑ ∑
t
t t t t t t
t t
      (5) 
 
Let the expected proportion of votes over the constrained policy space be concave 
on taxes. The electoral game is  
{ } { }{ }chhclylcckkvhhEC PVFSSCs y l,,,0,,,, ** ∀−∀ Θ∈≥∈∈=Γ ϕααtt  where the 
strategy set vS  contains voters’ decisions with respect consumption and voting behavior 
{ } 1Hh hCs = . The payoff for voters is the sequence of the preference relation 
{ } { }HhhchcHhhcV 11 == += ευ  and candidates’ payoff is the expected plurality function cPl  for 
{ },c k k= − . For a discussion of the conditions that guarantee the existence of the 
electoral equilibrium see Appendix A. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 To define the proportion of the expected vote we assume ( ) ( ), Pr , Pr ,l hk k k lk k ky yh ϕ α α− −∀ ∈ =t t t t . 
14 For simplicity of notation we will refer ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )lk l k l k lk l k l kyF Fυ υ α υ υ− −− = −t t t t . 
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We characterize an equilibrium for ECΓ  as follows: Let the perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium be constituted by strategies { }* 1Hh vhCs S= ∈ , and * *,k k cS− ∈t t  along with the 
system of beliefs [ ]: 0,1lc k kyF α −× →t t   lh ϕ∀ ∈  and lϕ∀ ∈Θ  such that: 
( ) { }
( ) ( )[ ]
[ ] { } [ ] 0 if , ,for     1,0  :    )
       where  )
,for  ,s.t    ,maxarg   )
**
,***
*****
=−=Θ∈∈∀→×
Δ≥−∀=∈−∨∈
−=∈∈
−
−−
−−
hlkklc
hkkhkhkhhh
ckk
y
kkcc
ΔεEkkchFiii
hCsCskCskii
kkcSPi
y φ
ευυ
α
α tt
tt
ttttt l
        (6) 
 
In other words, the notion of the equilibrium derived in (6) implies that the 
process of electoral competition leads parties to propose and implement policies 
*** ttt == −kk  that maximize the expected proportion of the votes (see condition i ), 
given candidates’ system of beliefs on the voting behavior clc yF *, tα   lh ϕ∀ ∈ , lϕ∀ ∈Θ  
and parties’ knowledge of the continuation of the game. By assumption, the information 
set, the systems of beliefs of candidates over the choice of the vote, and the policy space 
are the same for both parties, therefore parties’ platforms at equilibrium will converge.15 
By ( ii ) voters maximize their utility by voting for the party that delivers the highest 
utility. For [ ] 0=hΔεE  and *** ttt == −kk , voters vote for either party with probability 
21  and parties’ proportion of the vote is 21 . In this case, parties’ posterior system of 
beliefs are equivalent to the prior system of beliefs on the distribution of voters’ types 
and their preferences over the policy space (see condition iii). Thus, the perfect Bayesian 
equilibrium in our model is equivalent to a pooling equilibrium in signaling games in 
which the strategies of players do not lead to an update of players’ system of beliefs since 
the strategic behavior do not transmit additional information on players’ type, see Vickers 
(1986). It is easy to see that the individuals’ voting behavior in the third stage do not 
transmit information that leads to an update of parties’ beliefs if parties converge in their 
                                                 
15 By solving the maximization problem in (5) it can be noticed the equivalence of the solution from the 
first order conditions for parties k and –k which imply * * *k k−= =t t t . For formal proofs on convergence see 
Coughlin (1992). 
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tax policies and [ ] 0=hΔεE .  Thus the system of beliefs in (iii) supports the perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium.16 
 
 
Voters’ Preferences over Taxes and the Option of a Tax Rate Limit 
 
 
The analysis in the last section acknowledges a political process in which the 
political participation of individuals is constrained to the vote. In this section we 
introduce the possibility of voters’ initiatives. To do so, we assume several institutions 
including; a mechanism determining how a proposal for a TRL reaches the ballot, the 
type of tax amendments allowed, and the context in which a tax rate limit is voted.17 We 
propose a dynamic game of imperfect information to analyze the proposal, approval and 
effects on government’s behavior of TRL initiatives.  
The dynamic game is shown in Figure 2. In the first stage of the game nature (N) 
moves to show several states y=1,…Y with probability 0 : 1y yyα α∀≥ =∑ , and different 
types of distributions of voters’ preferences { } 1,Hhcy h yυ =  for { },c k k= −  and  
kh
y
hk
y
h
y
−−=Δ ,εεε  for all 1.....h H=  in state of nature 1,2...y Y=  and [ ] 0=hΔεE . 
Nature’s move is common knowledge but an individual voter knows his type 
(preferences). Parties’ uncertainty is reflected as parties’ lack of knowledge of the state of 
nature that depicts the true distribution of voters’ preferences. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 Beliefs will be updated if [ ] 0≠hΔεE . In this case, the proportion of the expected votes of some party k 
or –k  will be higher or lower than 21 . Parties use this information to set 0=yα  for those states in y  such 
that the sequences { } 1,Hhcy h yυ =  for { },c k k= −  and  khyhkyhy −−=Δ ,εεε  do not produce the proportion of the 
votes that parties k and –k receive in the election. 
17 That is, we need to consider whether the tax amendment is voted alone or it is also voted in a general 
election in which parties’ representatives are also on the ballot. 
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Figure 2.  The Game of Voters’ Initiatives 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the second stage, parties, k and –k, select simultaneously policies that 
maximize the expected proportion of parties’ plurality. In the third stage, voters observe 
parties’ proposals and vote for the party advancing the tax policy that leads to voters’ 
highest utility. In the fourth stage of the game, voters propose tax initiatives 
simultaneously. In the essay we assume it is costless to propose tax amendments. For 
simplicity of the analysis we assume that individuals are allowed to propose tax rate 
limits only over an arbitrary tax instrument it . After observing the initiatives advanced by 
voters, the polity chooses by majority rule which initiative (if any) is placed on the ballot. 
We assume that the process of tax initiative selection is common knowledge. 
In the fifth stage voters cast their votes for the tax amendment (if any is placed on 
the ballot). At the final stage, the elected government, within the context of the electoral 
competition and conditioned to a tax rate limit, if approved, will implement the tax 
structure * *,k k−t t  that satisfies party’s objectives. If a tax rate limit is not approved to be 
placed on the ballot by a majority in the fourth stage then the game in Figure 2 is reduced 
to our previous game in Figure 1. In this case *t  is implemented in the last stage of the 
game.  
The structure of the game in stages 4 and 5 is explained by our interest in 
analyzing the information on voters’ preferences over tax policies that is revealed by the 
process of direct voting over tax amendments. Clearly, a TRL approved to be placed on 
the ballot in the fourth stage is a tax amendment approved in the fifth stage. The relevant 
Candidates k and
–k make policy 
proposals:
* *,  k k−t t
N Voters cast 
their votes
for the
initiative
Voters make TRL proposals 
and select if  a TRL  is 
placed on the ballot
The elected party 
Implements the tax 
structure under a 
TRL (if approved){ } 1,
Set of voters' 
preferences  
 under states 0
1
H
h
y h y
y
y
y
h
υ
α
α
=
∀
∀ ≥
=∑
Voters cast 
their votes
for parties 
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is the information conveyed in the selection of the tax rate limit.18 Let’s consider the case 
in which tax structure is defined by two tax instruments. In the second stage parties 
propose * * * * *,k k i jt t−= = = ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦t t t  given ( )* *,i jR R t t= , parties’ beliefs, and the continuation 
of the game. Suppose a tax rate limitation is considered to be placed on the ballot with a 
proposal of fixing *i i it t t= < . First note that tax structure can be defined as a one 
dimensional function since ,     :i j j i jt t R t t t∀ ∈ ∃ →  and thus ( )( ) ( ),i j i iR R t t t R t= = . We 
assume voters’ preferences for tax policy are single peaked. In this case the most 
preferred feasible tax structure for voter h is denoted , ( )h h hh i j it t t= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦t
) ) ) )
 where: 
 
              ( ) ( ){ } ,s.t    , maxarg Rttttt ijijihh ∈∈ υt)   h∀          (7) 
 
In the fourth stage, the set of feasible tax amendments that are expected to receive 
the support of a majority is given by: 19 
 
   
( )( ) ( ){ }
( )
( )( ) ( ){ } ⎪⎭
⎪⎬
⎫
⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≥−
∈∃∀
−∈
=
  0, ,     
  ,  s.t                
, , maxarg  
**
**
ji
h
ij
h
i
iji
jiiji
h
i
tttttEii)
Rttti)
tttttt
d
MVMV
hh
υυ
υυ
                     (8) 
 
Condition ( )i  in set d reflects voter’s expectation on parties’ response to a TRL. 
Condition ( )ii  represents voter’s beliefs that with probability 0≥yα  the median voter in 
state y approves the tax motion.20 Hence, voter’s tax amendment hit  requires the approval 
of the expected median voter of the tax initiatives.  
After observing the set of initiatives, voters vote for tax amendments. By 
construction, it is costless to propose a tax rate limit and voters’ preferences over feasible 
                                                 
18 Note that our model is different to a signaling model in which players update their beliefs after they 
observe the set of signals. In our model, voters’ initiatives signal their preferences, but parties update their 
beliefs based on how individuals votes over the set of initiatives proposed. 
19 Where ( )( ) ( ){ } ( )( ) ( )[ ] 0, , , , **y** ≥−=− ∑∀y jiyhijhiyjihijhi ttttttttttE MVMVMVMV υυαυυ . 
20 Note that the system of beliefs that support the set of tax initiatives is the one dictated by Nature’s move 
in stage one. Beliefs, however, will be updated as voters observe the proportion of the votes received by the 
different tax initiatives. 
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tax systems are single peaked. Consequently, proposals for a TRL will be supplied 
competitively and a majoritarian equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for the mechanism 
dictating the selection of a tax rate limit. In this case the tax amendment selected to be 
placed on the ballot in the fourth stage (and approved in the fifth stage) will be dictated 
by the preferences of the median voter of the proposed tax initiatives (the decisive voter 
of set d). In this case, the median voter selects the feasible tax amendment that induces 
the maximum difference between the utility level set from the (ex-post) tax structure and 
the utility derived from taxes at the status quo. In other words, the median voter selects 
*
i i it t t= ≤  such that: 
 
      { }
( ) ( )
( )
*
* *
0
  , ,
   s.t:   ,  :  / 0
i i i
MV MV MV
i j i jt t t
i j i j i dR
Max t t t t
t t t R dt dt
χ υ υ= ≤
=
= −
∈ ≤
                     (9) 
 
In equation (9) the median voter recognizes that the government will respond by 
changing the unconstrained tax instruments to satisfy the tax revenue objective R . This 
restriction represents the expected reaction function of the government 
( ) :ijj ttt = 0/ 0j i dRdt dt = ≤ . Clearly, a tax rate limit will be put on the ballot and approved 
if and only if: 
 
   
0 0
0
MV
MV MV j j
i j i idR d
dt dtd
dt t dt dt υ
χ υ
= =
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪∂= − ≤⎨ ⎬∂ ⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
    for   
0 0
0
M
j jM
i idR d
dt dt
dt dt υ
γ
= =
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= − ≥⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
      (10) 
 
Which holds when 
00 == −≥− Rdijdij dtdtdtdt MVυ  where 0=− MVdij dtdt υ  is a 
change in the tax structure that keeps the median voter in the same utility level set, and   
0=− Rdij dtdt  is a change in the tax rates of commodities i and j such that the revenue 
requirement R  is satisfied. 
In this economy, a proposal to limit a tax instrument it  will be placed on the 
ballot and approved by the median voter of the tax initiatives when the tax structure at the 
status quo is not equivalent to the most preferred tax structure of the decisive voter. In 
other words, with costless proposals for tax amendments and 2n = , a difference between 
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the tax structure in the status quo and the most preferred policy of the median voter is a 
sufficient condition for proposing and approving a tax rate amendment. The outcome is 
proved in Theorem 1. 
 
Theorem 1. Let the tax structure derived by the process of electoral competition 
in the second stage be given by * * *,i jt t= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦t . Let ( ) ( ) ( )( )
l
MV k l lk lk k l k kF
ϕ
υ ϕ υ υ − −
∀ ∈Θ
≠ −∑t t t , 
where ( )MV kυ t  is the utility of the median voter of the tax initiatives while 
( ) ( )( ),
l
l lk lk k l k kF
θ
ϕ υ υ − −
∀ ∈Θ
−∑ t t  is a politically aggregated welfare function. Under 
costless tax amendments, a tax rate limit *iii ttt ≠=   will be proposed and approved. 
Proof  
In the second stage, ( ) ( )( ) ⎪⎭
⎪⎬⎫⎪⎩
⎪⎨⎧ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=−∈ ∑∑∑
==
−−
Θ∈∀
H
h
h
i
n
i
k
i
kklklklkl xtRF
l 11
*   :s.t  maxarg ttt υυϕ
ϕ
. 
Thus 
0,00, ** =−==−
≠−=
MVijkij d
MV
ttRdijdEV
PW
tt MRTSdtdtMRTS υtt  where 
∑∑
Θ∈∀Θ∈∀=
− =
ll
kij
l
j
lkll
i
lkl
dEV
PW
tt ffMRTS
ϕϕ
υϕυϕ
0,*t
 and MVMV jid
MV
tt ij
MRTS υυυ ==− 0, MV*t  since by 
assumption ( ) ( ) ( )( )
l
MV k l lk lk k l k kF
ϕ
υ ϕ υ υ − −
∀ ∈Θ
≠ −∑t t t .21 Therefore it must be that either 
* *, 0 , 0MVj i j id dR
dt dt dt dtυ = =− > −t t  or * *, 0 , 0MVj i j id dRdt dt dt dtυ = =− < −t t  where 
* , 0j i dR
dt dt =− t  is the government’s reaction to an exogenous change in *it . Without loss 
                                                 
21  To see this, define parties’ problem as 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−+−= ∑∑∑
==
−−
Θ∈∀
− H
h
h
i
n
i
k
i
kklklklklkk xtRFMax
l
k
11
,  λυυϕδ
ϕ
tttt
t
 where λ  is a Lagrange  multiplier. The 
optimality conditions are niRf i
l
i
lkl
l
..2,1  0 =∀=+∑
Θ∈∀
λυϕ
ϕ
 where lklklk Ff υ∂∂= , lililli xt αυυ −=∂∂=  
and  ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ ∂∂+= ∑∑∑
===
H
h
k
i
h
z
n
z
k
z
H
h
h
ii txtxR
111
 is the marginal tax revenue from it . The optimality conditions for tax 
rates i and  j imply jiRRff ji
l
j
lkll
i
lkl
ll
≠∀==∑∑
Θ∈∀Θ∈∀
  0
ϕϕ
υϕυϕ . Define a level set of the expected 
proportion of parties’ vote as 
** , 0, 0 kj i k l l
PW l lk l l lk l
t t j i i jdEVdEV
MRTS dt dt f f
ϕ ϕ
ϕ υ ϕ υ− == ∀ ∈Θ ∀ ∈Θ= − = ∑ ∑tt  and a tax 
revenue level set such that ( ) jiRdijiji RRdtdtRttt =−∈ =0,*:, t . Hence, 
0,00, ** =−==−
≠−=
MVijkij d
MV
ttRdijdEV
PW
tt MRTSdtdtMRTS υtt
. 
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of generality assume 
0,0, ** == −>− Rdijdij dtdtdtdt MV tt υ , therefore ( )* 0MV id dtυ ≤t . By 
the mechanism of the full pairwise comparisons among proposals for a tax structure 
amendment, a proposal  *iii ttt <=  such that:  
           ( ) ( ) ( ){ } 0:,s.t    , , maxarg
0,
**
* ≤∈−=∈ =Rdijijijijii dtdtRtttttttt MVMV tυυ        
Will not be beaten by any other alternative since ii tt =  is a feasible policy 
satisfying 
, 0 ,, 0MVj ii i
MV
j i t tt dR t d
dt dt MRTS υ−= =− = . Now suppose * *, 0 , 0MVj i j id dRdt dt dt dtυ = =− < −t t  
is derived from the initial tax structure, then ( )* 0MV jd dtυ ≥t  and therefore the median 
voter is strictly better off by proposing and approving *iii ttt >=  such that the optimal 
deviation from the status quo satisfies 
, 0 , 0MVj ii i
MV
j i t tt dR t d
dt dt MRTS υ−= =− = . 
 
Theorem 1 says that a tax rate limit in this economy will be cast on the ballot by 
any voter that seeks to reduce the distance between the voter’s most preferred policy 
position and the tax system at the status quo delivered by the electoral competition. 
However, a tax amendment will be approved only if there are gains to be exploited by the 
median voter of the proposed initiatives. 
Note that the electoral competition leads parties to propose and implement a tax 
system that maximizes a politically aggregated welfare function. Thus there might be a 
difference between the most preferred tax structure of the median voter of the tax 
amendments and the tax system that maximizes parties’ expected proportion of the votes. 
This explains why a tax rate limit reaches the ballot in the fourth stage. In the second 
stage, the electoral competition has aggregated the preferences of voters in a different 
way the majority rule does. To be more precise, the majority rule does not consider the 
intensity of voters’ preferences over tax instruments (one man is one vote regardless of 
the intensity of preferences over alternatives) while parties’ competition for votes in the 
electoral game does. This eventually leads to the proposal and approval of a tax rate limit 
in our economy. 
From the construction of our model we can infer that if we assume costly tax 
amendments, a proposal for a tax rate limit would be explained, as before, by the voters’ 
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desire to obtain a policy outcome closer to his most preferred feasible tax structure. 
However the possible proposals for tax limits would correspond only to a subset of the 
set of initiatives d. To see this, let Υ  is a fixed cost of proposing tax initiatives. The set of 
initiatives is { } ( ){ ( )( ) ( ){ } 0, ,      ,  s.t       maxarg ** ≥−∈∃∀Υ−∈= jihijhiijihi tttttEii)Rttti)td MVMVh υυχ  
and }0 ) ≥Υ−hiii χ  where ( )( ) ( )** , , jiijih ttttt hh υυχ −= , condition ( )i  represents the 
voter’s beliefs on parties’ response to a TRL, (ii) is the constraint that an initiative 
requires the support of a majority, and condition 0hχ − ϒ ≥  is a participation constraint. 
Denote hρ  as the Lagrangian for condition (iii)  and re-define { }ˆ h hχ χ= − ϒ  to find the 
set PTI  of tax initiatives that could be placed on the ballot: 
 
 
( ){ } ⎭⎬⎫⎩⎨⎧ ≥∧≤−+∂∂=≤== ==  0ˆ     01ˆ: 00* hdijRdijhihihiiip MVdtdtdtdttdtdtttTI χρυχ υ      (11) 
 
 
It is clear that the higher the costs of proposing tax initiatives the smaller is the set 
of permissible tax amendments PTI . Higher costs of proposing tax initiatives also 
suggests that the set of PTI  will be composed by more stringent tax limits. The approval 
of a tax amendment requires that the marginal rate of tax substitution of the median voter 
be at least as high as the government’s reaction, otherwise the median voter will be better 
off by rejecting the motion. Hence the set of the tax initiatives that could be approved is 
characterized by: 
 
 { }* 0 0:  0MVMV MVhA i i i j i j idR di jdTI t t t dt dt dt dtdt t υχ υ = =⎧ ⎫∂= = ≤ = − ≤⎨ ⎬∂⎩ ⎭        (12) 
 
Hence, a proposal for a tax rate limit that is approved by majority requires: 
 
 
{ }
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧ ≤∧≥≤∩∈≤==−    0ˆ      0ˆ   ,  0ˆ  :  *
i
MV
h
i
h
ApiiiAp dt
d
dt
dTITItttTI χχχ       (13) 
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There might be tax rate limits that fail to satisfy the former condition. For instance 
let Aiipiii TIttTIttt ∉=∧∈≤= * . Thus, *iii ttt ≤=  is proposed but the motion is 
rejected. Alternatively, let Aiipiii TIttTIttt ∈=∧∉≤= *  in this case the median voter 
would benefit from an initiative such that *iii ttt ≤= , however no such amendment is 
proposed.  
To sum up, in our economy with electoral competition under uncertainty and with 
costless tax amendments a tax rate limit is proposed and approved as long as the tax 
structure offered by parties in the context of electoral competition is different to the ideal 
policy of the median voter of the tax initiatives. Our model also suggests that if we 
assume costly tax amendments a proposal for a tax rate limit would be explained by 
voters’ desire to obtain a policy outcome closer to their most preferred feasible tax 
structure. However, under costly tax amendments the set of proposals for tax limits 
corresponds only to a subset of the full rounds of pair wise comparisons. It is easy to see 
that PTI  is a subset with more stringent tax rate limits. From this subset of tax 
amendments only those propositions in which the marginal rate of tax substitution of the 
median voter is actually higher than the government’s reaction function could potentially 
be approved by majority. 
 
 
Effects of a Tax Rate Limit on Government’s Choices and Behavior 
 
 
In this section we analyze the effects of a tax rate limit on government’s behavior. 
In particular, we are interested in the process that delivers the expected tax structure t  
induced by a TRL. We will focus our attention on how the TRL restricts the feasible set 
of tax instruments and how the tax constraint changes the way the electoral competition 
aggregates voters’ preferences. If approved, the tax amendment reduces the strategy set 
since parties will not be able to use the tax instrument it . Thus, the new feasible and 
“constrained,” strategy set for parties k  and k−  is given by ,k k cS S S−′ ′ ′∈ : 
 
( ) ( ){ }0,    , : / / 0 ik k c i j i j i i i jdR tS S S t t t R dt dt t R R− =′ ′ ′∈ = ∃ ∈ = − ≤       (14) 
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Where 0i iR R t= ∂ ∂ ≥  and 0j jR R t= ∂ ∂ ≥  are the marginal tax revenue of changes 
in it  and jt . In addition, in the fourth stage voters vote for the proposed tax initiatives 
and reveal the aggregate proportion of the vote ( ) [ ]1,0∈hpv t  attached to all tax systems 
( )[ ] dttt hijhih ∈=  , t . Thus, the process of voting shows that ( )hitpv  is ½ for ihi tt =  
where it  is the most profitable deviation of the decisive voter, ( )<hitpv ½  ihi tt <∀  and 
i
h
i tt >∀ . The information revealed by the approval of a tax rate limit modifies the 
system of beliefs of parties on how tax policies translate into aggregate votes. Parties set 
a probability ∑∀ =≥= y yyy 1~:  0~ ααα  to all states y in which the distribution of voters’ 
preferences assign the proportion of the aggregate votes ( ) [ ]1,0∈hpv t  dh ∈∀ t  revealed 
by the pair wise comparison of tax initiatives, otherwise parties set 0=yα . Hence the 
probability a voter lh ϕ∈  is now given by ( ) ( ) ( )( )klkllklkk F
l
y
−
Θ∈∀
− −= ∑ tttt υυϕ
ϕ
α ~,rP~ ~  
with ∑
=
=
Y
y
hk
yy
hk
yF
1
Pr~~ ~ αα . Therefore, parties’ problem is to select the tax system that 
maximizes the candidate’s new expected proportion of the votes conditioned to a tax rate 
limit *iii ttt <≤  and the new system, as it is shown in (15): 
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1 1
  
   )                              
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~,~  ~
iii
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h
h
i
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i
klkllklkkk
tttii
xtRi
FVEMax
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− tttt
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υυϕ
ϕ
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                  (15) 
 
 
Restricting our attention, as before, to an economy with two commodities we will 
show that the constrained electoral game in (15) is equivalent to maximize the utility of 
the median voter when the objective of the  collective action is to obtain a tax structure 
such that ,i jt t R∈ . In other words, an approved tax rate limit will be equivalent to a 
change in the weighing factors of the politically determined welfare function such that 
policy is determined by the decisive voter of the set d. This implies that the process of 
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electoral competition in (15) will maximize the utility of the median voter of the tax 
initiatives.  This result is shown formally in Theorem 2.  
 
Theorem 2. Let parties’ choice of tax policies be given by (15) for an economy 
with two tax instruments and under the presence of a tax rate limit *i i it t t≤ < . Therefore, 
the electoral equilibrium delivers the tax structure t  which is equivalent to a policy that 
solves the next problem: 
            { } ( ) ( ), 1 1     . :  )    where  ,i j n Hk h k kMV k ki i i jt t i hMax s t i R t x t tυ = == = ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ ∑t t  
Proof  
From the “constrained” policy set and the electoral competition problem it is clear 
that the solution to (15), denoted by ( ),i j it t t= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦t , is ( )  k ki it t S′∈  for party k. Similarly, 
party k−  selects ( )  k kj it t S− −′∈ . Since ,k k cS S S−′ ′ ′∈  are singleton sets the expected 
proportion of the votes for parties at ( ) j it t  is 
( )( ) ( )( ),  2 ,  
l
k l k
i j i i j iEV t t t EV t t tϕ
ϕ −
∀ ∈Θ
= =∑% %%  implying that parties’ pluralities are 
0k kP P −= =l l .22 
Now consider the “unconstrained” and certain electoral competition problem: 
            { } ( ) ( ), 1 1     . :  )    where  ,i j n Hk h k kMV ki i i jt t i hMax s t i R t x t tυ = == = ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦∑ ∑t t  
Its solution is the ideal tax structure of the median voter * * *,i jt t= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦t
) ) )
. The 
optimality conditions imply MV MVi i j jR Rυ υ=  hence 
* *0, 0,MVii i
j j
i idR t d t
t t
t t υ= =
∂ ∂=∂ ∂) ) . From (9), 
( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * * 0max  , ,   s.t: , : / 0 MV MVi i i j i j i j i j i dRt t arg t t t t t t t R dt dtυ υ == ∈ − ∈ ≤)  then it is 
satisfied  ( )
*
*
0, 0,
:
MVi i
j j
j j i
i idR t d t
t t
t t t t t υ= =
∂ ∂= =∂ ∂ )
) .We conclude, *=t t) . It follows that the 
problem of choosing jt  from the constrained strategy set for parties in (15) is equivalent 
                                                 
22 Note that the strategy sets ( ){ }k k j j iS S S t t t−′ ′ ′= = = =  have a single element that is mapped from the 
revenue function and therefore it, trivially, becomes in the parties’ dominant strategy to a tax rate limit. 
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to the policy chosen by parties seeking to maximize the utility of the median voter over 
the level of public revenue R . 
 
The relevance of Theorem 2 is to show that a binding tax rate limit, effectively, 
modifies the feasible strategy set of the electoral game which, in turn, limits the policy 
outcomes at the equilibrium and regulates the electoral competition. For our two 
commodity economy, a tax rate limit in one tax instrument is equivalent to signal to 
parties that a majority of voters prefers ( ),i j it t t= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦t  over * * *,i jt t= ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦t . Moreover, the 
process of voting for tax initiatives reveals the aggregate proportion of the expected vote 
( ) [ ]1,0∈hpv t  attached to all tax systems ( )[ ] dttt hijhih ∈=  , t . Since in this economy 
there exists a unique Condorcet winner and i it t=  reflects the most preferred feasible 
deviation from the status quo under a competitive process of tax amendment proposals, 
then it must be that i it t=  is the Condorcet winner. The tax rate limit serves as a signal 
that eliminates the uncertainty in the two commodity economy and, consequently, the 
electoral competition seeking to maximize the expected proportion of the votes is reduced 
to a certainty problem in which there exists a Condorcet winner. The electoral 
competition has a unique and stable equilibrium, the policy that maximizes the utility of 
the median voter of the tax initiatives. This implies that the electoral competition problem 
under uncertainty in the “constrained” case, (see equation 15) can be reduced to an 
“unconstrained” maximization problem under certainty in which the objective is to 
maximize the utility of the median voter subject to the satisfaction of the revenue 
objective R . 
Now we proceed to characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which a tax 
rate limit is proposed and approved by a majority in the game with voters’ initiatives.  
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Proposition 1. Let *t  be parties’ tax platform in the second stage of the game. Let 
* *≠t t)  where *t) is the ideal policy of the median voter of the tax initiatives. Then a tax 
rate limit *i i it t t≤ <  will be proposed and approved for the game of voters’ initiatives. 
The perfect Bayesian equilibrium compatible with the approval of a tax amendment is 
constituted as follows: 
i. In the second stage parties select *t : 
 
( ) ( )( ) { } ,   :s.t  maxarg
11
* kkcxtRF
H
h
h
i
n
i
c
i
klkllcl
l y −=∀⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=−∈ ∑∑∑
==Θ∈∀
−ϕ αυυϕ ttt  
and                   
{ } ( ) [ ] ∑∑ ∀= =≥∧∈=−=∧∈∀ • y yylky
Y
y
lk
yy
lcl
yFkkch 1:0    1,0Pr  : Pr   , , 
1
αααϕ α   
 
ii. Voters propose initiatives ht hi     ∀ : 
    
   ( )( ) ( ){ }     , , maxarg ** htttttt jihijihi hh ∀−∈ υυ  
( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ){ } ( )( ) ( )[ ]   0, , , ,   
   and         ,  ,  :     ,                      :s.t 
**
y
** ≥−=−
∈∃∀
∑∀y jiyhijhiyjihijhi
ijiiji
ttttttttttE
Rtttttt
MVMVMVMV υυαυυ  
iii. The median voter approves a tax rate limit *i i it t t≤ <  such that: 
 
 ( )( ) ( ){ } ( ) Rttti)tttttt ijijiijii MVMV ∈−∈   ,  s.t        , , maxarg  **υυ  
iv. Parties’ new system of beliefs after observing ( ) [ ]1,0∈hpv t  dh ∈∀ t  are: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ∑∑ ∀= =∧≥∧≠=∀∧∈∀ ••• y yylclc
Y
y
lk
yy
lcl
yyy FFFch 1~:    0~    
~  : Pr~ ~  ,  ~~
1
αααϕ ααα
 
v. Parties respond to a TRL by selecting ( )[ ]  , iji ttt=t : 
 ( ) ( ) ( )( )∑ Θ∈∀ −−∈ l yklkllij Ftt ϕ αυυϕ ~ ~maxarg  tt   
s.t:  ∈t ( ) ( ){ }0     :  / 0 c i j i j i i dRS t t t R dt dt t =′ = ∀ ∃ ∈ ≤ . 
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Proof  
Let the Lagrangian ( )    ˆ,ˆ cc ∀ttδ be parties’ plurality under ( )[ ]hijikk ttt ˆ ,ˆˆ === − ttt  
such that: 
   
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ){ }{ }
( ) ( ) { }kkcxtRRtttttt
tttttEt
Ft
H
h
h
i
n
i
c
i
h
iji
h
iji
jiijii
klkllcl
j
y
MVMV
yl
−=∀⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=∈∃∀
≥−∈
−∈
∑∑
∑
==
Θ∈∀
−
,     where,ˆˆ ,ˆ  : ˆˆ    ,ˆ         
 0  , ˆˆ,ˆ  maxargˆs.t            
   maxargˆ                    
11
** α
α
υυ
υυϕϕ tt
  
Now let ( ) ( )( ) { } ,   :s.t  maxarg
11
* kkcxtRF
H
h
h
i
n
i
c
i
klkllcl
l y −=∀⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=−∈ ∑∑∑
==Θ∈∀
−ϕ αυυϕ ttt  
which leads to a plurality ( ) cc ∀  , ** ttδ . Adding constraints to the policy space can not 
lead to higher plurality therefore ( ) ( ) ccc ∀≥   ˆ,ˆ, ** tttt δδ  which implies 
( ) ( ) ccc ∀≥   ˆ,ˆˆ,* tttt δδ . This proves that tˆ  can’t belong to a perfect Bayesian equilibrium 
and that parties propose * ttt == −kk  in the second stage of the game given parties’ 
knowledge of the continuation of the game and their system of beliefs. Theorem 1 proves 
condition (iii) holds for an equilibrium in which a tax rate limit is approved. Theorem 2 
also proves that the system of beliefs supporting the equilibrium corresponds to the 
beliefs shown in condition ( )iv . Condition ( )iii  and ( )iv  implies ( )v . 
 
 
Proposition 1 says that parties can minimize the probability that a TRL is 
approved if parties select tˆ . However, parties have no incentive to do so since parties’ 
plurality over a constrained policy space can not be higher than parties’ plurality over an 
unconstrained policy space. Since the election is held before a TRL is approved (rejected) 
then parties have no incentive to constrain their policy prospects to win the election. This 
doesn’t mean that parties will propose any policy, parties maximize their chances to win 
the election if parties propose a policy that weighs voters’ demands for tax structure 
according to voters’ marginal proportion of the expected vote. Any deviation from this 
strategy hurts parties’ chance to win the election in the third stage of the game 
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The hypothesis of tax substitution as the rationale for a TRL leads to the next 
conclusions: First a tax rate limit will be approved over a tax instrument it  if it is 
satisfied:    
 
 ⇒  
0 0MV
j j
i id dR
dt dt
dt dtυ = =
− ≥ −        ⇒     ( )j i j iMVt t t tMRTS Rσ− −≥        (16) 
 
In words, a proposal to limit a tax instrument it  is set on the ballot and receives 
the majority support if the marginal rate of tax substitution of feasible taxes for the 
median voter 
j i
MV
t tMRTS −  (defined as different combinations of ji tt ,  that keep unchanged 
the utility of the voter), is at least as high as the elasticity of substitution of tax revenue 
( )
j it t
Rσ −  which is defined as the rate in which taxes it  and jt  must change in order to 
collect the public revenue R . To see this, note that the reaction function of a tax rate limit 
from the incumbent government is given by 
( )
( ) ( )0 0j iiij i i j t tdR j j
dlnR dtR Rdt dt R R R
R R dlnR dt
σ −=− = = = = ≥
t
t
 where ( )R t  is the tax revenue 
function that collects R . Equation (16) is equivalent to: 
 
  ( ) **        0ij i j i
j
MV
R t jMV MV i
t t MVt t
j iR t
tsMRTS R
s t
εσ γ ε
−
− −
−
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎪ ⎪≥ ⇔ = − ≥⎜ ⎟⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎪ ⎪⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭
                     (17) 
 
Where ( ) ( )RttR iitR i *∂∂=− tε  and ( ) ( )RttR jjtR j *∂∂=− tε  are the elasticities of 
tax public revenue with respect taxes it  and jt , the ratio * *j it t  corresponds to the taxes 
prevailing at the status quo, and  hhzhz Ixs =  is the share of consumption of commodities 
{ }jiz ,=  over voter’s budget. Equation (17) reflects the notion that in our economy the 
approval of a tax rate limit is explained by the effects of a TRL on voters’ budget versus 
the effects of the initiative on tax revenue. The tax substitution hypothesis implies that a 
tax rate limit on it  leads to an increase in jt . There are higher incentives to impose a tax 
rate limit over an arbitrary tax instrument it : 
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(a) The higher is the relative share MVMV ji ss  of consumption of commodity i with 
respect commodity j for the median voter. This is so, since the higher is MVis  the 
more relevant are the voter’s budget effects (gains) from substituting one tax rate 
( it ) for the other ( jt ). 
(b) The lower is the relative ratio of the revenue elasticities of the tax instruments 
i jR t R t
ε ε− − . A lower i jR t R tε ε− − might be related with a higher marginal tax 
revenue that can be collected from an increase in tax rate jt  compared with a 
similar change in tax rate it . Hence, the lower i jR t R tε ε− −  the easier is to 
substitute tax revenue from commodity i to commodity j. 
(c) The broader is the taxable base 
1
H
h
j j
h
X x
=
= ∑  of the tax rate jt . In this case the 
broader the taxable base of the unconstrained tax instruments at the disposal of 
the government, the easier will be to accommodate the revenue loss from a tax 
rate limit over it .
23 
(d) The less broad (or more specific) is the tax base of the tax instrument to be subject 
to the limit (the lower 
1
H
h
i i
h
X x
=
= ∑ ) the higher the gain from the amendment.  A 
possible interpretation is that the lower the tax base of a tax instrument the larger 
is the tax rate associated with each level of revenue to be collected and then the 
larger could be the marginal excess burden associated with the tax instrument. 
                                                 
23 Formally, it can be shown that, ceteris paribus, the taxable base is positively related with the revenue 
elasticity.  
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Therefore there might be possible gains in reducing the inefficiency costs by 
diminishing the dependence in the revenue collection function from, presumably, 
a relatively more inefficient tax instrument. 
 
 
An Economy with n Commodities 
 
In our previous analysis of a two commodity economy, a tax rate amendment in 
one tax is binding since parties observe the aggregate share of the votes attached to the 
tax initiatives. This information allows parties to choose the tax system that is the 
Condorcet winner. A Condorcet winner exists in our economy with 2n =  because from 
the policy space there is a unique function (which is given by ( ) ( ),   : ,i j i i jt t t R R R t t∀ ∃ ∈ = ) 
that reduces the two dimensional policy space into an ordered policy space in one 
dimension. Thus the median policy in one space maps into the median policy of the other 
dimension and vice versa. Note that picking a Condorcet winner, when it exists, is a 
weakly dominant strategy for parties and the approval of a tax rate limit signaled such a 
policy. 
However, in the case in which policy is multidimensional we should ask: What 
drives the response of parties to a tax rate limit? In this section we are interested in this 
question and in analyzing the conditions for the approval of a tax rate limit by a majority 
when policy is multidimensional. However, to keep calculations simple we assume 3n = . 
We proceed to evaluate the conditions in which a tax rate limit would be proposed and 
approved by a majority. Consider the electoral game with voters’ initiatives in Figure 2. 
Let denote [ ]* * * *1 2 3, ,t t t=t  as the tax structure proposed by parties in the second stage of 
the game.  
As before, under the assumption that placing an initiative on the ballot is costless, 
a motion for a change in the tax structure will be proposed as long as there exists voters 
with their most preferred tax structure different to the status quo *t . Suppose that a tax 
rate limitation is placed to be voted with a proposal of fixing the tax rate of commodity i 
at *i i it t t= < .  If approved, the tax rate limit reduces the tax price for voters by 
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diminishing voters’ tax liability from tax instrument i . However, parties will introduce 
some compensating modifications in the rest of tax instruments to satisfy the public 
revenue objective that increase the tax liability of the voter from the unconstrained taxes. 
Thus, the effect of a tax rate limit on the overall tax liability of voters is ambiguous. To 
evaluate more closely this tradeoff, let the ex-post tax structure after the approval of a tax 
initiative be ( ) ( )[ ]2, ,...i i n it r t r t=t  where ( ) 1...... 1j ir t i j n∀ ≠ = −  are the government’s 
response to a tax rate limit. 
A sufficient condition for the approval of a tax rate limit is  a majority of 
individuals such that ( ) ( )*: 0l l lh ϕ υ υ∀ ∈ − ≥t t . Now, let define ( ) [ ]*: , 0,1PΩ →t t  
where Ω  is a continuous, strictly increasing cumulative distribution over the preference 
relation of voters on the policy space, and ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* *,  : 0l l lP h ϕ υ υ= ∀ ∈ − ≥t t t t  is the 
set of voters who prefer t  over an alternative tax system *t .  
  
Theorem 3. Let * n∈ℜt  be the tax structure derived by the process of electoral 
competition in the second stage. Let the tax structure that would prevail if a tax rate limit 
it  were approved be ( ) ( )[ ]2, ,...i i n it r t r t=t  where ( ) for 2,....j j ir t t j n= =  are the 
expected reaction functions derived by the process of electoral competition in the last 
stage of the game with voters’ initiatives. Then, if 
( ) 1 :  1 2
j i
n j i
l
j i t t
r t
l MRTS≠ −
′⎛ ⎞Ω ∀ ≤ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  a tax 
rate limit *iii ttt <≤  will be approved. 
Proof  
Let the set of voters who prefer a tax structure  t  over an alternative tax system 
*t  be given by ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* *,  : 0l l lP h ϕ υ υ= ∀ ∈ − ≥t t t t . A tax rate limit is approved if 
the proportion of individual who are at least as well off under t  compared to *t  
represents a majority. Therefore a sufficient condition for the approval of *i i it t t= <  is: 
                                ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* * 1,  : 2l l lP h ϕ υ υΩ = Ω ∀ ∈ ≥ =t t t t              
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                   ⇒  ( ) ( )
2
1;
*
*
0
=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ =Δ
−∈∀Ω
→Δ
t
tt
i
l
i
ll
t
l
dt
d
t
limh
i
χυυϕ  
With 0* <−=Δ iii ttt  with ii tt = , ( ) ( )*tt lll υυχ −=Δ . From 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* * 1,  : 2l l lP h ϕ υ υΩ = Ω ∀ ∈ ≥ =t t t t  and ( ) ( )[ ]2, ,...i i n it r t r t=t  where 
ijj dtdrr =′ , we obtain: 
       2
1 2 1 1
1 : ..... 0 2
l l l l
n
i n
drdrdl dt t t dt t dt
χ υ υ υ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂ ∂Ω ∀ = + + ≤ =⎜ ⎟∂ ∂ ∂⎝ ⎠  
⇒      ( ) ( )
2
2 1 : 1 ....... 0 2
i n i
l l i n il
l l
i i t t t t
r t r tdh dt t MRTS MRTS
χ υϕ
− −
′ ′⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤∂Ω ∀ ∈ = − − − ≤ =⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥∂ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠
 
Where lj
l
i
l
tt ij
MRTS υυ−=− .  Note 0l itχ∂ ∂ ≤ , since nittlli ..1   0 =∀≤∂∂= υυ  
then  
( )
1    0
j i
n j i l
il
j i t t
r t
tMRTS χ≠ −
′ ≤ ⇔ ∂ ∂ ≤∑ . Therefore: 
( ) 1 :  1 2
j i
n j il
l
j i t t
r t
h MRTSϕ ≠ −
′⎛ ⎞Ω ∀ ∈ ≤ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑     
 
It is left to prove that the condition above identifies a Condorcet winner for the 
process of tax amendments and that the motion is approved by a strict majority. We 
proceed by letting condition
( ) 1 :  1 2
j i
n j il
l
j i t t
r t
h MRTSϕ ≠ −
′⎛ ⎞Ω ∀ ∈ ≤ =⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  to hold. Now, let parties 
propose *t  in the first stage of the game. A voter lh ϕ∈  will propose a tax amendment 
such that ( ) ( )( ) ( ){ }*2arg max , ,..l l li i i n it t r t r tυ υ∈ − t  subject to ( )( ) 21, * =Ω yP αtt  where 
( )*lυ t  is given and ( ) ( )[ ]2, ,...l l ll i i n it r t r t=t  is the most profitable deviation from the 
status quo that receives the support of a majority given the system of beliefs of voter type 
l . As before, voters propose simultaneously their tax initiatives. 
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Let { }min 1Mli i lt Min t ==  and { }max 1Mli i lt Max t ==  then define d  as an ordered set 
representing the ideal deviations from the status quo that will be voted in the fourth stage 
of the game. That is, 
[ ] ( ) ( ){ } ( )( ){ } 21,s.t     maxarg :, , **maxmin =Ω−∈∈∃Θ⊂∈∀= ylllliiilil Ptttthd αυυϕ tttt . 
Let ( )liT t  be the set of voters with their most preferred tax policy amendment less than 
l
it d∈ , that is ( ) dtT li ⊆ . Let ( )( )min 0iT tΩ ≈ , ( )( )max 1iT tΩ = , and 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* * 1,  : 2l l lP h ϕ υ υΩ = Ω ∀ ∈ ≥ =t t t t   implies, ( )( ) 1 2TΩ =t . Now let there 
exists any two alternatives ,l d′ ∈t t  to be confronted such that 
  :  l l li i i it t t t′ ′ ′∈ ∧ ∈ <t t . Since Ω  is a continuous and a strictly increasing function 
then ( )( ) ( )( ) 1 2lT T′Ω < Ω =t t  hence the proportion of voters who prefer t  to l′t  is 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )max 1, 2 2 ll iP T t T T⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞′+Ω =Ω −Ω + Ω⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
t tt t t  similarly the proportion of voters 
who prefer l′t  to t  is ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )min 1, 2 2 ll l iP T T t T⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞′+′ ′Ω = Ω −Ω + Ω⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦t tt t t . Hence, 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1, , 1 02l l l lP P T T T′ ′ ′ ′Ω −Ω = −Ω −Ω = −Ω >t t t t t t t  and 
( )( ) ( )( ), ,l lP P′ ′Ω >Ωt t t t  therefore the proposal t  wins over any proposal l′ <t t . Thus, 
if * l= ≤′t t t  then t  wins over *t  by majority. 
Now let proposals l d′ ∈t  and t  be confronted where l′ >t t  means 
( )( ) ( )( ) 1 2lT T′Ω > Ω =t t  since Ω  is strictly increasing. Now the proportion of voters 
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who prefer t  to l′t  are  ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )min 1, 2 2 ll iP T T t T⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞′+′Ω = Ω −Ω + Ω⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦t tt t t  
and those who prefer l′t  to t  are ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )max 1, 2 2 ll liP T t T T⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞′+′ ′Ω =Ω −Ω + Ω⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦t tt t t  
thus: 
     ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )min, , 1 2 0l l l liP P T T t T T′ ′ ′ ′Ω −Ω =Ω −Ω +Ω =Ω − >t t t t t t t  
Therefore ( )( ) ( )( ), ,l lP P′ ′Ω > Ωt t t t and the alternative t  wins over any other 
proposal l′ >t t . Thus, if * l≥ ′t t  is confronted with t  , then policy t  wins by  majority. 
We conclude t  wins the pairwise voting rounds for tax initiatives and hence it is 
the Condorcet winner for the process of finding tax amendments that provides profitable 
deviations from the status quo. 
 
Condition 
( )
1≤′∑
≠ −
n
ij
l
tt
ij
ij
MRTS
tr
 in Theorem 3 is the general statement for 2n >  of 
our conclusion in the previous section that a proposal for a tax rate limit will receive 
voters’ support if and only if the marginal rate of tax substitution 
j i
l
t tMRTS −  for a voter h  
in group l   is at least as high as the  expected government’s reaction j idr dt . Condition 
(T.3.2) generalizes our previous finding and implies that the sum of the ratios between 
the reaction functions  j idr dt  over the j i
l
t tMRTS −   i j∀ ≠  must be less than one in order 
a voter prefers the tax structure ( ) ( )[ ]2, ,...i i n it r t r t=t  with *i i it t t= <  to the status quo.24 
Condition (T.3.2) also says that the approval of 1 1it t t= =  by majority reflects the most 
preferred feasible deviation from the status quo under a competitive process of tax 
amendment proposals. Therefore it must be that i it t=  is the Condorcet winner of the 
feasible deviations from the status quo.  
                                                 
24 Note that the condition (T.3.2) for 2n =  reduces to equation (10). 
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Now we proceed to characterize the reaction functions of the government 
( ) ( )2 ,...i n ir t r t  that are derived as a result of the approval of a tax rate limitation in the last 
stage of the game. We start with the effects of the tax motion on the policy strategy set. 
By definition the unconstrained policy space is ( ) 31 2 3, ,R R t t t= ∈ℜ , the approval of a tax 
rate limit on a tax instrument implies that the policy space is reduced to 
( ) ( )( )2 1 3 1 1 1,R R r t r t t t= = . The expression means that, conditional to 1 1it t t= = , taxes 
2 2 3 3 t r t r= ∧ =  must satisfy the public revenue objective R . The “constrained” strategy 
set for parties k  and k− , when 1it t= , is given by ,k k cS S S−′ ′ ′∈ : 
 
    ( ) ( )( ){ }1 2 3 2 1 3 1 1 1,  , , : ,  k k cS S S t r r R R r t r t t t−′ ′ ′∈ = ∀ = =        (18) 
 
If the tax rate limit is approved for 3n = , the parties’ problem is: 
 
              
{ } ( ) ( ) ( )( )
*
1 1
  
   )   ,2for       )   :s.t  
~~,~  
32
iii
n
i
H
h
h
i
k
i
klkllkl
y
kkk
,tt
tttiinxtRi
FVEMax
l
kk
<≤=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
−=
∑ ∑
∑
= =
−
Θ∈∀
− tttt υυϕα
ϕ
                     (19) 
 
 
In (19) we write ( ) ( ) ( )( )klkllklykkk FVE
l
−
Θ∈∀
− −= ∑ tttt υυϕα
ϕ
~~,~   to distinguish the 
candidate’s new system of beliefs with respect the voting behavior. The optimality 
conditions for (19) are given by:25 
 
   
( )
( )
( ) ( )
2 2 2 2 1
3 3 3 3 1
1
1 1
0      0         
0      0         
0        0               
l
l
ll lk
ll lk
n H
h
i i
i h
F R r t
F R r t
t x R t
ϕ
ϕ
λ
δ ϕ υ λ
δ ϕ υ λ
δ λ
∀ ∈Θ
∀ ∈Θ
= =
′= ⇒ + = ⇒
′= ⇒ + = ⇒
= ⇒ − = ⇒
∑
∑
∑ ∑%
% %%
% %%
% %
                 (20) 
 
                                                 
25 Where ( )2 3, , ir r tδ λ%  is the constrained objective function in (19) and   for 2,3j jt jδ δ= ∂ ∂ =% % . 
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Where 
1
hnH H
zh
j j z
h z hj j
xRR x tt t=
⎛ ⎞∂∂= = + ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑  is the marginal revenue from tax on 
commodities 2,3j = , for 2,3
l
ll lk
jF jϕ
ϕ υ
∀ ∈Θ
′ =∑ %  is the marginal expected votes, λ%  is the 
marginal political cost of relating for one unit the public budget constraint, and 
( ) ( )2 1 3 1 and  r t r t  are the reaction functions to a tax rate limit.  Let 1it t=  and use implicit 
differentiation to obtain the reaction functions 2 1dr dt  and 3 1dr dt :
26 
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R R R R R R Rdr
dt
δ δ δ δ
δ δ δ δ
− − += Δ
− + += Δ
% % % %
%
% % % %
%
       (21) 
 
 
In (21) the sign of the reaction function will depend of the nature of the 
relationship between commodities 1 2 3,  and l l lx x x  (that is on the sign of 2ji j it tδ δ= ∂ ∂ ∂% % ). 
To evaluate the sign of the reaction functions we follow Feldstein (1972a, 1972b), 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976, 1980) and assume that the demand of commodities are price 
independent (cross price effects are zero). Hence we obtain:  
 
    
( )
( )
2 2
2 1 3 332 1 332
33
1
2 2
3 1 2 223 3 1 22
22
1
0       for 0
0       for 0
k
k
R R EV t RR Rdr
dt
R R EV t Rdr R R
dt
λδ δ
λδ δ
∂ ∂ += = ≤ ≤Δ Δ
∂ ∂ += = ≤ ≤Δ Δ
%%% %% %
%%% %% %
     (22) 
 
 
Since the expected votes function on the constrained policy space is strictly 
concave then it follows ( ) ( )2 22 33 3 22 0R Rδ δΔ = − − >% %% , 2 233 3 33kEV t Rδ λ= ∂ ∂ +% %%  and 
2 2
22 2 22
kEV t Rδ λ= ∂ ∂ +% %%  which means that 33( )sign δ%  and ( )22sign δ%  imply, respectively, 
2 1( )sign dr dt  and 3 1( )sign dr dt . Equations (22) say that provided that the change in the 
marginal expected proportion of the votes is non increasing as we increase tax rates  
                                                 
26 For the details of the calculation see Appendix B. 
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( ) ( )2 1 3 1 and  r t r t  (in other words provided that 33 220 and  0δ δ≤ ≤% % ), a government 
seeking to maximize the expected votes will respond to a tax rate limit by increasing the 
tax rates at their disposal, namely ( ) ( )2 1 3 1 and r t r t , to satisfy the aimed public revenue 
collection R . 
Not surprisingly, the reaction function of parties ( ) ( )2 1 3 1 and r t r t  weigh the 
public revenue effects of increases of tax rates ( ) ( )2 1 3 1 and r t r t  with its political costs 
(measured by 2 2 3kEV t∂ ∂% , and 2 2 2kEV t∂ ∂%  in equation 22). From the discussion above  
the reaction functions can lead in a more intensive use of tax 2r  compared with 3r  ( or 
( ) ( )2 1 3 1r t r t≥  ), as a result of the approval of a tax amendment if:  2 3R R≥  and/or if the 
relative marginal expected votes lost, as we increase tax rates  ( ) ( )2 1 3 1 and  r t r t ,  is 
smaller  for 22δ%  relative to 33δ% .27 In both cases, a more intense increase in  2r  compared 
with 3r  would reflect that marginal political costs per revenue collected over the 
unconstrained taxes are equalized. 
The discussion above formalizes the tradeoffs of the response of parties to a tax 
initiative. Now we are interested in the effect of a tax rate limit on the aggregation of 
preferences from voters. As mentioned before, a tax rate limit reduces the electoral 
competition to the problem depicted in equation (19). The objective function kEV%  
reflects the new expected proportion of votes (or candidates’ updated beliefs on the 
voting behavior) over the constrained policy space ( ) ( )( ) 22 1 3 1 1 1,R R r t r t t t= = ∈ℜ . As it is 
shown by Theorem 3, the process of voting for tax amendments reveals the aggregate 
proportion of the votes attached to the set of tax initiatives d. Parties update their system 
of beliefs by setting  ∑∀ =≥ y yy 1~:0~ αα  to all states of nature in which the distribution 
of voters’ preferences assign the proportion of the aggregate votes revealed by the pair 
wise comparison of tax initiatives, otherwise parties set 0=yα . The new system of 
beliefs leads to a probability a voter lh ϕ∈  votes for party k  (for kk −tt  and ) given by 
                                                 
27 The smaller is 22δ  relative to 33δ  implies that the lower is the rate of change in the marginal expected 
proportion of the votes as there are changes in the tax instrument ( )2 1r t  compared with ( )3 1r t . 
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( ) ( ) ( )( )klkllkykklk F −− −= tttt υυα ~~,rP~ . This implies that in the new politically aggregated 
welfare function kEV%  parties assign a higher weight to the preferences of those 
individuals in the majoritarian coalition approving the tax rate limit (compared with the 
weight assigned to those voters in the expected votes function kEV ). The outcome is 
proved in Theorem 4. 
 
Theorem 4. A tax rate limit regulates government’s behavior by designating a 
higher weight in the politically aggregated welfare function to those voters expected to 
belong to the majoritarian coalition approving the tax limit. Let l l lkfω ϕ=  be the weight 
assigned to the preferences of voter type l in the second stage of the game, and 
lll f~~ ϕω =  is the new weight assigned to  voter type l after a TRL is approved. Therefore 
( ) lll Phh ωωϕ  ~   ,, : * ≥∈∈∀ tt . 
Proof  
In the first stage, the optimality conditions of party’s problem imply 
*0 
l
ll lk
j j jf R tϕ
ϕ υ λ
∀ ∈Θ
+ = ∀∑  where lk lkF f′ = . The weight assigned to the voter type l in 
determining party’s tax policies is given by l l lkfω ϕ= .28 In the third stage, parties 
observe the aggregate proportion of the votes attached to all policies  
( )( ) ,: ll Pd ttt Ω∈∀  where t  is the initiative winning the full round of pair wise 
comparisons. The approval of the tax rate limit *i i it t t= < ⇒ ( )( )* 1 , 2P∃ Ω =t t  . 
Therefore: 
( ) ( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )* * * * ; , :  :   , :l l l l l l k l k l k l kh h P l l Pϕ ϕυ ϕυ υ υ υ υ− −∃ ∈ ∈ ∀ ≥ ⇒∀ ∈ − ≥ −t t t t t t t t t t  
Let the new system of beliefs of parties ∑∀ =≥ y yy 1~:0~ αα  leads to a non 
decreasing cumulative distribution function given by ( ) yF α~~ • . Hence, 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )klklklkll FFPhh −− −≥−∈∈∀ tttttt υυυυϕ ** ~~  :, ;  k kS− −′∀ ∈t . Since 
                                                 
28 By definition, l l lkfω ϕ=  is the marginal proportion of the expected vote from voters type l .The higher 
lω  the more effective voters type l  are to influence parties. Hence, the higher lω , the closer is the policy 
position taken by parties to the ideal policy position of voter l. 
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( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* *l k l k l k l kF Fυ υ υ υ− −− = −t t t t% , ( )*,  ,lh h Pϕ∃ ∈ ∈ t t  and lkF EV∈% % ∧  
lkF EV∈  such that ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )*lk l k l k lk l k l kF Fυ υ υ υ− −− ≥ −t t t t% . Hence it is satisfied  
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )* *,  , :  l lk l k l k lk l k l kh l P f fϕ υ υ υ υ− −∀ ∈ ∈ − ≥ −t t t t t t%  k kS− −′∀ ∈t  which 
implies l lω ω≥% . 
 
 
 
We conclude that a tax rate limit also affects the objective function of the 
electoral competition game by modifying candidates’ beliefs on the voting behavior 
which is the mechanism that regulates the electoral competition. Thus a tax rate limit 
“regulates” the government’s behavior by changing the process in which the electoral 
competition aggregates voters’ preferences. In particular, voters approving the tax rate 
limit will be assigned a higher weight in the politically aggregated welfare function. This 
suggests that a government with election concerns will be more responsive to those 
individuals who are expected to have supported the tax amendment. 
Now we will proceed to characterize the perfect Bayesian equilibrium in which a 
tax rate limit is proposed and approved by a majority. 
 
 
Proposition 2. Let *c n∈ℜt  for n>2, be the tax structure derived by the process of 
electoral competition in the second stage. In the game of voters’ initiative, a tax rate limit 
* iii ttt <≤  is approved and leads to ( ) ( )[ ]2, ,...i i n it r t r t=t  if the following is satisfied: 
i.  Parties propose * * *k k−= =t t t  in the second stage of the game,  where: 
 
   ( ) ( )( ) { } ,   :s.t  maxarg
11
* kkcxtRF
H
h
h
i
n
i
c
i
klkllcl
l y −=∀⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=−∈ ∑∑∑
==Θ∈∀
−ϕ αυυϕ ttt  and                   
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ii.  Voters propose initiatives ht hi     ∀ : 
 
           ( ) ( ){ } httttt jinihi hh ∀−∈    , ,...... maxarg    **υυ  
   ( ){ } ( )( )  21 ,   and         :s.t * =Ω= ≠ yijijj Ptrr αtt  
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 where ( )  j j ir r t j i= ∀ ≠  are the expected best responses of parties to a tax rate limit. 
iii.  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * *1 : ,  where , =  :   2l l lh P P lϕ υ υ∃ ∈ Ω = ≥t t t t t t   
iv.  Parties’ new system of beliefs are: ( ) { } :1 ~ 0~  ,, , ;  * =∧≥−=∧∈∈∃ ∑∀Y yyl kkcPhh ααϕ tt  
   ( ) ∑
=
=•
Y
y
lk
yyy
lcF
1
Pr~~ ~ αα   implying   l lω ω≥%  
v.  In the final stage, parties respond to a TRL by selecting ( ){ }    
ijijj
trr ≠= where: 
 
        ( ) ( ) ( )( )∑ Θ∈∀ −−∈ l yklkllij Ftr ϕ αυυϕ ~ ~maxarg tt   
 s.t:  ( ){ } ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=∈= ∑∑
==≠
H
h
h
j
n
j
c
jijijji
xtRRtrrt
11
:  ,  for 2>n , c∀  and  * iii ttt <≤  
Proof  
Condition ( )i  follows from the proof in proposition 1. Theorem 3 proves 
conditions ( )ii  and ( )iii . Theorem (4) shows condition ( )iv  holds for an equilibrium in 
which a tax amendment is approved. Condition ( )iv  implies ( )v . 
 
 
We summarize our findings. We have extended the analysis made in Theorems 1 
and 2. Theorem 3 provides a sufficient condition for the approval of a tax rate limitation 
when tax initiatives are costless and policy is multidimensional. We have concluded that 
a proposal for a tax rate limit will receive the support from a majority if the sum of the 
ratios between the reaction functions  j idr dt  over the j i
l
t tMRTS −   2.....i j n∀ ≠ =  is less 
than one for a majority. The result is the equivalent statement to our previous finding 
that, in order a voter h supports a tax rate limit, the marginal rate of tax substitution 
j i
l
t tMRTS − for voter h  in group l   must be at least as high as the government’s reaction 
function j idr dt . 
Theorem 1 is extended when policy is multidimensional. The approval of a tax 
rate limit by a majority reflects the most preferred feasible deviation from the status quo 
under a competitive process of tax amendments. Theorem 3 shows that i it t=  (if 
approved) is the Condorcet winner of the feasible alternatives to deviate from the status 
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quo. Also, we argue that Theorem 2 does not carry out for an economy with 2n > . In 
other words, the conclusion that a tax rate limit regulates the electoral competition as to 
aggregate the votes as if one man equals one vote regardless of the intensity of his 
preferences (which follows from the outcome that the median voter determines the design 
of public policy) does not hold for 2n > . It must be clear that as we increase the 
dimensions of the policy space (as n  becomes larger) a tax rate limit becomes less 
influential in constraining the policy space and in regulating the process of aggregation of 
voters’ preferences for tax policy. In short, as n  becomes larger the tax rate limit might 
not be binding. Finally we have shown that under the assumption that the demand of 
commodities is independent, the expected reaction function of parties to a tax rate limit is 
to increase tax rates ( ) ( )2 1 3 1 and  r t r t . By so doing, parties weigh the extra tax revenue 
collected from increases in ( ) ( )2 1 3 1 and  r t r t  with their political cost derived in a fall in 
the expected proportion of the votes.  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This essay incorporates into the analysis of tax design the constitutional provision 
that allows voters to propose tax initiatives. In particular, we focus our analysis on 
initiatives known as tax rate limits. The objective of the essay is to study why tax rate 
limits are placed on the ballot, what explains the approval/rejection of the initiatives and 
which are the effects of tax amendments on the behavior of the government.  
We argue that a tax rate limit is likely to arise as a result of two institutions with 
different mechanisms to aggregate voters’ preferences. We develop a probabilistic model 
of electoral competition that determines the tax system by aggregating the preferences of 
all voters in the electorate. That is, the tax system at the status quo is the result of parties 
weighing the conflicting demands of individuals over policy according to voters’ 
marginal propensity of the vote. However, the majority rule (in our model, the institution 
that dictates if a TRL is approved/rejected) aggregates the preferences of the decisive 
voter of the process of tax initiatives. Thus, the tax system at the status quo might be 
different to the ideal policy of the median voter of the tax initiatives. A TRL is approved 
if the decisive voter prefers the tax system that would arise as a result of the tax rate limit 
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compared with the tax structure at the status quo. The approval of the motion, however, 
does not necessarily imply that voters are unsatisfied with the size of the budget or that 
voters question the efficiency of the government to transform public revenues into 
services.29  
Empirical evidence suggests that voters’ initiatives did not affect the size of the 
government but changed the tax structure of state and local governments. Assuming one 
single unit of government, we provide a model that explains the change of tax structure 
due to the approval of a TRL. In our model, the size of the government remains 
unchanged even when parties react in a countercyclical manner to a tax amendment. The 
approval of a tax rate limit induces parties to increase the reliance of the tax system on 
the unconstrained taxes to maintain unchanged tax revenue collection. The model 
suggests that parties change unconstrained taxes as to equalize the expected marginal 
proportion of the votes per dollar collected by the unconstrained tax instruments. 
In our analysis, a proposal for a TRL is placed on the ballot by a coalition of 
voters who seek to obtain a tax structure that is closer to their most preferred feasible 
policy. A TRL will be approved if the marginal rate of tax substitution of the decisive 
voter (defined as the rate at which a voter changes tax structure while keeping his utility 
constant) is at least as high as parties’ reaction functions (or changes in the unconstrained 
tax instruments as a result of the approval of a TRL). The hypothesis of tax substitution 
suggests that a tax rate limit is more likely to be approved when the government can 
easily substitute public revenue from the tax instrument subject to the tax limit.30 The 
theory also suggests that individuals with a higher share of consumption of the 
commodity subject to the tax rate limit are more likely to approve the motion. 
In previous works a tax rate limit has been regarded as a constraint on the budget 
set for the government. We show that a tax rate limit also modifies the way parties 
aggregate voters’ preferences for policy since a tax rate limit changes parties’ beliefs on 
how tax policy proposals translate into votes. The approval of a tax rate limit signals to 
parties that a majority of voters is expected to be better off under a tax structure that is 
                                                 
29 These two arguments have dominated the discussion of the rationale for a tax rate limit. 
30 Assume it  is subject to a TRL. The degree of substitution of tax revenue is higher when the ratio of the 
revenue elasticities of tax instruments it  and jt  is lower, the broader is the taxable base for jt , and the less 
broad is the taxable base for it . 
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different to the status quo. After observing a tax rate limit is approved, parties update 
their beliefs on how tax policies might translate into votes. This, in turn, affects the way 
parties aggregate voters’ preferences for tax policies. The change in the way parties 
aggregates voters’ interests tends to accommodate the approval of the tax initiative. 
Hence, the model suggests that governments with electoral constraints will not go against 
the sentiment expressed by voters on the ballot. This may help to explain why tax 
initiatives might be long lived. 
We distinguish between binding and non binding tax rate limits. A binding tax 
rate limit will restore the equilibrium of the median voter when policy is one-
dimensional. In this case, the equilibrium of the median voter was initially disturbed by 
parties’ imperfect information on voters’ preferences. A binding tax rate limit serves as a 
signal to eliminate the uncertainty related with voters’ preferences therefore parties 
accommodate unconstrained tax revenue to deliver the ideal policy of the median voter of 
the tax initiatives. A non binding tax rate limit is related with the dimensions of the tax 
structure. It should be clear that as we increase the dimensions of tax policy, a tax rate 
limit becomes less influential in constraining the policy space and in regulating the 
process of aggregation of voters’ preferences. In short, as the dimensions of policy 
increase, a tax rate limit will not be binding. 
Our framework leads to some policy implications on tax and expenditure 
limitations. Our model suggests that the success of a tax and expenditure limitation rely 
heavily on the differences of the processes determining the tax structure at the status quo 
and the one determining the approval/rejection of a tax amendment. The lower the cost of 
placing initiatives on the ballot the higher the likelihood of a tax rate limit. This might 
explain why tax amendments are so prevalent across state and local governments. 
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ESSAY II:  PUBLIC GOODS AND TAX STRUCTURE UNDER VOTERS’ 
PARTISAN ATTITUDES AND DOWNSIAN ELECTORAL COMPETITION 
 
In the theory of elections, public policy is the outcome of the strategic interaction 
between policy makers (parties) and the electorate. The leading paradigm advanced by 
Downs (1957) assumes, among other things, that parties are teams selecting policy to win 
the election, parties have perfect information on voters’ preferences, voters vote for the 
party advancing the platform that is closer to voters’ ideal policy, and policy has one 
dimension.31 Romer (1975, 1977), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richards (1981, 
1983) apply the Downs model to the analysis of tax design. They predict that parties 
converge in their fiscal policies, and the tradeoff between political redistribution and 
efficiency is determined by the tastes of the median voter and the deadweight costs of 
taxation. 
The hypothesis of convergence of parties’ policies is under debate. Reed (2006), 
Alt and Lowry (2001), Caplan (2001) and Rogers and Rogers (2000) find evidence that 
state taxes increase when Democrats have significant control of the legislative bodies of 
state governments. Fletcher and Murray (2006) find that party control is positively 
associated with higher top income tax rates, higher income threshold for the first bracket 
of the income tax, and Democrat administrations lead to higher earned income tax 
credits. Chernick (2005) finds that party control by Republicans is associated with more 
regressive state tax structures. Caplan (2001) finds that corporate and income taxes tend 
to rise under Democrat control of state legislatures and fall with larger Republican 
                                                 
31 Other assumptions include: voters’ preferences are singled peaked, all voters vote, Parties are free to 
choose platforms at any point along the preference distribution, parties choose platforms simultaneously, 
and barriers of entry for new parties are infinite. For a discussion of the models’ set up see Riker and 
Ordeshook (1973). 
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majorities. Blomberg and Hess (2003) find evidence that productive federal spending 
(spending net of transfers) and federal taxes increase in the second and third years of 
Democrat administrations. Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) find that federal budget 
deficits are higher under Republican governments although they also find that parties 
converge in their federal spending on personal transfers. 
In the Downs model, the formation of public policy is analyzed under the 
assumption that citizens vote for the party proposing the policy platform that is closer to 
voters’ views. In contrast to the Downsian assumption that voting is policy oriented, the 
literature on voting behavior suggests that the choice of the vote is explained (among 
other things) by policy issues and partisan attitudes (see Downs, 1957; Campbell et al., 
1960; Miller & Shanks, 1996; Fiorina, 1997).32 The evidence on voting behavior also 
indicates that voters’ partisan attitudes are the best predictor of the choice of the vote 
(Republican voters tend to vote for the Republican party), see Campbell et al. (1960), 
Miller and Shanks (1996), Niemi and Weisberg (2001), Bartels (2000). Finally, the 
evidence from the American national election studies (ANES) shows that the vast 
majority of the American electorate has a partisan preference.33 Therefore, if the 
distribution of votes is also explained by voters’ attitudes and parties design policies to 
win elections then what is the impact of voters’ loyalties on tax design?  
In addition, the prediction that parties select the ideal policy of the median voter 
does not hold when we relax the assumption of parties’ perfect information on voters’ 
preferences. In the probabilistic voting theory (PVM), parties have imperfect information 
                                                 
32 Voters’ partisan attitudes are defined as voters’ self identification (or lack of it) with some party. 
33 Data from the ANES suggests that, for the period 1952-2004, the average proportion of voters identified 
as Democrats is 52%, 35% regard themselves as Republicans, 11% as independents and the rest as 
apoliticals. 
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and select the policy that maximizes the preferences of all voters in the electorate. In this 
setting, the aggregation of the conflicting preferences of all voters is central to explain the 
design of public policies.34  The emphasis of ongoing research under the PVM is on 
identifying coalitions of voters (and pressure groups) that can, systematically, influence 
spending and tax policies, see Hettich and Winer (1997, 1999), Hotte and Winer (2001), 
Coughlin, et al. (1990a, 1990b). Moreover, in the PVM, to the best of my knowledge, 
there is an open question on the roles that redistributive politics and efficiency play on 
guiding the design of tax rules for an economy with electoral constraints when policy is 
multidimensional and there is political-economic heterogeneity.35  
To sum up, the stylized facts suggest that parties’ policies do not converge and the 
individuals’ choice of the vote is explained by policy issues and voters’ partisan attitudes. 
Moreover, many researchers have emphasized that the heterogeneity of voters’ 
preferences helps to explain the design of spending and tax policies. The objective of this 
essay is to provide a model of electoral competition that explains tax policy and 
incorporates that the choice of the vote is explained by voters’ loyalties and policy issues. 
Furthermore, we provide a characterization of the tradeoff between redistributive politics 
and efficiency for an economy with electoral constraints when policy is multidimensional 
and there is political-economic heterogeneity. 
The argument put forward in this essay is that voters’ partisan preferences 
influence the design of tax policy through two different channels.  First, voters’ attitudes 
                                                 
34 Empirical analysis by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), Gramlich and Rubinfeld (1982), Borcherding and 
Holsey (1997), Dickson and Yu (2000), Reed (2006), among many others, find evidence that variables 
reflecting the composition of the electorate (such as the distribution of voters’ age, gender, education, 
ethnic and religious background) explain the demand for public services and tax revenue. In other words, 
evidence suggests that heterogeneity of voters’ preferences is an important determinant of fiscal policies. 
35 By political heterogeneity we mean voters with different propensities to vote for the 
Democrat/Republican party. By economic heterogeneity we mean voters with different preferences over 
policies and/or endowments. 
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affect the way parties aggregate the demands of voters over policy. That is, if a party 
designs fiscal policies to maximize the expected votes in an election then the party has 
incentives to weigh (aggregate) voters’ preferences over policy according to voters’ 
propensity to vote for the party. Since the partisan attitude is highly correlated with the 
individuals’ choice of the vote, then the party identification of voters will affect the 
aggregation of voters’ preferences and the design of public policy. Second, the 
distribution of the partisan identification in the electorate affects the relative political 
influence of voters by changing the expected votes that different coalitions of voters 
(Democrats, Republicans, Independents) can deliver in the election. 
In our probabilistic voting model, the preferences of voters in the electorate 
explain the roles that redistributive politics and efficiency play on tax design.36 Our 
Downsian model suggests that, even if parties are only concerned with winning the 
election, each party will weigh differently the demands of the same electorate (due to 
voters’ partisan attitudes) and therefore the fiscal platforms of parties will, in general, 
diverge.37 Thus, our model is different from other studies of electoral competition in 
which parties’ lack of convergence is explained by assuming that parties have preferences 
over policy outcomes  (see Roemer, 1997, 1999, 2001). 
If parties believe that voters with partisan loyalties deliver the highest marginal 
proportion of the expected votes then the Democrat (Republican) party weighs more 
heavily the demands of, correspondingly, Democrat (Republican) voters. Data from the 
American National Election Studies suggests that Democrat voters prefer higher public 
spending compared with the ideal spending of Republican voters. Moreover, individuals 
                                                 
36 In other words, our analysis is different from other Downsian applications of tax design since in our 
setting there is no decisive voter but policy is the outcome of the preferences of the whole electorate. 
37 Still, we characterize some sufficient conditions that guarantee the convergence of parties’ policies. 
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in the lowest ranks of the distribution of income are identified as Democrats. In this case, 
Democrat voters prefer high spending and a progressive commodity tax system while 
Republican voters prefer low spending and a regressive commodity tax structure. 
Empirical evidence suggests that Democrat administrations increase taxes and 
spending and modify provisions towards a more progressive tax system. Our model can 
rationalize these stylized facts. In particular our analysis identifies conditions in which 
the Democrat party proposes higher public spending and redistribution compared with the 
policies proposed by the Republican party. That is, under Democrat administrations taxes 
on income elastic goods increase while taxes on income inelastic commodities fall 
implying that the Democrat party has an electoral incentive to propose a commodity tax 
system in which redistribution plays a more prominent role than efficiency on tax design. 
In contrast, the Republican party weighs less heavily redistribution (vis-à-vis efficiency) 
as a guiding principle of tax design.  
 
Theory of Elections and Tax Design 
 
In this section we review the predictions of the theory of elections on tax design.38 
The leading paradigm of the theory of elections, the Downs model, suggests that public 
policy reflects the preferences of the median voter. In their analysis of a linear income tax 
system, Romer (1975, 1977), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981, 1983) 
indicate that redistribution depends on whether the income of the median voter is lower 
or higher than the mean income. In this setting, the extent of political redistribution is 
                                                 
38 In our review we ignore the analysis of the theory of committees (or direct voting) and the role of other 
Democrat institutions (as the role of electoral systems). The interested reader can consult the surveys of 
Hettich and Winer (1997, 2004). 
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limited by the deadweight costs of taxation and the preferences over policy of the 
decisive voter. In spite of the simplicity of the median voter model, the lack of an 
electoral equilibrium in the multidimensional space when there is heterogeneity of 
preferences and endowment of voters, the prediction that policy outcomes reflect voting 
cycles, and the inability of the model to rationalize the divergence of parties’ platforms, 
have limited the applicability of the Downs model. 
The perceived limitations of the median voter model persuaded researchers to 
relax the Downsian assumptions. For instance, the probabilistic theory of elections (PTE), 
assumes that parties have imperfect information on voters’ preferences. In the PTE, there 
exists an electoral equilibrium when policy is multidimensional and voters’ preferences 
are heterogeneous. In this setting, parties aggregate voters’ preferences by turning the 
conflicting interests of different groups into some form of policy platform.  Hettich and 
Winer (1997, 1999) offer the first application of the PTE to the analysis of tax design, 
and argue that the government will set the tax structure to minimize the political 
opposition per dollar of tax revenue across taxable units. Hettich and Winer (1988, 1997, 
1999) analyze a tradeoff between administrations’ costs and parties’ ability to implement 
a tax discrimination policy. They, however, do not analyze to what extent redistributive 
politics and efficiency guide the design of tax structure and in their model parties’ 
policies convergence. 
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that parties’ policies do not converge. Reed 
(2006), Alt and Lowry (2001), Caplan (2001) and Rogers and Rogers (2000) find 
evidence that states’ taxes increase when Democrats have significant control of the 
legislative bodies of state governments. Blomberg and Hess (2003) find evidence that 
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productive spending (spending net of transfers) and taxes increase in the second and third 
years of Democrat administrations; Alesina, Roubini and Cohen (1997) find that budget 
deficits are higher under Republican administrations, although they reject the hypothesis  
that parties differ in their spending on welfare. Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) rationalize 
divergence on parties’ policies through a model in which parties have preferences over 
policies and parties have imperfect information on voters’ preferences.39 
Roemer (1999, 2001) seeks to endogeneize parties’ preferences for policy by 
assuming that parties are composed by factions of activists with different interests. 
Roemer applies the model of factions to explain why both parties, at the left and at the 
right of the political spectrum, have supported progressive taxation in the U.S. Roemer 
(1999) concludes that even when there might exist groups inside parties trying to deviate 
parties’ proposals towards factions’ most preferred positions, the incentives of the 
electoral competition lead both parties to propose a progressive tax structure if the 
majority of voters have an income lower than the mean income. Hence, the electoral 
constraints are still binding and policy oriented parties cannot advance their own agenda 
on policies. 
The political economy of public finance has also contributed to the analysis of 
design of public policies by studying the role of political influence in determining 
policies. Becker (1983, 1985) contends that pressure groups advance their economic 
interests by exerting political pressure over policy makers. In Becker (1983), competition 
among pressure groups favors efficient methods of taxation. In the analysis of Hettich 
and Winer (1999, 2001), individuals with higher propensity to vote for a party can exert a 
                                                 
39 Hinich, Ledyard and Ordeshook (1973) provide conditions in which parties might diverge from the 
median position if voters abstain. To the best of my knowledge, the model has not been applied to the 
analysis of tax design. 
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more effective influence on the party. Coughlin, et al. (1990a) provide a model in which 
the demands of pressure groups are weighed according to their ideological beliefs. The 
focus of the model is to show the existence of an electoral equilibrium while the 
implication of ideological interest groups on the design of public spending is explored in 
Coughlin, et al. (1990b). Rutherford and Winer (1990, 1999), and Hotte and Winer 
(2001) incorporate interest groups to study the role of political influence on tax design. 
Rutherford and Winer (1990, 1999) use a computable general equilibrium model to reject 
the hypothesis that the systematic reductions in capital and personal income taxes over 
the decade after 1973 are explained by changes in the relative political influence of some 
special interest groups.40  
Another area that remains relatively unexplored is the analysis of tax design under 
a richer set of conditions determining the individuals’ choice of the vote. As we 
mentioned before, in the context of a representative democracy the voting behavior is 
central for the aggregation of preferences and the observed policy outcomes. In the 
Downs model, the formation of public policy is assumed that citizens vote for the party 
proposing the policy platform that is closer to voters’ views over policy. In contrast to the 
Downsian assumption that voting is policy oriented, the literature on the voting behavior 
suggests that the individuals’ choice of the vote is explained by policy issues (Downs, 
1957; Niemi & Weisberg, 2001), by partisan attitudes (see Campbell et al., 1960; Miller 
& Shanks, 1996; and Fiorina 1997), and by a prospective-retrospective evaluation of 
parties’ performance (see Barro, 1973; Fiorina 1981).41 Furthermore, the evidence of the 
voting behavior indicates that party identification (or voters’ partisan attitude) is the best 
                                                 
40 Although Rutherford and Winer (1999) conclude that the relative influence of lower income voters kept 
taxes on capital and high income from falling and taxes on labor from rising. 
41 For a survey on the determinants of the voting behavior see Fiorina (1997). 
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predictor of the choice of the vote, see Campbell et al. (1960), Miller and Shanks (1996), 
and more recently Bartels (2000). Finally, the evidence from the American national 
election studies (ANES) shows that the vast majority of the American electorate has a 
partisan preference.42 Therefore, it is relevant to ask: What is the effect of voters’ partisan 
attitudes on tax design? Moreover, voters’ preferences will be aggregated in a different 
manner under alternative distributions of voters’ attitudes. In this case we are interested 
to analyze the provision of a public good and tax structure under different distributions of 
voters’ attitudes. In the next section we present a model that seeks to answer these 
questions.  
 
Voters’ Preferences for Tax Structure 
 
Consider an economy in which individuals decide their consumption vector on the 
opportunity set and participate politically by voting for a representative of a party. We 
consider two candidates-parties denoted by D and R (with obvious references) competing 
to form the government. Preferences and the opportunity set for individuals are 
characterized as follows: 
 
    ( ) ( ), 1hk h h k hksU Gβμ β ε= + −x  and ( )k h h h k h hw L= + ≤q x px c t  h∀       (23) 
 
Where hkU  is the overall utility of consumer h if party { },D Rk =  forms the 
government. ( ),h h ksGμ x  represents the preferences over private consumption nh ℜ∈x  
and the public good ksG . The parameter 
hkε  measures the partisan preference of 
                                                 
42 For the period 1952-2004, on average, the proportion of voters with a party identification represented 
88% of the electorate, around 11% regard themselves as independents and the rest as apoliticals. 
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consumer h for party k and hβ  is a weighing parameter such that [ ]0,1   h hβ β= ∈ ∀ . 
Equation (23) implies that the overall utility of individuals depend not only on the 
policies that each party might enact but also individuals have a preference relation over 
the party that rules the government. We consider the view of the Michigan school on the 
partisan preference. Consequently, we assume that party identification (or preference) is 
learned in childhood, and it is largely exogenous (not based on policy views), see 
Campbell et al. (1960), Miller and Shanks (1996), among others.43 
The opportunity set is defined by consumers’ price k k= +q p t . We will assume 
that in this economy the supply of private commodity i  is perfectly elastic at ip  
∀ 1,2....i n= . The producers’ value is hpx , ( ) h k k h=c t t x  is the tax liability of individual 
h under tax policies nk ℜ∈t proposed by parties { },D Rk = , and h hw L  is labor income. 
From (23) we can derive the indirect utility function hkV  in (23’):44 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * *, , 1 , 1 s.t: hk h k k h hk h h k hk k h h hs sV G y Max G w Lβυ β ε βμ β ε= + − = + − ≤t x q x        (23’) 
 
From equation (23’) we can obtain the ideal policy of voter h (denoted as * *h hs,Gt ) 
by maximizing the indirect utility hkV  subject to the constraint that the public good is 
financed by taxation. That is, we consider the preference relation over the policy space 
given by the public budget condition ( )hsG R= t  where the right hand side of the 
constraint is the tax revenue function ( ) ( )
1
,
n
h h h
i ih
i
R t x y dh
=
=∑ ∫t t , ( ),h hix yt  is the 
                                                 
43 This explains why we introduce the partisan preference as an additive parameter in (23). 
44  Eqn. (23’) is obtained by finding ( ) ( ) ( )* argmax , 1 s.t: h hk h h k hk k h h h k h hsU G w Lβμ β ε∈ = + − = + ≤x x q x px c t . 
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Marshallian demand which depends on full income y  and the ideal tax structure of voter 
h. Hence, the ideal fiscal policies * *h hs,Gt  for voter h are found by:
45 
 
{ } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1  , , , , , 1h hs
n
h h h h h h h h h h h hk
s s i ih,G i
Max G y V , G y t x y dhδ β υ β βε
=
⎛ ⎞= = + −⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∫t t t t t          (24) 
 
The indirect utility function that recognizes the opportunity budget set of the 
individual and the public budget constraint (that is ( ), ,h h h hsG yδ t ) is our primitive 
preference relation over the policy space and it is assumed to be a concave function of 
taxes.46 By finding * : 0h hi it tδ∂ ∂ = *,  1,...it i n∀ =  we obtain the optimal tax structure for 
voter h denoted as [ ]* ** *1 2, ,......h hh hnt t t=t , while the most preferred level of the public good 
is obtained by using  [ ]* ** *1 2, ,......h hh hnt t t=t  into ( )* * *
1
,
n
h h h h h
s i ih
i
G t x y dh
=
=∑ ∫ t . Finally the 
utility level attained to the individual’s ideal policy position is given 
by ( )( )* * * * *, ,h h h h hsGδ εt t . 
We conclude this section by characterizing some stylized facts on preferences 
over policy and partisan attitudes. The surveys from the ANES measure the preferences 
of voters for government services and spending. Individuals are asked to evaluate 
whether public spending should be cut or increased. The survey reveals that for the 
                                                 
45 For convenience we normalize (23’) as shown. 
46  Note that { }h k h k h ki i s it t G Rδ υ υ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ +∂ ∂  reflects the fiscal exchange of changes in taxes. A concave ( )hkhsh G εδ ,,t  would suggest that at low taxes the fiscal exchange for voter h is positive due to the cost of 
the public good is shared among the electorate. However, successive increases in taxes lead to decreasing 
changes in the fiscal exchange, that is,  { } { }22 2 2 2 2 2 0h k h k h k h ki i s i s iit t G R G Rδ υ υ υ∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ +∂ ∂ +∂ ∂ ≤  
where 2 2 0h kitυ∂ ∂ ≥ , decreasing marginal utility on public goods implies { }22 2 0h ks iG Rυ∂ ∂ ≤  while 
{ } 0h ks iiG Rυ∂ ∂ ≤  if the marginal tax revenue is decreasing in taxes, that is if 2 2 0kii iR R t= ∂ ∂ ≤ . 
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period 1982-2004, from the group of voters who prefer an increase in government 
services, 43% were identified as Democrats and 21% as Republicans. Furthermore, from 
the group of voters who prefer a reduction in government services, 16% were identified 
as Democrats and 42% as Republicans. In other words, a higher proportion of Democrats 
along the period from 1982 to 2004 have consistently being associated with preferences 
which support an increase in public spending and services in relation to Republicans. The 
surveys from the ANES also provide information that relates the distribution of income 
and the partisan identification of respondents. As shown in Table 1 of Appendix C, voters 
at the low/high ranks of income have a party identification with the Democrat/Republican 
party. We formalize these stylized findings as follows: Let 
( ) { }( )1 1R Dh h hθ ε β β ε ε β β= Δ − = − − , { }R Dh hε ε εΔ = −  represents the partisan bias, 
and hθ  is the partisan bias normalized by a factor related with the weigh in which the 
partisan preference explains the individuals’ choice of the vote. Let 0<hθ  be a 
Democrat and 0>hθ  a Republican voter. The finding that Democrats’ ideal spending is 
higher than that of Republicans is denoted as follows: [ ] 00:,, 1010 >∧<∈∀ θθθθθθ , 
10 ** θθ
ss GG ≥ , where 0*θsG  and 1*θsG are the ideal spending for Democrat and Republican 
voters.47 The positive association of income and Republican identification is denoted by 
[ ] 0, covariance ≥yθ . 
 
 
                                                 
47 An alternative way to represent that Democrats’ ideal spending is higher than that of Republicans will be 
denoted as follows: [ ] 00:,, 1010 >∧<∈∀ θθθθθθ , ( ) ( )0 00 1G x G xMRS MRSθ θ− −≥ . That is, Democrats’ 
marginal valuation of the public good in terms of the nummeraire private good 0x  is higher than that of 
Republicans. 
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Electoral Competition and the Design of Fiscal Policy 
 
In this section we characterize the electoral competition between parties. Parties D 
and R propose policy positions on tax structure and the level of the public good, the voter 
observes parties’ policies and vote.  The objective of candidates is to maximize their 
probability to win the election denoted by ( ) { },k k D Rkπ =Ρ , the vector 
1 : ,k n k k ksG
+ ⎡ ⎤∈ℜ = ⎣ ⎦Ρ Ρ t  reflects public policies proposed by parties { },D Rk =  and kt  is 
a commodity tax vector. 
We assume candidates do not know with certainty the determinants of the 
individuals’ choice of the vote.48 Thus, from candidates’ point of view, policies ,D RΡ Ρ  
and voters’ bias hθ  lead to a probability hDPr  that a voter h votes for party D. For 
convenience of the analysis, let partition the electorate such that each voter belongs to the 
domain ,hθ θ θ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦ , where { }h hMinθ θ ∀=  and { }h hMaxθ θ ∀=  with 0 0θ θ< ∧ > . Let 
there is a fraction such that ( ) , =h hh h g θ θ θ θ′′∀ ≠ ∈ =  and 
( )( )Pr Pr PrD D Dh h θ θ′= = Ψ −  where ( ) ( ) ( ) θυυθ −−=−Ψ yGyG RRRDDD ss ,,,, tt  is the net 
utility from policy and partisan issues of voter type θ  if party D is elected. ( )yG DDD s ,,tυ  
is the utility for voter h when party D selects policies ,D DsGt , and a similar interpretation 
is given to ( )yG RRR s ,,tυ . Define ( )Df •  as the probability distribution function (pdf) 
over ( )θΨ − . Thus, the probability that an individual type θ   votes for party D is: 
                                                 
48 The choice of the vote can be influenced, among other things, by policy issues, partisan attitudes, voters’ 
perceptions over candidates (as candidates’ competence), and a retrospective view of parties’ performance, 
see Fiorina (1997). Therefore, it is compelling to assume that parties do not have perfect information on the 
determinants of the vote. 
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               ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )Pr   D D DDvoting f d Fθθ θ ψ ψ θΨ −−∞= = Ψ −∫        (25) 
 
 
The expression [ ]: 0,1D D RF θ× × →Ρ Ρ  is the cumulative distribution function 
evaluated at ( )θΨ −  for all partisan bias ,θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  and pair of fiscal policies ,D RΡ Ρ . DF  
is a common, continuous, non decreasing function of ( )θΨ − . The properties of the 
function of the probability, DF , reflect parties’ prior beliefs on the distribution of net 
utility of voters ( )θΨ −  when party D holds office. If party D believes the probability of 
the vote is marginally increasing over ( )θΨ = Ψ −  then ( )( )DF θΨ −  is convex. The 
probability of the vote is concave if the density over the net utility is concentrated around 
low values of ( )θΨ = Ψ −  and decreases monotonically afterwards. 
The proportion of the expected votes for party D aggregates the probabilities of 
voting for a candidate across voters’ partisan types ,θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈⎣ ⎦ . That is:49  
 
     ( ) ( ) ( )( ),D D R Dg F dθθφ θ θ θΡ Ρ = Ψ −∫                                 (26) 
 
The probability to win the election is denoted as the cumulative distribution over 
the plurality of parties. Let [ ]: 0,1D RW φ φ× →  be a continuous, non decreasing, and 
concave cumulative distribution function and ( ) 0DW w ρ′ = ≥  is the corresponding pdf. 
Therefore, the probability of winning the election for party D is 
                                                 
49 Similarly, the proportion of the expected votes for party R is: 
           ( ) ( ) ( )( ),R D R Rg F dθθφ θ θ θΡ Ρ = −Ψ −∫                             (26’) 
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( ) ( ),D D R D D Rπ π φ φ= −Ρ Ρ  where ( ) ( ), ,D D D R R D Rρ φ φ= −Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ  is the proportion of the 
expected plurality for party D.  Hence the probability of winning the election is 
characterized as:50 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,DD D R D D D R R D Rw d Wρπ ρ ρ φ φ−∞ ⎡ ⎤= = −⎣ ⎦∫Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ              (27) 
 
The problem of candidate D is to select the commodity tax vector and the public 
good subject to the public budget constraint that leads to the highest political support to 
the party. Formally, the party’s problem is: 
 
           
{ } ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) [ ]
( ) ( ) θθ
θθθθυυθυ
φφ
φφρ
ρρπ
θ
θ
ρ
dyxgtGiv
GGiii
ii
i)ts
dwMax
DDD
RRRDDD
RDRRDD
RDRRDDD
D
i
i
is
ss
G
D
D
s
D
,  )
,   ,,-  )
)(26' and (26)in  defined are ,  and  ,  )
,,      :.
                  
n
1
, 
D
t
tt
PPPP
PPPP
t
∫∑
∫
=
∞−
=
∈∀−−=Δ=Ψ
−=
=
       (28) 
 
A similar characterization is defined for party R.51 The optimality conditions for 
parties D and R define two platforms for a commodity tax system given by: 52,53 
                                                 
50 In the expression in (27) we use ( )
1
0
k
k klim
ρ
π ρ
→−
= . 
51 The equation is derived as follows: The net utility from policy and partisan issues for voter type θ  if 
candidate –k wins the election is ( )θ−Ψ− . The probability that a voter type θ  votes for candidate R is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )Pr  voting R R RR f d Fθθ θ ψ ψ θ−Ψ −−∞= = −Ψ −∫ . The proportion of the expected vote for party R  is  
( ) ( ) ( )( ),R D R Rg F dθθφ θ θ θΡ Ρ = −Ψ −∫  and the probability of wining the election is: 
( ) ( ), RR D R Rw dρπ ρ ρ−∞= ∫Ρ Ρ                        (27’) 
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( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
*
*
:     0      
:     0      
D D
D D D
D D D
R R
R R R
R R R
D
i
i i i
R
i
i i i
D g f d t i
t t t
R g f d t i
t t t
θ
θ
θ
θ
π φ θ θ θ
π φ θ θ θ
∂ ∂ ∂Ψ= ϒ = ϒ Ψ − = ∀∂ ∂ ∂
∂ ∂ ∂Ψ= ϒ = ϒ −Ψ − = ∀∂ ∂ ∂
∫
∫
      (29) 
           
From (29) ( )2 0k k kw ρϒ = ≥  for { },D Rk = , the term ( ) ( )kg fθ •  inside the 
integral is the marginal proportion of the expected vote due to a change in the well being 
of voter type θ . The term determines the weight parties assign to the preferences over 
policy outcomes of voter type θ , while 0kit ><∂Ψ ∂  provides the directional mobility of 
candidate k.54 Equation (29) says that parties will select tax rates * *,  D Ri it t  at the point in 
which the marginal proportion of the expected vote is maximized by exhausting the gains 
of the fiscal exchange across the electorate. For the case of party D, equation (29) can be 
arranged as follows: 
 
          ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )  D DD D i
i s
g f d g f d R
t G
θ θ
θ θ
υ υθ θ θ θ θ θ⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫∂ ∂− Ψ − = Ψ −⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬∂ ∂⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭∫ ∫   Dit * ∀     (29’) 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
52 The optimality condition is ( ){ } DDRDDDDD iiii tttwt *  0   0 ∀=∂∂−∂∂⇒=∂∂ φφρπ . Since 1D Rφ φ+ =  
then D D R Di it tφ φ∂ ∂ = −∂ ∂  therefore D D D D Di it tπ φ∂ ∂ = ϒ ∂ ∂  where ( )2D Dw ρϒ = . From (26) we obtain 
( ) ( )( )D D D Di it g f t dθθφ θ θ θ∂ ∂ = Ψ − ∂Ψ ∂∫ . A similar procedure is derived to obtain 0R Ritπ∂ ∂ =  
53 So far we have not discussed the conditions that guarantee the existence of the electoral equilibrium. For 
a more detailed characterization of the sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium see 
Appendix D. 
54 Suppose 0≥∂∂=∂Ψ∂ kiki tt υ , then at the margin if candidate k increases tax rate i the candidate 
changes his expected proportion of the votes by ( ) ( )kg fθ • . 
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The left hand side of (29’) represents the marginal lost of the proportion of 
expected votes because a tax on commodity i reduces voters’ utility by 
0≤−=∂∂ ii xt D αυ .55 A tax on commodity i, also raises a marginal tax revenue ( iR ) 
which produces an equivalent amount on public services. Hence, the right hand side is the 
marginal expected vote gain from the delivery of the public good. Rearranging terms we 
express condition (29’) as follows: 
 
        
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )
1
D
D D
D
D D
n
j ij
j
i G
t g S d g f d cg T i d
X yf
θ θ
θ θθ
θ
θ θ θ θ λ θ θ θθ υ
= Ψ − ⎧ ⎫∂− = − ⎨ ⎬∂Ψ − ⎩ ⎭
∑ ∫ ∫ ∫          (30) 
 
The left hand side of (30) is the percentage change along the compensated 
demand of commodity i  as a result of the tax system, and Dcij i jS x t= ∂ ∂  is the change in 
the compensated demand to a change in prices. In the right hand side 
( ){ }0D DG xMRS T iλ α −= −  is the marginal utility of the net fiscal exchange for voter type 
θ . Dλ  is characterized by the product of the marginal utility of income (α ) and the 
difference between voter’s marginal valuation of the public good in terms of the 
nummeraire private good 0x  (that is 0G xMRS − ), and voter’s tax share from tax instrument 
i, that is, ( )D D Di i i iT i t x t X=  where ( )i iX g x dθθ θ θ= ∫ . Hence, ( ) ( )( ) θλθθ dfg DD −Ψ∫  
is the marginal proportion of the expected vote from the net fiscal exchange. By the mean 
value Theorem ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )D D DD G
s
g f d f
G
θ
θ
υθ θ θ υ θ∂Ψ − = Ψ −∂∫ ,  
                                                 
55 From the expression  0≤∂∂ Ditυ , 0≥ix  is the Marshallian demand of good i and α  is voters’ marginal 
utility of income. 
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( )( ) ( ) ( )( )D Df g f dθθθ θ θ θΨ − = Ψ −∫  is a weighted marginal probability of the vote while 
D D
G sGυ υ= ∂ ∂  is, a politically weighted, marginal utility of the public good.  The last 
expression in (30), ( ) ( )Dcg T i d
y
θ
θ θ θ
∂
∂∫ , is a weighted measure of the change in tax 
revenue if parties redistribute one dollar to the electorate through the tax system. 
We re-write condition (30) as: 
      
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1
,
D
D D D D D
D
D D
n
j ij
j
i G
t g S d f f E cE T i
X yf
θ
θ θ θ σ θ λ θ λ
θ υ
= ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Ψ − + Ψ − ⎡ ⎤∂⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦− = − ⎢ ⎥∂Ψ − ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∫
      
 
In the equation above, ( )( ) ,D D Dfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ −⎣ ⎦  is the covariance between the 
marginal probability that a voter type θ  votes for party D ( ( )( )Df θΨ − ) and the net fiscal 
exchange Dλ . ( )D DE g dθθλ θ λ θ⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦ ∫  is the expected net fiscal exchange across 
individuals, and ( )( )D D Df Eλ θ λ⎡ ⎤= Ψ − ⎣ ⎦  is the proportion of votes from the gains 
derived by the expected net fiscal exchange. Dividing the term by ( )( )D DGf θ υΨ − , we 
obtain a normalized ratio of the net benefits from the net fiscal exchange over the 
politically aggregated marginal utility of the public good given by D DGλ υ . Finally the 
tax rule becomes: 
           
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1
,
D
D D D D
D
DD D
n
j ij
j
i GG
t g S d f cE T i
X yf
θ
θ θ θ σ θ λ λ
υθ υ
= ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ⎡ ⎤∂⎣ ⎦− = + − ⎢ ⎥∂Ψ − ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∫
 Dit
* ∀          (31) 
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According to (31), the pattern of redistributive taxation is explained by the 
covariance between voters’ marginal probability of voting for candidate D and the net 
fiscal exchange denoted as ( )( ) ,D D Dfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ −⎣ ⎦ . Hence, if party D forms the government 
the party will implement a tax system with a higher tax rate *Dit  for the case it is observed 
a distribution of voters’ preferences for fiscal policies such that voters with higher than 
average marginal probabilities of voting for party D are associated with higher than 
average marginal net fiscal exchange gains.56 
To highlight the role of the partisan preference consider two different types of 
voters with a partisan bias given by [ ] 00:,, 1010 >∧<∈∀ θθθθθθ  and ideal policies 
0 1* *
i it tθ θ≥  leading to ( ) ( )0 1θ θΨ ≥ Ψ  * *,D Ri it t∀ . Assume the function of the probability of 
the vote DF  is convex then ( ) ( )0 1θ θΨ ≥ Ψ  implies ( )( ) ( )( )0 1D Df fθ θΨ ≥ Ψ . If in 
addition, ( ) ( )0 1g gθ θ≥  then, unambiguously, a Downsian candidate D will weigh more 
heavily the preferences over fiscal policies of individuals who have a partisan bias for 
party D (that is, Democrat voters or individuals type 0θ ). As a result, party D provides a 
level of public good ( DsG ) that is closer to the ideal spending on public good of citizens 
with a partisan bias towards party D (that is 
0*θ
ss GG
D → ).57 Conversely, if kF  is a 
concave cumulative function of ( )θΨ − , 0 1* *i it tθ θ≥  and voters’ attitudes lead to 
( ) ( )0 1θ θΨ ≥ Ψ  * *,D Ri it t∀  and ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )0 0 1 1D Dg f g fθ θ θ θΨ ≤ Ψ  for 0 1θ θ< , then 
party D will weigh less heavily the preferences over fiscal policies from voters type 0θ . 
                                                 
56 In this case ( )( ) , 0D D Dfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦ . Thus the higher the covariance the higher *Dit . 
57 Since parties will select policies in the region in which marginal tax revenues are positive (see Hettich & 
Winer 1997, 1999) then 1****** 101010 ,  if    ℜ∈≥⇒≥ θθθθθθ iissii ttGGtt . 
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In this case, the provision of the public good will be lower compared with our previous 
example (since 
011 ***    θθθ ssss GGGG
D ≤∧→ ). 
In addition, party D has the incentive to tax more heavily income elastic 
commodities and less prominently income inelastic and inferior goods. To see this, note 
that ( ) ( )0 00 1G x G xMRS MRSθ θ− −≥ ,  Democrat voters prefer a higher level of spending 
compared to the ideal expenditures of Republican voters and an income elastic 
commodity implies ( ) ( )1 0, ,D DT i y T i y≥  for individuals with 1 0y y≥  ( the share of tax 
liability in good i  is higher for voters with higher levels of income). Data from ANES 
suggests that [ ] 0 covariance ≥θ,y , therefore Democrat voters will be associated with 
lower than average shares of the tax price and therefore with higher than average values 
of the net fiscal exchange gains ( ) ( )0 1, ,D Di y i yλ λ≥ . Furthermore, for a convex DF , 
0 1* *
i it tθ θ≥  leading to ( ) ( )0 1θ θΨ ≥ Ψ  * *,k ki it t −∀  implies ( )( ) ( )( )0 1D Df fθ θΨ ≥ Ψ  for 
0 1θ θ< . Therefore, higher than average ( )( )Df θΨ −  will be associated with higher than 
average Dλ  and hence ( )( ) , 0D D Dfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦ . Consequently, the higher the 
covariance Dσ  the higher the tax rate *Dit  on the tax system proposed by party D.  
It should be clear that the covariance Dσ  is higher under an income elastic 
commodity i compared with that of an income inelastic commodity z since the net fiscal 
exchange gains for Democrat voters are higher under good i. Consequently, party D will 
propose a higher tax rate on income elastic goods compared with that of income inelastic 
goods. A similar analysis can be made for an inferior commodity. Party D will not tax 
heavily an inferior commodity j if ( ) ( )10 ,, yjTyjT DD ≥  leads to ( ) ( )10 ,, yjyj DD λλ ≤  for 
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1 0y y≥ . Since a convex function ( )( )DF θΨ  and ( ) ( )0 1θ θΨ ≥Ψ , implies 
( )( ) ( )( )0 1D Df fθ θΨ ≥ Ψ  for 0 1θ θ<  and higher than average ( )( )Df θΨ −  will be 
associated with lower than average Dλ  which means ( )( ) , 0D D Dfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦ . Clearly, 
the tax rate  *Djt  on the tax system proposed by party D will be lower the more negative is 
( )( ) , 0D D Dfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦ . 
Assuming the demand of commodities are independent (cross price effects are 
zero), the expression (31) is reduced to  
( )( )
( )( ) ( )
,1
1
i i
D D DD D
D
D DD D
j
j x q GG
ft cE T i
t yf
σ θ λ λ
ε υθ υ−
⎧ ⎫⎡ ⎤Ψ − ⎡ ⎤∂⎪ ⎪⎣ ⎦= + −⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥+ ∂Ψ − ⎣ ⎦⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
 
where { } ( ) ( )i i cx q ij i iS q x T i g dθθε θ θ− =−∫  is a weighted compensated price elasticity of 
commodity i.58 The last expression reflects more clearly the tradeoff between political 
redistribution and efficiency. An income elastic commodity implies 
( )( ) , 0D D Dfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦ . Thus, competition for votes leads party D to redistribute in favor 
of Democrat voters which induces party D to increase *Dit . However, since commodity i 
is income elastic 
i ix q
ε −  is high, as well as the deadweight costs of taxation, which reduces 
voters’ political support to the party. Thus, efficiency concerns induce party D to reduce 
*D
it . 
Now we proceed to evaluate the role of the marginal proportion of the expected 
vote from the last unit of the public good ( )( )D DGf θ υΨ − . In general, this term has an 
ambiguous effect over *Dit . To see this suppose an exogenous change in 
D
Gυ  and note 
                                                 
58 For simplicity, we normalize 1=ip . 
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from (31) that provided ( )( ) , 0D D Dfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦   and 0Dλ ≥ , then a higher 
( )( )D DGf θ υΨ −  tends to reduce (ceteris paribus) tax rate *Dit , but also a higher 
( )( )D DGf θ υΨ −   might increase the tax rate if ( )( ) , 0D D Dfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦  and 0Dλ ≤ .59 
Hence the net impact of an increase in the willingness to pay for the public across the 
electorate is ambiguous. 
The term D DGλ υ  represents the ratio of the politically weighted measures of the 
net ( Dλ ) and gross ( DGυ ) fiscal exchange gains.  The larger the ratio the higher will be the 
tax rate used in the tax system since the political gains from public provision are 
exhausted at higher levels of public spending. The expression 
( ) ( ) ( )  D DE c y T i g c y T i dθθ θ θ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ∫  represents the expected extra tax revenue that the 
government obtains as a result of redistributing one dollar to voters. To see this, note that 
the government can induce a change in income across the electorate by changing the 
relative prices of commodities through the tax structure. In the equation, the individuals’ 
share of tax contributions ( ( )DT i ) is a weighing factor of the marginal tax revenue 
( c y∂ ∂ ) from returning one dollar to each taxpayer. From the expression in (31), the 
higher ( ) DE c y T i⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  the lower the tax rate *Dit  to be used in the tax system. 
                                                 
59  The ceteris paribus condition must be interpreted as considering an increase in ( )D DGf υΨ  that leads to  
a distribution of the net fiscal exchange gains so that ( )( ) ,D D Dfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ −⎣ ⎦  and Dλ  remain unchanged. 
Otherwise the effect of the expected vote from the net fiscal exchange is ambiguous. 
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A similar tax rule (to that defined in equation 10) can be derived for party R.60 As 
before, the preferences of voters over policy and the aggregation of voters’ interests by 
party R determine the tax platform offered by the candidate. Party R aggregates more 
heavily the preferences of Republican voters if the cumulative distribution, 
( )( )θ−Ψ−RF , is convex. In this case, [ ] 00:,, 1010 >∧<∈∀ θθθθθθ  and ideal 
policies 0 1* *i it tθ θ≥  such that ( ) ( )01 θθ −Ψ−≥−Ψ−  * *,D Ri it t∀  imply 
( )( ) ( )( )01 θθ −Ψ−≥−Ψ− RR ff , that is, Republican voters have higher marginal 
propensities to vote for party R. Moreover, for an income elastic commodity 
( ) ( )10 ,, yjTyjT RR ≥  for individuals with 1 0y y≥ . Therefore, 
( ) ( )0 00 1G x G xMRS MRSθ θ− −≥ , [ ] 0 covariance ≥θ,y  and ( ) ( )10 ,, yjTyjT RR ≥  imply 
( ) ( )01 ,, yjyj RR λλ ≤  for 1 0y y≥  (Republican voters have a lower than average net fiscal 
exchange gains).  Since Republican have higher than averages marginal propensity to 
vote for party R and lower than average net fiscal exchange gains then 
( )( ) , 0R R Rfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤−Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦ . This implies that redistribution plays a less prominent role in 
designing tax structure for party R compared to the role that distribution plays for party 
D.  Similarly, if party R weighs more heavily the preferences of Republican voters then 
D DR R
G Gλ υ λ υ≤ , which implies that the expected proportion of votes from the gains 
derived by the net fiscal exchange is actually lower for party R at high tax rates over 
                                                 
60 For completeness, the tax rule for party R is given by:  
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1
,
R
R R R R
R
RR R
n
j ij
j
i GG
t g S d f cE T i
X yf
θ
θ θ θ σ θ λ λ
υθ υ
= ⎡ ⎤−Ψ − ⎡ ⎤∂⎣ ⎦− = + − ⎢ ⎥∂−Ψ − ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∫
        (31’) 
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commodity i. Thus, ( )( ) , 0R R Rfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤−Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦  and D DR RG Gλ υ λ υ≤  implies * *R Di it t≤ . In other 
words, parties D and R do not converge in their tax policies. 
With respect the question of parties’ platforms convergence (divergence), we 
must notice that the distribution of the partisan preferences modifies the individual’s 
marginal probability to vote for either candidate for a given set of parties’ policies. A 
voter with a strong partisan preference for candidate D (a voter with a large value of 
0θ < ) will have a higher probability to vote for party D  than to vote for party R if both 
candidates propose the same tax policies. A similar case stands for a Republican voter (a 
voter with 0θ > ) who will have a higher probability of voting for party R if both 
candidates propose the same policies. From the optimality conditions, and our discussion 
above, it is clear that a party will weigh differently, more heavily/less heavily, the 
preferences of those individuals with strong partisan preferences in favor of the party 
when the function kF  is convex/concave. In particular, proposition 3 in Appendix E 
shows that if the probabilities of the vote, DF  and RF , are convex then at the Nash 
equilibrium * *D Ri it t≥ , if the functions of the probability of the vote are concave then 
* *D R
i it t≤ , and for the case of bimodal cumulative distributions * *D Ri it t>< . 
The claims above follow because if 0 1* * 0 10 0i it tθ θ θ θ≥ ∀ < ∧ >  leads to 
( ) ( )0 1θ θΨ − ≥ Ψ −  at * *,D Ri it t , and if  DF  and RF  are convex cumulative distributions, 
party D expects that the marginal probability of the vote of Democrat voters is higher 
than that of Republican and Independent voters. Party D has an electoral incentive to 
weigh more heavily the demands of Democrat voters and, consequently, party D takes a 
policy platform closer to the ideal policies of Democrat voters.  In contrast, the marginal 
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probability of the vote for party R of Democrat voters is lower (compared with that of 
Republican voters), hence party R tends to weigh less heavily the demands of Democrat 
voters. Therefore, at equilibrium, * *D Ri it t≥ .  
The former discussion implies that parties aggregate differently the preferences of 
the same electorate and as a result parties diverge in their policy platforms (for a formal 
proof of this outcome see proposition 6 in Appendix F). Convergence of parties’ policy 
platforms is the dominant strategy for parties if policies satisfy condition (29) and the 
probabilities of voting for candidates D and R  are a continuous, uniform cumulative 
distribution of Ψ (for a formal proof of this outcome see proposition 5 in Appendix F). In 
this case, parties do not gain by differentiating tax burdens under the basis of voters’ 
political affiliation (since voters’ propensity of the vote is the same) and parties’ tax 
policies converge. In this case, the relative political influence of voters over policy 
makers (parties) is explained only by the relative size of coalition of voters in the 
electorate (larger coalitions are expected to deliver higher number of votes and hence 
parties design policies that please these groups of voters).  
 
The Distribution of Voters’ Partisan Preference and the Redistributive 
Properties of Tax Structure 
 
Empirical evidence from the American National Election Studies 1952-2004 
indicates that in the last decades the proportion of individuals identified as Democrats fell 
while the proportion of Republicans increased. This fact suggests that the relative 
political influence of Democrats and Republicans has changed over time. In this section, 
we are interested in analyzing the influence of different distributions of voters’ partisan 
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identification over the provision of the public good and the degree of progressivity of the 
tax system. A change in the distribution of partisan preferences affects the way parties 
aggregate voters’ interests for policy since different distributions of voters’ loyalties 
affect the marginal propensity of the vote across the electorate and the relative proportion 
of votes delivered by different coalitions of voters.    
To analyze these issues, let us define the concept of first order partisan dominance 
as a distribution of the partisan bias in which a higher proportion of loyal voters implies a 
higher probability of winning the election for the party. Figure 3 in Appendix C provides 
an example, the distribution of voters’ partisan attitudes in 1964 dominates the 
distribution in 2002. Formally, for given policy vectors PPP ∈RD , , consider two 
distributions of voters’ party identification ( ) ( )ˆ  and G Gθ θ%  such that if ( )G θ%  partisan-
dominates ( )Gˆ θ  then party D has a higher probability of winning the election (for a 
formal proof see proposition 7 in Appendix G . Formally: 
 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( )( ) ( )( ) ΡΡΡΡΡΡΡ ∈∀≥⇒∈∀≤ RDRDDRDD GGGG ,  ˆ,,~,,       ,  ~ˆ θπθπθθθθθ       (32) 
 
The changes in tax structure due to changes in the dominance of voters’ political 
attitudes follow from the optimality conditions. Thus, let 1* ℜ∈kt , differentiate (29) with 
respect ( )  ,G θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈ ⎣ ⎦  to obtain ( )
( )
022
2*
<
>
∂∂
∂∂∂−=
DD
DDD
i
ii
t
Gt
dG
dt
π
θπ
θ  as 
( ) 02 <
<∂∂∂ θπ Gt DD i  since the concavity of ( )RDD PP , π  implies 022 ≥∂∂− DD itπ . 
Moreover, ( ) ( )G g dθθθ θ θ= ∫   is a non decreasing monotone function, then there exists 
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an inverse function ( )( ) ( )[ ] 1: −=′= θθθχθχθ gG  such that  ( ) ( )θθθθπ GtGt DD D ii ∂∂∂∂=∂∂ ∂ 2  . 
Hence:  
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( ) ( ) 0
 '
2
<
>
−
∂Ψ∂−Ψ−∂Ψ∂−Ψ′
=∂∂
∂ ∫∫
θθ
θθθθθθ
θ
π
θ
θ
θ
θ
gg
dtfgdtfg
Gt
DDDD
D
D ii
i
 
 
The expression above says that a change in the distribution of the partisan 
attitudes will affect the pattern of weights assigned by party D to the preferences of 
voters by modifying the distribution of ( )θg  and the marginal probability of the vote 
( )( ) θ−ΨDf  across the electorate. To see this, recall ( ) ( ) ( )( ) θθθϖ −Ψ= DfgD  
determines how party D aggregates the preferences of individuals’ type θ . Positive 
changes in ( )θϖ D  induce party D to propose a platform that is closer to the ideal policies 
of voters’ type θ . Hence, the expressions of the numerator reflect the change in the 
aggregation of preferences due to changes in ( ) [ ]θθθθ .  ∈∀G . 
The term ( ) ( ) 0g gθ θ >− <  can be considered as a measure of the extent of the 
partisan dominance if ( ) ( )ˆ   ,G Gθ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤≤ ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦% . The data of the American National 
Election Studies shows that the proportion of individuals regarded as Strong Democrats 
(by our convention ( )g θ ) is higher than the proportion of strong Republicans (or voters 
type ( )g θ ).61 That is, the empirical data clearly suggests ( ) ( ){ } 0  1 ≥−− −θθ gg . 
                                                 
61 For the period 1952-2004 the surveys from ANES provide a 7-point scale measure of the intensity of 
party identification. We can denote θ  from θ ≈ strong Democrats to θ ≈ strong Republicans. The survey 
suggests that the proportion of strong Democrats has represented 19% of the electorate while the proportion 
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We integrate by parts the second term of the numerator to obtain: 
 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
2  1 0
D
D D
D D D
i i i
g f g f
t G t tg g θ θ
π θ θ θ θθ θ θ
⎧ ⎫⎧ ⎫∂ − ∂Ψ ∂Ψ >⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪= Ψ − − Ψ −⎨ ⎬⎨ ⎬∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ <−⎪ ⎪⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭⎩ ⎭
     (33) 
 
To interpret (33) assume commodity i is income elastic and preferences of strong 
Democrat and Republican voters are given by 0  and  0 **  , , ≤∂Ψ∂≥∂Ψ∂ DiDi titi
DD tt θθ .
62 In 
this case, ( ) 02 ≥∂∂∂ θπ Gt DD i  implies ( ) 0* ≥θdGdt Di , therefore the partisan dominance 
(equivalently, an increase of ( )   ,G θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈ ⎣ ⎦ ) induces party D to  increase the tax rate 
of equilibrium over commodity i and, consequently, the degree of progresivity of the tax 
system increases. 
In other words, an increase in the proportion of voters with a bias in favor of party 
D, changes the pattern of weights assigned by the party to the preferences of voters by 
modifying the distribution of the partisan bias and the marginal probability of the vote 
across the electorate. As a result of a more dominant partisan distribution, there is an 
increase in the proportion of the expected votes from Democrat voters for party D. By 
assumption, strong Democrat voters (or voters type θ ) prefer an increase in the tax rate. 
Hence, if party D increases the tax rate, the expected proportion of the votes for the party 
increases by a proportion given by ( ) ( )( )θθ −ΨDfg . Simultaneously, a more dominant 
                                                                                                                                                 
of strong Republicans the 11%. The difference between strong Republicans-strong Democrats has always 
been non positive (that is ( ) ( ) 0g gθ θ− ≤ ) with an average difference for the period 1952-2004 of -8%. 
62 That is, the ideal policy of strong Democrat voters θ*it  is higher than the policy platform 
D
it
*  of party D . 
Thus, 0* , ≥∂Ψ∂ Diti
Dt θ
 implies that an increase of the tax rate increases the welfare of voters type θ , while 
a decrease of the tax rate increases the welfare of strong Republican, or 0* , ≤∂Ψ∂ Diti
Dt θ
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partisan distribution reduces the proportion of the expected votes for party D from the 
rest of voters (this effect is approximated by a fall in the proportion of Republican voters 
( ) ( )( )θθ −ΨDfg  in equation 12). By assumption, strong Republican voters (or voters type 
θ ) support a decrease in Dit* . Consequently, party D has an incentive to take a policy 
position closer to Democrat voters. Therefore, a distribution of preferences 
0  and  0 **  , , ≤∂Ψ∂≥∂Ψ∂ DiDi titi
DD tt θθ  implies ( ) 0* ≥θdGdt Di  if there is an increase in 
the partisan dominance of Democrat voters in the electorate. 
Interestingly, the increase in the partisan dominance might induce party D to take 
a policy position that reduces the welfare of Democrat voters if Republican and Democrat 
voters share similar views on policy. To see this, assume 
0  and  0 **  , , ≥∂Ψ∂≥∂Ψ∂ DiDi titi
DD tt θθ ,  ( ) ( )θθθθ −Ψ≥−Ψ≥ :** ii tt , and DF  is concave 
enough such that ( )( ) ( )( )θθ −Ψ≥−Ψ DD ff . In this case, an increase ( )   G θ θ∀  implies  
( ) 0* ≤θdGdt Di . The interpretation of this result is simple, under a concave function of 
the probability of the vote, an increase in the proportion of Democrat voters might 
actually reduce their expected proportion of the votes for party D since the marginal 
probability of the vote of Democrats is decreasing as θ θ→ . As a result, party D might 
increase the probability of winning the election if the party designs a policy platform in 
the opposite direction of a welfare increase of Democrat voters. 
To see this, note that if party D takes a policy position closer to strong Democrat 
voters as a response of an increase ( )  G θ θ∀  (in our example with 0* , ≥∂Ψ∂ DitiDt θ , if 
party D increases *Dit ) then the proportion of the expected votes by voters type θ  
  
69
 
increases by ( ) ( )( )θθ −ΨDfg  and the expected proportion of the votes from strong 
Republican voters falls by ( ) ( )( )θθ −ΨDfg . Under a concave DF  the second effect might 
dominate, and therefore the expected plurality of party D falls if the party increases *Dit . 
In contrast, parties’ plurality increases, as a result of an increase in the partisan 
dominance of Democrat voters, if party D takes a policy position in the opposite direction 
to a welfare increase of strong Democrat voters (if party D reduces *Dit ). 
The former result is counterintuitive and explained by the assumption of the 
concavity of the probability of the vote. Note that the electoral competition induces party 
D to redistribute in favor of those coalitions of voters that deliver a high expected 
marginal proportion of the votes. Under a concave probability of the vote, an increase 
( )   G θ θ∀   is equivalent to an increase in the proportion of individuals with a low 
marginal probability of voting for party D. This reduces the expected proportion of votes 
to be deliver in the election by Democrat voters and hence party D assigns a lower weight 
to the preferences of Democrat voters. As a result, party D changes (marginally) its 
platform in the opposite direction of a policy that increases the welfare of Democrat 
voters. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In a democracy, political parties perform the important role of aggregating voters’ 
preferences for public policies. The issue of representation is central to the design of 
fiscal policies, since the aggregation of interests is closely related to the tradeoff between 
efficiency and redistribution, and the size and composition of government expenditure. In 
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the deterministic models of electoral competition, the leading paradigm suggests that the 
efficiency-redistribution tradeoff is explained by the preferences over policy of the 
median voter. The probabilistic voting models suggest that the preferences of all voters in 
the electorate influence public policy (that is, in this context there is no decisive voter). 
However, in the probabilistic voting models there is little research on the roles that 
redistributive politics and efficiency play on guiding the design of tax rules for an 
economy with electoral constraints when policy is multidimensional and there is 
political-economic heterogeneity. In this essay we expect to contribute in filling this gap. 
We propose a model in which the individuals’ choice of the vote is determined by 
parties’ policies and voters’ partisan preferences to explain the design of the tax system. 
The voter’s partisan attitude is a form of political heterogeneity that helps to explain the 
distribution of votes in an election. Parties use voters’ loyalties to redistribute the gains of 
public policy across the electorate and maximize parties’ chances to win the election. 
Redistribution is guided by parties’ electoral incentives to maximize the net fiscal 
exchange gains to voters (or group of voters) that deliver a high marginal proportion of 
the expected votes while parties penalize those voters with low marginal proportion of 
the expected votes. This, in turn, leads to a process of preference aggregation that 
determines the roles that redistributive politics and efficiency play on tax design. 
The data from the American National Election Studies suggests that Democrat 
voters prefer higher public spending when compared with the status quo while 
Republican voters prefer lower spending. Moreover, individuals at the lowest (highest) 
ranks of the distribution of income are identified as Democrats (Republicans). In this 
case, Democrat voters would prefer high spending and a progressive commodity tax 
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system while Republican voters would prefer low spending and a regressive commodity 
tax structure. We identify conditions ( if the function of the probability of the vote for the 
party is convex) in which a differential commodity tax system will be used to redistribute 
tax burdens in favor of individuals with a partisan bias towards the party. In other words, 
the Republican (Democrat) party would tend to design tax and spending policies that are 
closer to the ideal policies of voters identified as Republican (Democrat) voters.63 
Hence, the model predicts that the Democrat party has an electoral incentive to 
propose a commodity tax system in which redistribution plays a more prominent role 
than efficiency in guiding the design of tax structure (taxes on income elastic goods are 
higher than on income inelastic commodities) and public spending is high. In contrast, 
the Republican party has an electoral incentive to weigh less heavily redistribution (vis-à-
vis efficiency) as a guiding principle of tax design and spending is lower compared with 
the provision of the public good under a Democrat administration. Parties’ beliefs that 
voters with partisan loyalties deliver the highest marginal proportion of the expected 
votes explain why the Democrat (Republican) party proposes a platform close to the ideal 
policies of Democrat (Republican) voters. 
Recent empirical analysis suggests that parties in the central government and in 
the states implement different fiscal policies. In particular, the evidence shows that 
Democrat administrations are associated with higher spending and tax revenue. Our 
Downsian model can explain tax divergence. Our model suggests that, even if parties are 
only concerned in winning the election,  each party will aggregate differently the 
demands of the same electorate (due to voters’ attitudes) and therefore the fiscal 
                                                 
63 The opposite holds if the function of the probability to vote for the party is concave and partisan voters 
deliver the lowest marginal proportion of the votes. In this case, the Republican (Democrat) party has an 
electoral incentive to be more responsive to the demands for fiscal policy of Democrat (Republican) voters. 
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platforms of parties will, in general, diverge.64 Thus, our model provides a different 
rationale for tax divergence. In particular, our analysis is different to models in which the 
lack of fiscal convergence is explained by candidates’ preferences over policy outcomes. 
The probabilistic theory of elections  predicts that public policy reflects more 
closely the preferences of the coalition(s) of voters that are more effective to influence 
policy makers. By introducing voters’ partisan attitudes, we are able to identify groups 
that may influence parties through the coalitions’ propensity to vote for the party and the 
relative size of the coalition with respect the electorate. In our model, we provide 
conditions in which a more dominant coalition of Democrat voters in the electorate 
induce both parties to design a tax policy that reflects more closely the ideal fiscal policy 
of Democrat voters ( higher spending and a more progressive tax structure) even when 
divergence of parties’ policies persist. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
64 Still, we are able to characterize sufficient conditions that guarantee the convergence of parties’ policies. 
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ESSAY III:  PUBLIC GOODS AND TAX STRUCTURE UNDER VOTERS’ 
PARTISAN PREFERENCES AND POLICY MOTIVATED PARTIES 
 
The leading paradigm of electoral competition, the Downs’ model, explains the 
design of fiscal policy under two fundamental assumptions: First, citizens vote for the 
party that advances the platform that is closest to voters’ preferences over policies. 
Second, parties propose policies to win the election. However, evidence suggests that the 
individuals’ choice of the vote is explained, among other things, by parties’ policies and 
voters’ partisan attitudes. Evidence also suggests that the voter’s party identification is 
the best predictor of the actual vote (Republican voters tend to vote for the Republican 
party), and the stylized facts indicate that the vast majority of the American electorate has 
a partisan attitude.65 With respect the second Downsian assumption, many researchers 
have emphasized that parties seek to win the election to advance the interests of parties’ 
supporters.66 In other words, parties have preferences over policy outcomes and 
therefore, parties do not seek to propose policies to win the election (Downs, 1957) but 
seek to win the election to implement their ideal policies. 
The formulation of fiscal policy when the individuals’ choice of the vote is 
explained by policy issues and partisan attitudes, and parties are policy motivated has not 
received adequate attention in the literature. In this context, questions such as how voters’ 
preferences will be aggregated, and what is the impact of the representation of voters’ 
interests on the tradeoff between redistributive politics and efficiency have not been 
addressed. Furthermore, the question on how parties’ interest for policy and the electoral 
                                                 
65 For analysis on voting behavior and partisan attitudes see Niemi and Weisberg (2001), Miller, and 
Shanks (1996), Green, Palmquist, and Schickler (2002), Fiorina (1997), Green and Palmquist (1990), 
Campbell, et al. (1960). 
66 See Wittman (1973, 1990), Hibbs (1987), Alesina (1987, 1988), Roemer (2001) and others. 
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competition influence the tradeoff between efficiency and redistribution has not received 
attention. 
Finally, considering policy motivated parties and an electorate with partisan 
attitudes allows us to recognize that parties’ electoral constraints are affected by voters’ 
loyalties.67 To see this, note that if party’s share of the vote is explained (at least at some 
extent) by voters’ attitudes then the party’s need to design policies with the support of a 
majority is softened.68 In this context, it is of significant interest to ask: What is the size 
of public spending and what determines tax structure when the electoral constraints of 
policy motivated parties are softened?  
A model that incorporates different sets of electoral constraints is not only 
relevant for the theoretical analysis of fiscal policy design, but also recent empirical 
evidence suggests that imperfections in political competition affect the tax and spending 
policies of state governments. For instance, Reed (2006), Alt and Lowry (2001), Caplan 
(2001) and Rogers and Rogers (2000) find evidence that state taxes increase when 
Democrats have significant control of the executive and legislative bodies of state 
governments.69 Caplan (2001) finds that corporate and income taxes tend to rise under 
Democrat control of state legislatures and fall with larger Republican majorities. 
Chernick (2005) finds that party control by Republicans is associated with more 
regressive state tax structures. Fletcher and Murray (2006) find that party control is 
                                                 
67 We define the electoral constraints of a party, as party’s need to design policies with the support of a 
majority to win the election. 
68 To see this, suppose three states of nature in which a party expects to receive respectively, 10%, 20%, 
and 30%, of party’s share of the vote from voters who decide their vote based on their party identification. 
Thus, conditional to the state of nature, a policy motivated party might select policies that seek to secure 
the 41%, 31%, and 21%, respectively, of the share of vote to win the election. Hence, the proportion of the 
vote a party expects to receive because of voters’ loyalties reduces party’s need to design policies with the 
support of a majority. In this sense, the electoral constraints of the party are softened. 
69  Party’s control of the legislature can be interpreted as an environment in which a majoritarian coalition 
faces little or imperfect political competition. 
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positively associated with higher top income tax rates, higher income threshold for the 
first bracket of the income tax, and Democrat administrations lead to higher earned 
income tax credits. Thus, for the purpose of explaining the observed spending and tax 
policies of governments, it is important that our models incorporate how imperfections in 
the political arena affect the decision making process of policy. 
The main contribution of this essay is to extend the literature on tax and 
expenditure design when the voting behavior is influenced by voters’ preferences over 
policy issues and partisan loyalties, and parties have preferences over fiscal outcomes. In 
our analysis, the relative merits of efficiency versus redistribution in designing the tax 
system are determined by the process of aggregation of voters’ preferences and parties’ 
preferences over policy. That is, tax policy is the result of two conflicting incentives: On 
the one hand, parties seek to design a tax system that redistributes in favor of party’s 
followers. On the other hand, parties’ need to win the election forces parties to design a 
tax platform that appeals to a majority. The two conflicting incentives describe the 
tradeoff between the narrow interests of the party versus the pluralist preferences of the 
electorate in determining fiscal policy. This tradeoff depends on the electoral constraints 
faced by parties. 
The model of electoral competition developed in this essay allows us to 
distinguish different sets of electoral constraints for parties. If a party faces soft electoral 
constraints (due to a high proportion of loyal voters in the electorate) then party’s 
dominant strategy is to select the ideal policy of party’s constituency. In this case, the 
tradeoff between the narrow interests of parties versus the pluralist preferences of the 
electorate suggests that soft electoral constraints lead to fiscal cycles, that is, increases on 
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tax and spending under Democrat administrations and reductions on tax and spending 
under Republican governments. 
If, in contrast, the electoral constraints are binding then parties select policies that 
appeal to a majority of voters. However, even in the case in which the electoral 
constraints are binding, candidates’ policies do not converge since voters’ loyalties 
induce parties to aggregate the preferences of the electorate differently. We identify 
conditions in which a differential commodity tax system will be used to redistribute tax 
burdens in favor of individuals with a partisan bias towards the party. That is, policies of 
the Democrat (Republican) party follow closely the preferences of Democrat 
(Republican) voters.70 Under certain conditions, re-distributional concerns dominate the 
design of policy for Democrat governments while efficiency issues are more heavily 
weighed in the design of the tax system under Republican administrations.  
 
Literature Review and the Case for Policy Motivated Parties in the Analysis 
of Public Finance 
 
The leading paradigm of the theory of elections, the Downs’ model, suggests that 
parties design fiscal policy to win the election. This assumption has been challenged by 
Wittman (1973, 1990), Hibbs (1987), Roemer (2001) and others. Their argument is that 
parties have preferences over policy outcomes since parties represent the interests of their 
constituencies. For example, Hibbs (1987) argues that the Democrat party weighs more 
heavily the undesired effects on the economy of unemployment (vis-à-vis the negative 
                                                 
70 Evidence from the American National Election Studies (ANES) suggests that Democrat (Republican) 
voters support high (low) spending. Moreover, voters with low (high) levels of income are identified with 
the Democrat (Republican) party. This suggests that income transfers and a progressive tax structure would 
be supported (opposed) by Democrat (Republican) voters. 
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effects of inflation) since voters favoring the Democrat party (those typically with 
incomes around the median income or below) weigh more heavily unemployment 
concerns than inflation concerns. The opposite is said to hold for the Republican party.71  
If parties seek to advance the interests of their constituencies then the analysis of 
parties with preferences over policy outcomes (or Wittman’s electoral competition) is 
relevant for the study of public finance. To see this, we use data from the ANES which 
shows voters’ characteristics and preferences over spending. This data suggests that on 
average, for the period 1952-2004, Democrat (Republican) voters prefer an increase 
(decrease) in government expenditure compared to the level of spending at the status quo. 
Data from the ANES also shows that individuals with low levels of income are identified 
with the Democrat party, while voters at high levels of income are identified with the 
Republican party. Thus, if parties represent the preferences over policies of their 
constituencies, then the Democrat party would propose higher government spending and 
redistribution would play a more prominent role (vis-à-vis efficiency) on tax design 
compared to the policies proposed by the Republican party. Therefore, the analysis of 
public policies when parties are policy motivated is relevant for the tradeoff between 
redistributive politics and efficiency, the indirect-direct tax controversy, and the size and 
composition of public spending. 
Empirical evidence seems to be on line with the conventional wisdom that 
Democrat administrations lead to higher spending and redistribution. For instance, 
Blomberg and Hess (2003) finds evidence of a fiscal cycle with federal taxes and 
spending increasing (falling) under Democrat (Republican) administrations. Alesina, 
                                                 
71 For arguments along the same lines see Alesina (1987, 1988), Alesina and Rosenthal (1995), and Paldam 
(1997). 
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Roubini and Cohen (1999) also find that budget deficits are higher under Republican 
administrations.72 Caplan (2001) finds that corporate and income taxes tend to rise under 
Democrat control of state legislatures and fall with larger Republican majorities. Overall, 
this evidence suggests the existence of cycles in the fiscal policies of the federal and state 
governments in the U.S. 
Our review of the literature and the surveys conducted by Hettich and Winer 
(1997, 1999, 2004), Mueller (2003), Gould and Baker (2002), Roemer (2001), Poterba 
(1999), and Holcombe (1998) indicate that the theoretical applications of the Wittman’s 
electoral competition to the analysis of public finance have received little attention. For 
example, insights might be gained by analyzing the type of tax structure, the selection of 
tax bases, and the special provisions that would arise in the context of the Wittman’s 
electoral competition. For instance, Roemer (1997, 1999, 2001) considers the possibility 
of progressive income taxes. Roemer (2001) shows that under certain assumptions, policy 
motivated candidates propose the ideal policy of the median voter.73 According to this 
prediction, the electoral constraints are binding as to remove any distortion on the 
representation of voters’ preferences that might have been created by parties seeking to 
advance the interests of their political base. However, the median voter outcome is not 
the only equilibrium that might arise under the Wittman’s political competition. In the 
analysis of Roemer (1997, 2001), the ideal policies of parties might also be an 
equilibrium. In this case, the electoral constraints are not binding at all and a party is able 
                                                 
72 For international evidence on differences of parties’ fiscal policies, see Mueller (2003) and Alesina, 
Roubini and Cohen (1999), Mueller (2003). 
73 These assumptions include: Policy motivated parties have perfect information on voters’ preferences, the 
individuals’ voting behavior is driven only by policy issues, policy is one-dimensional, and the ideal policy 
of the median voter is bounded by the ideal policies of parties. 
  
79
 
to advance the interests of a faction inside the party without any consideration to the 
preferences of the median voter (or for that matter of the rest of the electorate). 
Roemer assumes that parties have perfect information on voters’ preferences, and 
the individuals’ choice of the vote is driven by policy issues. However, Roemer’s 
analysis of the Wittman’s electoral competition cannot be extended to study 
multidimensional policies when there is political-economic heterogeneity of voters and 
parties have perfect information on voters’ preferences, since the model does not produce 
an equilibrium.74 Thus, to be able to predict policies, we need to extend the analysis of 
the Wittman’s electoral competition from the perspective of the probabilistic theory of 
elections.75 If we assume that parties have imperfect information on voters’ preferences, 
then the properties of the probabilistic function that translates policies into votes and the 
individuals’ voting behavior become central elements to explain the design of fiscal 
policies.  
Most of the probabilistic models of electoral competition assume that the 
individuals’ vote is driven by policy issues. In contrast, empirical evidence shows that the 
voting behavior depends not only on policy issues but also on voters’ partisan loyalties. 
Furthermore, an overwhelming majority of the American electorate has a partisan 
attitude, and voter’s party identification is considered the best predictor of the choice of 
the vote.76 However, the analysis of tax design when policy motivated parties have 
                                                 
74 See Roemer (2001) for a careful analysis of the existence of an electoral equilibrium under the Wittman’s 
model. 
75 Based on imperfect information of parties, the probabilistic theory of elections produces an electoral 
equilibrium when policy is multidimensional and there is heterogeneity of voters’ preferences over policies. 
76 See Niemi and Weisberg (2001), Miller, and Shanks, (1996), Green, Palmquist, and Schickler, (2002), 
Fiorina (1997), Green, and Palmquist (1990), and Campbell, et al. (1960). 
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uncertainty on voters’ preferences and the individuals’ vote is explained by policy issues 
and partisan loyalties has not received attention. 
Voters’ partisan attitudes might influence the design of tax policy in several ways. 
First, voters’ partisan loyalties affect the individuals’ choice of the vote and therefore 
affect the way parties aggregates voters’ preferences.77 Second, when parties have 
preferences over policies, voters’ partisan loyalties might lead to softer electoral 
constraints allowing parties to set their own agenda on taxation. To see this, note that the 
proportion of partisan voters favoring the party increases the party’s chance to win the 
election. Therefore, if the party has significant political support (or votes) from loyal 
voters, then party’s dominant strategy is to propose the ideal policy of party’s 
constituency instead of designing a policy that seeks to represent the preferences over 
policy of a majority of the electorate.78 In this sense, an electorate with partisan attitudes 
might soften the electoral constraints of the party and affect the design of fiscal policies.  
Empirical evidence suggests that imperfections in the process of political 
competition affect the tax and spending policies of state governments. For instance, Reed 
(2006), Alt and Lowry (2001), Caplan (2001) and Rogers and Rogers (2000) find 
evidence that state taxes increase when Democrats have significant control of the 
executive and legislative bodies of state governments.79 Nelson (2000) reports that 
Democrat administrations enacted 59% of the statutory state tax increases between 1943 
                                                 
77 See Ponce-Rodriguez (2006). 
78 To see this, note that under the absence of electoral constraints (in the special case that the party wins the 
election with certainty) a party with preferences over policies selects the party’s ideal policy. On the 
opposite case, if the party has an intrinsic disadvantage to win the election (for example, because of the 
well known incumbency advantage, see Mueller, 2003) then the party will have to look for additional votes 
by taking policy positions that appeal not only to party’s base but also to a majority of the electorate to win 
the election. 
79 Party’s control of the legislature can be interpreted as an environment in which a majoritarian coalition 
faces little or imperfect political competition. 
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and 1993, and 39% of total tax increases were approved under Democrat control of the 
legislature. Fletcher and Murray (2006) find that party control is positively associated 
with higher top income tax rates, higher income threshold for the first bracket of the 
income tax, and Democrat administrations lead to higher earned income tax credits. 
Chernick (2005) finds that party control by Republicans is associated with more 
regressive state tax structures. Rogers and Rogers (2000) also find that imperfect political 
competition (in this case measured by an index that depends on the share of the vote in 
the governor’s election) leads to greater state tax revenue and spending. Thus, for the 
purpose of explaining the observed spending and tax policies of governments, it is 
important that our models incorporate how imperfections in the political arena affect the 
decision making process of policy. 
Another important difference between the Downs’ and the Wittman’s models of 
electoral competition lies on how voters’ preferences for policy are aggregated. In a 
representative democracy, the question of representation of preferences is central for the 
tradeoff between redistributive politics and efficiency. In the case of the leading model of 
elections, the process of preference aggregation is characterized by the tastes of the 
median voter, see Romer (1975, 1977), Roberts (1977), and Meltzer and Richard (1981, 
1983). In the probabilistic theory of elections, voters’ demands are aggregated according 
to voters’ propensity to vote for the party (see Hettich & Winer, 1997, 1999; and 
Coughlin, 1992). Roemer finds that in the case of the Wittman’s electoral competition 
when parties have perfect information of voters’ preferences and policy is one-
dimensional, the aggregation of interests is characterized by either: The preferences of 
the median voter or the interests of the party’s constituency. However, the aggregation of 
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voters’ preferences in the Wittman’s electoral model when parties have imperfect 
information on voters’ preferences ( when the voting behavior is probabilistic) remains an 
unanswered question. 
To sum up, applications of the electoral competition with policy motivated parties 
to public finance have received little attention. In particular, Wittman’s electoral 
competition model has not been extended to the study the tradeoff between redistributive 
politics and efficiency in a setting with multidimensional tax/spending policies and 
heterogeneity of preferences (endowments) of voters. In this context, there exists a 
tradeoff between parties’ interests and the preferences of the electorate in determining 
fiscal policy. Moreover, in this setting, the aggregation of voters’ preferences and the 
effect of the representation of voters’ interests on tax design remain open questions. 
In addition, empirical evidence suggests that imperfections in political 
competition increases spending and tax revenue under Democrat administrations. 
Evidence also suggests that the lack of convergence of parties’ policies leads to cycles in 
the fiscal policies of the federal and state governments. The main focus of this essay is to 
find answers to the questions outlined above and to develop a model that introduces soft 
electoral constraints to explain tax policy and fiscal cycles. 
 
Voters’ Preferences for Tax Structure 
 
Consider an economy with a continuum of voters-consumers. In this economy, 
individuals choose their consumption vector over the opportunity set and participate 
politically by voting for a party. We consider two candidates-parties denoted by k and -k 
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competing to form the government. Preferences and the opportunity set for individuals 
are characterized as follows: 
 
   ( ) ( ), 1hk h h k hksU Gβμ β ε= + −x  and ( )k h h h k h hw L= + ≤q x px c t  h∀       (34) 
 
Where hkU  is the overall utility of consumer h if party k forms the government. 
( ),h h ksGμ x  represents the preferences over private consumption nh ℜ∈x  and the public 
good ksG . The parameter 
hkε  measures the partisan preference or attachment of consumer 
h for party k and hβ  is a weighing parameter such that [ ]0,1   h hβ β= ∈ ∀ . Equation (34) 
implies that the overall utility of individuals depend not only on the policies that each 
party might enact (through the influence of kt  on hx  and the provision of ksG ) but also 
that individuals have a preference relation over the party in power. Here we adopt the 
Michigan school approach to partisan preference. Consequently, we assume that the 
voters’ party identification (or preference) is learned during childhood through a process 
of socialization, and it is largely exogenous (not based on policy views), see Campbell et 
al. (1960), Miller and Shanks (1996), among others.80 
The opportunity set is defined by consumers’ price k k= +q p t . We assume that 
the supply of private commodities is perfectly elastic at ip  ∀ 1,2....i n= . The producers’ 
value is hpx  and ( ) h k k h=c t t x  is the tax liability of individual h under tax policies 
nk ℜ∈t proposed by party k, and labor income is given by h hw L . 
 
                                                 
80 This explains why we introduce the partisan preference as an additive parameter in (34). 
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 From (34) we can derive the indirect utility function hkV :81 
 
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }* * *, , 1 , 1 s.t: hk h k k h hk h h k hk k h h hs sV G y Max G w Lβυ β ε βμ β ε= + − = + − ≤t x q x       (35) 
 
From equation (35) we obtain the ideal policy of voter h (denoted as * *h hs,Gt ) by 
maximizing the indirect utility hkV  subject to the constraint that the public good is 
financed by taxation. That is, we consider voters’ preference relation over the policy 
space constrained by the public budget condition ( )hsG R= t , where the right hand side of 
the constraint is the tax revenue function ( ) ( )dhyxtR
h
h
i
n
h
h
i ∫∑ ∀== ,1 tt , and where ( )yx hi ,t  is 
the Marshallian demand which depends on full income y and tax structure. Hence, the 
ideal fiscal policies * *h hs,Gt  for voter h can be found by:
82 
 
  { } ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) hkh hi
n
h
h
i
hhhh
s
hhhh
s
hh dhyxtyGVyGMax
h
εββυβδ −+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛== ∫∑ ∀= 1,,,,,,  1 ttttt      (36) 
 
The indirect utility function that recognizes the opportunity budget set of the 
individual and the public government’s constraint (that is ( ), ,h h h hsG yδ t ) is our primitive 
preference relation over the policy space and it is assumed to be a concave function of 
taxes.83 By finding * : 0h hi it tδ∂ ∂ = *,  1,...it i n∀ =  we obtain the optimal tax structure for 
                                                 
81  Equation (35) is obtained by finding ( ) ( ) ( )* argmax , 1 s.t: h hk h h k hk k h h h k h hsU G w Lβμ β ε∈ = + − = + ≤x x q x px c t . 
82 For convenience we normalize (35) as shown in (36). 
83  Note that { }h k h k h ki i s it t G Rδ υ υ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ +∂ ∂ , where ( ) kii tRR ∂∂= t  is the marginal tax revenue and 
{ } { }22 2 2 2 2 2 0h k h k h k h ki i s i s iit t G R G Rδ υ υ υ∂ ∂ =∂ ∂ +∂ ∂ +∂ ∂ ≤  where 2 2 0h kitυ∂ ∂ ≥ , decreasing marginal utility 
on public goods implies { }22 2 0h ks iG Rυ∂ ∂ ≤  while { } 0h ks iiG Rυ∂ ∂ ≤  if the marginal tax revenue is 
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voter h denoted as [ ]* ** *1 2, ,......h hh hnt t t=t , while the most preferred level of the public good 
is obtained by using  [ ]* ** *1 2, ,......h hh hnt t t=t  into ( )* * *
1
,
n
h h h h h
s i ih
i
G t x y dh
=
=∑ ∫ t . Finally the 
utility of the individual’s ideal policies is given by ( )( )* * * * *, ,h h h h hsGδ εt t . 
Let us define ( ) { }( ),1 1h h k hkθ ε β β ε ε β β−= Δ − = − − ,  where { },h k hkε ε ε−Δ = −  
represents the partisan bias, hθ  is the partisan bias normalized by a factor related with the 
weight in which the partisan preference explains the individuals’ choice of the vote. Let 
voters identified with the Democrat party have a preference bias 0θ <  for party k (or 
Democrat party) and Republican voters have a bias 0θ >  for party –k (or Republican 
party). Evidence from the American National Election Studies (ANES) suggests that 
Democrat (Republican) voters support high (low) spending. Moreover, voters with low 
(high) levels of income are identified with the Democrat (Republican) party. We use 
these stylized facts to characterize voters’ preferences and type as follows: Let the 
domain of the distribution of voters’ partisan type be [ ]θθθ ,∈h . Also, let the most 
preferred level of public good for [ ] 00:,, 1010 >∧<∈∀ θθθθθθ  be denoted as 
( ) ( )* 0 * 1s sG Gθ θ≥ , and ( )α θ  represents the marginal utility of income of voter type θ . 
According to the available evidence from the ANES, voters’ preferences for policy and 
parties are characterized as follows: ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1, , :  G Gθ θ θ θ θ θ υ θ υ θ α θ α θ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈ ≤ → ≥ ∧ ≥⎣ ⎦ : 
( ) ( )* 0 * 1s sG Gθ θ≥  where ( )Gυ θ  is the marginal utility of the public good for voter type 
θ , and ( )Covariance , 0yθ ≥  where y  is full income. 
                                                                                                                                                 
decreasing in tax rates, that is if 2 2 0kii iR R t= ∂ ∂ ≤ . Thus, concavity of ( ), ,h h h hsG yδ t  implies that the 
decreasing marginal utility of public goods and decreasing marginal tax revenue dominate  2 2 0h kitυ∂ ∂ ≥ . 
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Electoral Competition between Policy Motivated Parties and the 
Tradeoff between Redistribution and Efficiency 
 
In this section we characterize tax policy as a result of the electoral competition 
between policy motivated parties that seek to hold office. We assume parties k and -k 
compete by selecting fiscal policies. The parties’ objective is to design fiscal policies that 
maximize the expected utility of a faction inside the party. Parties’ platforms, however, 
need to recognize the electoral constraints in order to maximize the parties’ chance to 
hold office. 
Let ( ),k k kπ −Ρ Ρ  be the probability of winning the election for party k  where the 
vector 1 : ,k n k k ksG
+ ⎡ ⎤∈ℜ = ⎣ ⎦Ρ Ρ t  denotes the public policies proposed by party k and k−Ρ  
are the policies of party -k.  Also, assume that parties are uncertain about the voting 
behavior.84 Thus, parties’ system of beliefs on the voting behavior is characterized as 
follows: Let there exists a voter h with a partisan attitude hθ  and a pair of policies 
,k k−Ρ Ρ  such that the probability voter h votes for candidate k is hkPr .85 Let kf  be the 
probability distribution function (pdf) over ( ) ( ) ( ) hkskkhkshkhh yGyGk θυυθ −−=−Ψ −−− ,,,, tt  
which is defined as the net utility from policy and partisan issues for voter type hθ  if 
party k is elected. Note that ( )yG ksk k ,,tυ  is the utility for voter h when party k selects 
policies ksG
k ,t , and a similar interpretation is given to ( )yG ksk k ,, −− −tυ . Thus, hkPr  is 
given by 
                                                 
84 The choice of the vote can be influenced, among other things, by policy issues, partisan attitudes, voters’ 
perceptions over candidates (such as candidates’ religion, gender, ethnic background, honesty), and a 
retrospective view of candidates’ performance (see Fiorina, 1997). Therefore, it is quite compelling to 
assume that parties do not have perfect information on the determinants of the vote. 
85 See Appendix H for the characterization of the individuals’ voting calculus. 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ),Pr   Pr , , hhk hk hk k k h k k k h k h h k h hs sh voting k G G f d Fυ υ θ ψ ψ θΨ− − − −∞= − − = = Ψ −∫t t . 
The expression [ ]: 0,1k k k hF θ−× × →P P  is the cumulative distribution function 
evaluated at ( )h hθΨ −  for some hθ  and ,k k−Ρ Ρ . Assume kF  is a continuous, and non 
decreasing function of ( )h hθΨ − . 
For convenience of the analysis, let the distribution of types of the partisan 
preference be given by ,hθ θ θ⎡ ⎤∈ ⎣ ⎦  where { }h hMinθ θ ∀=  , { }h hMaxθ θ ∀=  with 
0 0θ θ< ∧ > . Let [ ]θθθ , ∈∀ h  there is a fraction of voters ( )g θ  such that 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )  , = :Pr Pr Pr , ,h h hk h k k k k k k k k ks sh h g G G f dθθθ θ θ θ υ υ θ ψ ψΨ −′ ′ − − − −∞′∀ ≠ ∈ = = = − − = ∫t t
 for ( ) ( ) ( ) θυυθ −−=−Ψ −−− yGyG kskkksk k ,,,, tt . The proportion of the expected votes is 
a function that aggregates the probabilities of voting for a candidate across voters’ 
partisan type ,θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈⎣ ⎦ . Hence, the proportion of the expected votes for party k is: 
 
       ( ) ( ) ( )( ),k k k kg F dθθφ θ θ θ−Ρ Ρ = Ψ −∫                      (37) 
 
In the same fashion the proportion of the expected vote for candidate –k is 
( ) ( ) ( )( ),k k k kg F dθθφ θ θ θ− − −= −Ψ∫Ρ Ρ .86 
                                                 
86 The equation is derived as follows: A voter h will vote for candidate –k iff  0h h hθ υ−Ψ = −Δ ≥ . The 
probability that a voter h votes for candidate -k is given by 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )Pr voting Pr Pr hh k h k h h k h h h h k h hk f d Fθ υ ψ ψ θ−Ψ− − − −−∞− = −Ψ = −Δ = = −Ψ∫ . Hence the 
proportion of the expected vote for party k−  is:  
( ) ( )( )k kg F dθθφ θ θ θ− −= −Ψ∫           (37’) 
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The probability to win the election is denoted as the cumulative distribution over 
the plurality of parties. Let [ ]: 0,1k k kW φ φ−× →  where we assume kW  is a continuous 
non decreasing and concave cumulative distribution function of taxes. Let 
( ) 0k k kW w ρ′ = ≥  be the corresponding pdf. Therefore the probability of winning the 
election is: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ,k k k k k k k k k k k k ks sG Gπ π π ρ π φ φ− − − −= × × = = −Ρ Ρ t t       (38) 
 
Where ( ) ( ), ,k k k k k k kρ φ φ− − −= −Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ  is the proportion of the expected plurality 
for party k. Let ( ) ( )
1 1
 0 1
k k
k k k klim lim
ρ ρ
π ρ π ρ
→− →
= ∧ =  while ( ) ( ), 0 1 2k k k kWπ − = =Ρ Ρ  for 
0k k kρ φ φ−= − = . Hence we can characterize the probability of winning the election as: 87 
 
     ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,kk k k k k k k k k kw d Wρπ ρ ρ φ φ− − − −−∞ ⎡ ⎤= = −⎣ ⎦∫Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ       (39) 
 
As mentioned earlier, the problem for candidate k is to select the tax vector and 
the public good that leads to the highest expected utility of the candidate subject to the 
spatial mobility constraints imposed by electoral competition. Formally, the problem for 
candidates is: 
   { }
( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( )
{ } ( ) { } ( ) ( ) ( )∫
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87 The expression for party –k is ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), , ,kk k k k k k k k k kw d Wρπ ρ ρ φ φ−− − − − − −−∞ ⎡ ⎤= = −⎣ ⎦∫Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ  
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For party k, kℑ  is the expected utility of candidate k , { } ( )1 ,k k k kyπ δ −− Ρ  is the 
expected utility under the state in which the opposition wins and implements policies 
,k ksG
− −t , and ( ),k k k kyπ δ Ρ  is the expected utility in the state in which party k wins and 
implements policies ,k ksGt . A similar interpretation is given for 
k−ℑ . To save space we 
develop the analysis of the policy platform for party k, while the case of party –k is only 
discussed in the interpretation of the results. The optimality conditions for the tax system 
proposed by party k are given by: 
 
     ( ) ( )( ) 0kk k k k
k k
i i
d dg f d
dt dt
θ
θ
δθ θ θ δ π⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫Ψϒ Ψ − Δ + =⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭∫   1,....Wkit i n∀ =           (41) 
 
Where ( )2k k kw ρϒ =  and ( ) ( ) 0k k k k kδ δ δ −Δ = − ≥P P . At equilibrium, the 
marginal gain of the candidate’s spatial mobility is the marginal expected payoff for 
candidate k of holding office (the first expression in 8). The term { }k k kitπ δ∂ ∂  is the 
expected marginal utility change (or cost) for the candidate where  
{ }k k k k k ki i s id dt t dG Rδ υ υ= ∂ ∂ + ∂  and ki iR R t= ∂ ∂  is the marginal tax collection.  
It is instructive to distinguish among the different types of policies that might 
arise. Hence we denote ( ) arg max , : 0Dk
i
Dk k k k k
i i t
t tπ π−∈ ∂ ∂ =Ρ Ρ  as the tax system Dkt  
under the Downs’ electoral equilibrium. This policy arises when electoral competition 
leads all parties to advance a platform that maximizes a politically aggregated welfare 
function. Let the vector [ ],D Dk D k−=t t t  denote the set of policies compatible with the 
Downsian electoral equilibrium. Now let the vector [ ],W W Wk k−=t t t  denotes the set of 
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public policies derived from the Wittman’s electoral competition where 
( ) { } ( ){ }arg max 1 : 0Wk
i
Wk k k k k k k k k
i i t
t tπ δ π δ −+ − ∂ℑ ∂ =t t . Lastly, we define 
( ) ** arg max  , , : 0
i
k
k k k k k k k
i s i tt G y tδ δ∈ ∂ ∂ =t  as the candidate’s most preferred policy 
platform leading to the set of policies [ ]* * *,k k−=t t t . Following Roemer (2001) we 
assume the distribution of parties’ preferences are given as follows * *k k−≥t t . 
Now, we can proceed to analyze the properties of our model of electoral 
equilibrium. Rearranging the optimality conditions in (41) we characterize the tradeoff 
between political redistribution and efficiency as follows: 
 
   
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
n
k
k k k k kj ij
j
k k k k ki G G
t g S d g f d c T i g d
X yg f d
θ θ
θ θθ
θ θ
θ
θ θ θ θ λ θ π δ λ θ θ
θ θ υ θ π δ υ
= Ψ − + ϒ Δ ⎧ ⎫∂− = −⎨ ⎬∂⎩ ⎭Ψ − + ϒ Δ
∑ ∫ ∫ ∫∫
     (42) 
 
In (42),  ( ){ }0G xMRS T iλ α −= −  is the marginal utility of the net fiscal exchange 
for voter type θ  characterized by the product of the marginal utility of income (α ) and 
the difference between the voter’s valuation of the public good in terms of the 
nummeraire private good 0x  (that is 0G xMRS − ) and the voter’s tax share in tax instrument 
i, ( ) k ki i i iT i t x t X= , where ( ) θθθθ dxgX ii ∫= . The expressions ( ) ( )( )kg f dθθ θ θ λ θΨ −∫   
and ( ) ( )( )k Gg f dθθ θ θ υ θΨ −∫  are the marginal proportion of the expected votes from the 
electorate obtained from λ  and the marginal utility of the public good Gυ . Similarly, kλ  
and kGυ  correspond to the marginal utility of the net fiscal exchange and the marginal 
utility of the public good of candidate k. The term ( ) ( ) ( )E c yT i c yT i g dθθ θ θ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ∫  
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is the expected extra tax revenue that the government obtains as a result of redistributing 
one dollar to voters. The left hand side of (42) is the percentage change along the 
compensated demand of commodity i  as a result of the tax system where c kij i jS x t= ∂ ∂  is 
the change in the compensated demand ( cix ) due to a change in prices. The tax rule in 
(42) can be characterized as follows: 
 
( ) ( )( )[ ] ( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( ) ( )⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
∂−Δ+−Ψ
Δ+−Ψ+−Ψ=−
∑ ∫
= iT
y
cE
Υf
Υff
X
dSgt
k
G
kkk
G
k
kkkkkkk
i
n
j
ij
k
j
υδπυθ
λδπλθλθσθθ
θ
θ ,1      (43) 
 
Expression (43) suggests that the efficiency-redistribution tradeoff is explained by 
a combination of party’s own preferences over tax structure and the electoral incentives 
to redistribute tax burdens in favor of voters who deliver the highest expected proportion 
of the vote. To see this, consider the case 1kπ → , then the tax design problem is the one 
describing an economy in which parties do not face electoral constraints.88 We impose 
condition 1kπ =  in (40) and solve the candidate’s problem to obtain: 
    
( ) ( ) ( )
1
,
0
k k k nk ks k k
i j j ik k k ji i s
G
x g d t x t g dt t G θ θ
δ υ υ θ θ θ θ∀ ∀=
∂ ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂= + + ∂ ∂ =⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂ ⎣ ⎦∑∫ ∫
t
  * , kit i∀           (44) 
 
Rearranging terms, equation (44) can be expressed as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( )1
n
k
j ij kj
k
i G
t S g d
c T i g dX y
θ
θ θ
θ
θ θ λ θ θυ
= ∂− = − ∂
∑ ∫
∫ * ,  1,...kit i n∀ =       (45) 
 
                                                 
88 We define the electoral constraints of a party, as the party’s need to design policies with the support of a 
majority to win the election. If 1kπ → , party k, wins the election with certainty. 
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In (45), ( )
0
k
s
kk k k
G xMRS T iλ α −⎡ ⎤= −⎣ ⎦  is the marginal utility of the net fiscal 
exchange for candidate k, and kGυ  is the marginal utility of the public good for party k. 
Equation (45) says that under the absence of electoral constrains for party k, the 
aggregation of preferences is dominated by the tastes of the representative faction inside 
party k. In this case, the tax rate over a commodity i  in the most preferred tax system of 
candidate k is explained by the normalized net fiscal exchange gain ( kk Gλ υ ) of the 
candidate, and the cost sharing gains delivered by the collective action 
( ( ) ( )c yT i g dθ θ θ∀ ∂ ∂∫ ). 
From (45), the higher kk Gλ υ  the higher is the ideal tax rate *kit  to be used in the 
tax system *k n∈ℜt , since the net fiscal exchange gains obtained by candidate k are 
exhausted at high levels of spending on the public good and, therefore, the tax revenue to 
be collected is high. Fixing candidates’ preferences for the public good, the lower the tax 
share ( )kT i  from tax instrument *kit , the higher is the tax rate that candidate k would 
propose in the tax system. For instance, if party k represents followers with low income 
and commodity i  is an income elastic good then ( ) ( )1 0, ,k kT i y T i y≥  for 1 0y y≥  (i.e the 
share of tax liability in good i  is higher for individuals with higher levels of income). 
Therefore, the tax rate *kit  over an income elastic commodity that candidate k proposes in 
the tax system will be high.  
The term ( ) ( )c yT i g dθθ θ θ∂ ∂∫  is a weighted measure of the marginal tax 
revenue obtained by redistributing one dollar to all voters through the commodity tax 
system. From 
1
n
k
i i
i
c t x
=
= ∑  we obtain the marginal tax contribution of voter type θ  due to 
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an increase of one dollar income (
1
n
i i
i
c y t x y
=
∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂∑ h∀ ), and the term ( )T i  in (45) is a 
weighing parameter. Hence, the higher is the marginal tax revenue obtained by 
redistributing one dollar to all voters through the tax system (the higher 
( ) ( )c yT i g dθ θ θ∀ ∂ ∂∫ ), the lower will be *kit  in the tax system. 
Condition (45) can characterize differences in tax policies between parties k and –
k that are attributed to parties’ preferences over policy. If party k represents the 
preferences of a faction of voters with low income and with a high valuation of the public 
good, while party –k represents a faction of voters with high income and low valuation of 
spending, then according to (45) party k proposes a higher tax rate over an income elastic 
commodity compared of that proposed by party –k. 
Equation (43) also allows us to study tax design when the electoral constraints are 
binding. As mentioned before, the tradeoff between efficiency and redistributive politics 
is explained by a combination of party’s own preferences over tax structure and the 
electoral incentives. The relative weight for the party’s preferences in determining the 
tradeoff between redistribution and efficiency is determined by k k kπ δΔ ϒ  in equation 
(43). If 0kπ →  leads to 0→ΥΔ kkk δπ  then the electoral concerns dominate the 
design of the tax system for party k. In this case, a policy motivated party proposes a 
platform in which the tax rule becomes: 
 
    
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )
1
,
k
n
k kj ij
j
k
i GG
t g S d f cE T i
X yf
θ
θ θ θ σ θ λ λ
υθ υ
= ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ⎡ ⎤∂⎣ ⎦− = + − ⎢ ⎥∂Ψ − ⎣ ⎦
∑ ∫
   1,....Wkit i n∀ =        (46) 
 
  
94
 
From (46), the pattern of redistributive taxation is explained by the covariance 
between voters’ marginal probability of voting for candidate k ( ( )( )kf θΨ − ) and the net 
fiscal exchange λ  (denoted as ( )( )[ ]λθσ ,−Ψkk f ). Hence, party k proposes a tax system 
with a higher tax rate Wkit*  when the distribution of preferences for the public good and 
tax liabilities are such that, higher than average marginal probabilities of voting for k are 
positively related with higher than average (positive) net fiscal exchange gains.89 
The relationship between the partisan preference bias, the aggregation of voters’ 
preferences for tax policy, and the candidates’ platforms can be explained as follows: 
From (41) the term (in the integral) ( ) ( )( )k kig f d dtθ θΨ − Ψ  is the marginal proportion 
of the expected vote due to a change in the well being of voter type θ . The expression 
( ) ( )( )kg fθ θΨ −  represents a weighing factor that determines how responsive candidate 
k is to the preferences over policy of voters type θ , while 0kit ><∂Ψ ∂  provides the 
marginal welfare change of the voter and, consequently, it shows the direction of the 
spatial mobility of the candidate.90  
Now, consider two different types of citizens with a partisan bias 
0 1 0 1, , : 0 0θ θ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∈ < ∧ >⎣ ⎦  and ideal policy positions ( ) ( )* 0 * 1i it tθ θ≥ , leading to 
( ) ( )0 1θ θΨ − ≥ Ψ −  * *,k ki it t −∀ . Assume the probability of the vote ( kF ) is convex and, to 
                                                 
89 In this case ( )( )[ ] 0, ≥−Ψ λθσ kk f , thus the higher the covariance the higher the tax rate *kit . 
90 Suppose 0kit θ∂Ψ ∂ ≥ , then at the margin, if candidate k increases tax rate i, then the candidate changes 
his expected proportion of the votes by ( ) ( )( )kg fθ θΨ − . 
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simplify let ( ) ( )0 1g gθ θ= , then it is satisfied ( )( ) ( )( )0 1k kf fθ θΨ − > Ψ − .91 In words, 
controlling for the proportion of voters’ type in the electorate, a Downsian candidate k 
will weigh more heavily the preferences over fiscal policies from individuals type 0θ , 
who have a partisan bias in favor of candidate k (that is, the Democrat/Republican party 
will weigh more heavily the preferences of Democrat/Republican voters). 
If differences in the partisan preferences are also associated with differences in 
the ideal policy positions of voters, that is, if ( ) ( )1*0*10    θθθθ ss GG ≥⇒<∀ , then the 
provision of the public good will be closer to the ideal level of the public good of citizens 
with a partisan bias towards party k (voters type 0θ ) and therefore, the provision of the 
public good by party k will be high at the Nash equilibrium. The opposite holds for the 
case kF  is a concave cumulative function of ( )θΨ − . Thus, for ( ) ( )0 1g gθ θ=  and 
( ) ( )* 0 * 1i it tθ θ≥  leading to ( ) ( )0 1θ θΨ ≥ Ψ  * *,k ki it t −∀ , and given ,k k−Ρ Ρ  then 
( )( ) ( )( )0 1k kf fθ θΨ − < Ψ −  for 0 10 0θ θ< ∧ > . This implies that a Downsian candidate 
k will weigh more heavily the preferences over fiscal policies from voters type 1θ  (or 
voters with a partisan bias towards candidate –k). Therefore, the provision of the public 
good will be lower compared with the previous case since by assumption 
( ) ( )* 0 * 1i it tθ θ≥ .92 
Furthermore, assume commodity i  is income elastic, let kF  be a convex function, 
0 10 0θ θ< ∧ > , and ( ) ( )* 0 * 1i it tθ θ≥  leads to ( ) ( )0 1θ θΨ ≥ Ψ  kWiWki tt −∀ ** , , then it must be 
                                                 
91 A convex cumulative density can be justified through an exogenous system of beliefs of parties in which 
loyal voters have the highest propensity to vote for the party. 
92 Since parties select policies in the region in which marginal tax revenues are positive (see Hettich & 
Winer, 1997,1999) then ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11*0*1*0*1*0* ,  if     ℜ∈≥⇒≥ θθθθθθ iissii ttGGtt . 
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( )( )[ ] 0, ≥−Ψ λθσ kk f , which implies that party k proposes a tax structure in which luxury 
goods are taxed more heavily. In the case commodity i is income inelastic, the tax rate of 
equilibrium Wkit *  will be lower. To see this, note that by assumption 
( ) ( )0 00 1G x G xMRS MRSθ θ− −≥  (i.e voters with partisan bias for party k prefer a higher 
level of spending compared to the ideal expenditure of voters with a partisan attitude 
towards party –k). If commodity i  is an income elastic commodity then 
( ) ( )10 ,, yiTyiT ≥   for individuals with 1 0y y≥  ( the share of the tax liability in good i  is 
higher for voters with higher levels of income). Data from ANES suggests that 
[ ] 0y,covariance ≥θ , therefore voters with a partisan bias for party k will be associated 
with lower than average shares of the tax price and therefore with higher than average 
values of the net fiscal exchange gains, hence ( ) ( )10 ,, yiyi λλ ≥ .93 Furthermore, for a 
convex kF , it holds ( )( ) ( )( )0 1k kf fθ θΨ ≥ Ψ  for 0 1θ θ< . Therefore, higher than 
average values of ( )( )kf θΨ −  will be associated with higher than average values of λ  
which implies ( )( )[ ] 0, ≥−Ψ λθσ kk f . Consequently, for an income elastic commodity, 
the tax rate Wkit *  in the tax system proposed by party k will be higher.
94 
                                                 
93 The notation ( )0, yiλ  reflects the net fiscal exchange gains from tax instrument i when voter type θ  has 
income 0y . 
94 A similar analysis can be made for an income inelastic good. Suppose commodity j is income inelastic 
such that ( ) ( )10 ,, yiyi λλ ≤  is satisfied for 1 0y y≥ . By the convexity of ( )( )kF θΨ ,  
( )( ) ( )( )0 1k kf fθ θΨ − ≥ Ψ −  for 0 1θ θ< . Thus, higher than average ( )( )kf θΨ −  will be associated 
with lower than average λ  which implies ( )( ) , 0k kfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦ . Therefore, for an income inelastic 
good, the tax rate  *kjt  on the tax system proposed by party k will be lower, the more negative is 
( )( ) , 0k kfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦ . 
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Now, let define ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )k kf g f dθθθ θ θ θΨ − = Ψ −∫   as the average of the marginal 
probability of the vote, [ ] ( ) θλθλ θθ dgE ∫=  as the expected net fiscal exchange across the 
electorate, and let define ( )( ) [ ]λθλ Ef k −Ψ= . By the mean value Theorem, it is satisfied 
( ) ( ) ( )k kGk
s
g f d f
G
θ
θ
υθ θ υ∂Ψ = Ψ∂∫ , where kG sGυ υ= ∂ ∂  is a politically weighted marginal 
utility of the public good. Therefore, the term Gλ υ  represents the ratio of the politically 
weighted measures of the net (λ ) and gross ( Gυ ) fiscal exchange gains.  The larger the 
ratio, the higher will be the tax rate used in the tax system since the political gains from 
the provision of the public good are exhausted at higher levels of public spending. 
The model suggests that an increase in the willingness to pay for the public good 
from the electorate ( ( )( )k Gf θ υΨ − ) does not necessarily implies that the level of the 
public good at the political equilibrium *ksG  will be higher. To see this, note that provided 
the numerator in (46) is positive/negative then a higher ( )( )k Gf θ υΨ −  tends to 
reduce/increase the tax rate Wkit * .
95 Hence we conclude that an increase in the willingness 
to pay for the public good from the electorate does not necessarily implies that the level 
of the public good at the political equilibrium *ksG  will be higher. 
The last term ( ) ( ) ( )E c yT i c yT i g dθθ θ θ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂⎣ ⎦ ∫  is the marginal tax revenue 
that the government expects to obtain as a result of redistributing one dollar to voters. 
                                                 
95  Our interpretation requires that an increase in ( )( )k Gf θ υΨ −  leads unchanged ( )( ) ,k kfσ θ λ⎡ ⎤Ψ −⎣ ⎦  and 
λ . Otherwise, the effect of a change in the expected vote from the net fiscal exchange on *kit  is ambiguous 
because a change in ( )( )k Gf θ υΨ −  would affect kσ  and λ . 
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Recall the government can induce a change in income across the electorate by changing 
the relative prices of commodities through the tax structure. In the equation, the 
individuals’ share of tax contributions ( ( )T i ) is a weighing factor of the marginal tax 
revenue ( c y∂ ∂ ) from returning one dollar to each taxpayer. From the expression in (46), 
the higher ( ) E c y T i⎡ ⎤∂ ∂⎣ ⎦  the lower the tax rate Wkit *  to be used in the tax system. 
So far we have analyzed the cases in which 1 0k kπ π→ ∧ → . For the case 
( )0,1kπ ∈ , the model suggests that the efficiency-redistribution tradeoff is explained by a 
combination of party’s own preferences over tax structure and the electoral incentives to 
redistribute tax burdens in favor of voters who might deliver the highest expected 
proportion of the vote (see equation 10). The (normalized) expected net fiscal exchange 
for candidate k, ( )k k k kπ δ λΔ ϒ , is positively related with *kit  since 0kπ ≥ , 0kδΔ ≥  and 
0kϒ ≥ . The numerator of (43) reflects the tradeoff between pluralist interest and narrow 
representation in designing tax policy. That is, a policy motivated party balances the 
incentives for designing a policy with the support of a majority of the electorate (the 
pluralist representation of preferences), or in other words, a policy that maximizes the 
expected proportion of the votes (this effect is captured by ( )( )[ ]λθσ ,−Ψkk f  and 
( )( )k Gf θ υΨ − ) versus a policy that maximizes the preferences of party’s followers (the 
narrow interest of a faction inside the party determined by kλ  and kGυ ). The relative 
influence of the pluralist versus narrow interest in determining policy is given by 
( )k k kπ δΔ ϒ . If ( ) 0k k kπ δΔ ϒ → , tax policy is determined by the joint interaction of  
preferences over policy of all voters. In this case, a policy motivated party behaves as a 
Downsian party, and the electoral competition leads parties to design a policy that 
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maximizes a politically aggregated welfare function and the tax system lies in the Pareto 
set. If, in contrast, ( )k k kπ δΔ ϒ →∞  then party’s electoral constraints are significantly 
softened and the party can advance its agenda on tax policy. Policy is determined by the 
narrow interest of groups or factions inside the party. 
Assuming the ideal policy of party’s followers is higher than the policy that 
maximizes the probability of winning the election, if *k Dk≥t t , then (46) and ( )0,1kπ ∈  
implies * *Wk k Dk k−≥ ≥ ≥t t t t .96 In other words, a policy motivated party k will reduce tax 
collections ( Wk Dk→t t ) as the electoral constraints dominate the design of tax policy (as 
0kπ → ). If in contrast, the electoral constraints are softened (if 1kπ → ) tax collections 
increase ( *Wk k→t t ) and redistribution in favor of the interest of parties’ followers plays a 
more prominent role in guiding the design of the tax system. A similar tax rule to that in 
(46) can be derived for party k− .97  Thus, for * *Wk k D k k−− −≤ ≤ ≤t t t t , the model implies 
that under soft electoral constraints for candidate –k (if 1kπ − → ), party –k designs a 
policy with lower tax collections ( *W k k− −→t t ) and efficiency dominates the design of the 
tax system (or equivalently, redistribution plays a less prominent role in the design of the 
tax system). If conversely, the electoral constraints dominate the design of tax policy (as 
0kπ − → ) the party –k increases tax collections ( *W k D k− −→t t ) and the tax policy of party 
–k lies in the Pareto set since the policy maximizes a politically aggregated welfare 
function. 
                                                 
96 This characterization of preferences is used by Roemer (1999, 2001). 
97 For completeness we show that the tax rule for the party –k is given by:  
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− − − − − −
=
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100
 
Electoral Constraints, Partisan Composition and Tax Design 
 
In this section we are interested in evaluating how the distribution of voters’ 
loyalties in the electorate affect the design of tax and spending policies proposed by 
parties. Data from the ANES suggests that the proportion of Democrat voters is higher 
than that of Republican voters for the period 1952-2004. Different distributions of the 
partisan preferences imply different electoral constraints for political parties. To see this, 
suppose a distribution in which there is a dominant coalition of Democrat voters. In this 
case, for any given set of parties’ policies, the probability that the Democrat party wins 
the election is higher compared with the case of an electorate with a less dominant 
coalition of Democrat voters. In this case, the electoral constraints of the Democrat party 
are softened since a more dominant coalition of Democrat voters reduces the need of the 
Democrat party to design a policy with the support of a majority. 
In this context, we ask the following questions: First, does the level of the public 
good increase (decrease) under a more (less) dominant distribution of the partisan 
preference? And what is the effect of alternative distributions of the partisan loyalties on 
the degree of progressivity of the tax system? Another relevant issue for the 
representation of voters’ preferences is the one concerned with the heterogeneity 
(variance) of the partisan preferences. In particular, we are interested in analyzing the 
effect of the variance of the distribution of voters’ loyalties on tax structure.  
To compare distributions of partisan loyalties, let define the concept of first order 
partisan dominance, as a distribution of the partisan bias in which a higher proportion of 
individuals with a partisan loyalty for party k  (voters type 0θ < ) implies a higher 
probability of winning the election and a reduction of the electoral constraints for party k. 
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Figure 3 in Appendix C provides an example; The distribution of voters’ partisan 
attitudes in 1964 dominates the distribution in 2002. Formally, for given policy vectors 
,k k− ∈Ρ Ρ Ρ , consider two cumulative distributions of party identification ( ) ( ),G Gθ θ%  
such that ( )G θ%  partisan-dominates ( )G θ . Therefore:98 
 
   ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ,   , , , ,  ,k k k k k k k kG G G Gθ θ θ θ θ π θ π θ− − −⎡ ⎤≤ ∀ ∈ ⇒ ≥ ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ% %      (47) 
 
A change in the electoral constraints faced by parties (due to a change in the 
composition of the partisan preferences) affects the way parties aggregate the preferences 
of voters over policy. To see this, note that the weight party k assigns to the preferences 
of individuals’ type θ  is ( ) ( ) ( )( )kg fϖ θ θ θ= Ψ − . A positive change in the marginal 
proportion of the expected votes from voters type θ  ( ( )ϖ θ ) induces party k to propose a 
platform closer to the ideal policy of voters type θ . Intuition suggests that a higher ( )g θ  
such that ( ) ( )  ,G Gθ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤≤ ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦%  (the more dominant the partisan preference) the 
more responsive parties k and –k will be to the preferences of these type of voters. 
However, a change in ( )g θ  modifies the whole distribution of the partisan 
preferences and, consequently, the distribution of ( )ϖ θ ,θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈⎣ ⎦ . Note ( )ϖ θ  also 
depends on how ( )( )kf θΨ −  changes along voters’ type. Then it is likely that the 
marginal proportion of the expected votes from voters with a partisan bias towards party 
k might actually decrease with an increase in ( )g θ  if ( )( )kf θΨ −  is decreasing in θ . In 
this case, parties would move away from the policy positions preferred by voters type 
                                                 
98 For a formal proof see proposition 7 in Appendix G. 
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0θ <  under a more dominant composition of the electorate in which the proportion of 
voters type 0θ <  increases. 
To proceed with the analysis, we use the results from the ANES to assume 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0 1 0 1 0 1: k k
s o s o
G G G x G x
MRS MRSυ θ υ θ α θ α θ θ θ− −≥ ∧ ≥ ≥  for 0 1 0 1, , : 0 0θ θ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∈ < ∧ >⎣ ⎦ . 
That is, partisan individuals favoring party k are associated with lower levels of income 
and higher government expenditure as their ideal policy. In this case, the net marginal 
fiscal exchange for 0θ  will tend to be higher under a progressive tax system since 
( ) ( )0 1, ,T i T iθ θ≤  for an income elastic commodity i while 
( ) ( )0 1k k
s o s oG x G x
MRS MRSθ θ− −≥  and ( ) ( )0 1α θ α θ≥ , therefore ( ) ( )0 1λ θ λ θ≥ . Now let 
the tax rate of equilibrium ( )θGki Wt *  be determined under the partisan distribution ( )G θ . 
Furthermore, let voters type θ  and θ  satisfy ( ) ( )λ θ λ θ≥  such that 0*, ≥∂Ψ∂ WkitkiWt θ  
and 0*, ≤∂Ψ∂ WkitkiWt θ .99 This assumption means that at the prevailing rate ( )θGki Wt * , the 
voter with the strongest bias for party k (voter type θ ) prefers a higher tax on commodity 
i, or equivalently a higher degree of progressivity in the tax system, while the voter with 
the strongest partisan bias for party –k (voter type θ ) prefers a lower tax on commodity 
i. 
The change in the tax structure due to a change in the dominance of voters’ party 
identification follows from condition (41). Thus, let * 1Wk ∈ℜt , differentiate (41) with 
                                                 
99 That is, the ideal policy of strong Democrat voters ( )*it θ  is higher than the policy platform of party k 
( ( )θGki Wt * ). Thus, 0*, ≥∂Ψ∂ WkitkiWt θ  implies that an increase of the tax rate increases the welfare of voters 
type θ , while a decrease of the tax rate increases the welfare of strong Republican or 0*, ≤∂Ψ∂ WkitkiWt θ . 
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respect ( )  ,G θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈ ⎣ ⎦  to obtain ( )
( )2*
2 2
0
k kk
ii
k k
i
t Gdt
tdG
θ
θ
∂ ℑ ∂ ∂ >= − ∂ ℑ ∂ < .  The concavity of 
( ) ,k k k−ℑ P P  implies 2 2 0k kit−∂ ℑ ∂ ≥ , hence ( ) ( )2 *  k k ki isign t G sign dt dGθ θ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤∂ ℑ ∂ ∂ ⇔⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . 
Moreover, ( ) ( )G g dθθθ θ θ= ∫   is a non decreasing monotone function, then there is an 
inverse function ( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1: :  G G g θθχ θ θ θ χ θ χ θ −⎡ ⎤′→ = ⇒ = ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦  such that  
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θ
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∂ℑ ∂∂ ℑ ∂= ∂∂ ∂ ∂  . Therefore:  
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( )( ){ }
( ) ( )( ){ }{ }
12
                       
 
                
k k k
k
i
k
k k k k
kk
ii
k
k k
k
i
dg f dt
dg g g f d g Fdtt G
dg F dt
θ
θ
θ θ
θθ
θ
θ
δ θ θ
θ θ δ θ θ θ θ θθ
δθ θ
−
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪Ψϒ Δ Ψ − +⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭⎢ ⎥∂ ℑ Ψ⎢ ⎥⎡ ⎤= − ϒ ′Δ Ψ − Ψ − +⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥ϒ Ψ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∫      (48) 
 
We use the optimality condition (41) in condition (48) to obtain: 
 
( )
{ } ( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
2 0
kk k k k k k k
k k
i ik
k
i
d dr g F g fdt dt
t G g g
θθ
θ θ
δπ θ θ δ θ θ
θ θ θ
⎧ ⎫Ψ+ϒ Ψ − +ϒ Δ Ψ −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∂ ℑ >= <∂ ∂ −       (49) 
 
As we might have suspected an electorate dominated with a higher proportion of 
loyal voters for party k ( an electorate with a higher proportion of Democrat voters) 
reduces the electoral constraints for party k and affects the way parties aggregate the 
preferences of the electorate. The first term in (49), 
{ } ( ) ( )( ){ } kk k k k k
i
dr g F dt
θ
θ
δπ θ θ+ ϒ Ψ −  reflects the expected variation of welfare for 
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candidate k due to the change in the distribution of voters’ loyalties. This term depends 
on the net marginal welfare of candidate k as a result of a change in *kit , 0* ≥Wk
it
k
i
k dtdδ  
since by assumption kk W** tt ≥ , on the change in the expected proportion of the votes 
from the electorate, ( ) ( )( )kg F θθθ θΨ − , and on the first and second order effects of 
changes of θ  on the probability that party k wins the election, i.e., on 0kϒ ≥ , and 
0k k kr ′= −ϒ ϒ ≥ . The expression { } ( ) ( )( ){ }k k k kr g F θθπ θ θ+ϒ Ψ −  reflects the change in the 
expected proportion of the votes for party k that can be attributed to the partisan bias and 
party’s tax platform. The expression 0* ≥Wk
it
k
i
k dtdδ  shows the direction of a welfare 
change for candidate k. For, ( ) ( )( ) 0kg F θθθ θΨ − ≥ , the first term in (49) moves in the 
direction of a welfare increase of the party, hence this expression reflects the extent in 
which the electoral constraints are softened when candidate k faces an electorate in which 
the proportion of voters with a partisan attitude dominates in the electorate.100 
The second term in (49) represents the change in the way parties aggregate the 
preferences over policy from the electorate. Thus, for preferences 0*, ≥∂Ψ∂ WkitkiWt θ  and 
0*, ≤∂Ψ∂ WkitkiWt θ ,  the term ( ) ( )( ) 0≥Ψ−Ψ θθθθ kik dtdfg  is the change in the marginal 
proportion of the expected votes due to a more dominant distribution of loyal voters to 
party k in the electorate. In other words, an increase in the proportion of voters with a 
                                                 
100 The condition ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0k k kg F g F g Fθθθ θ θ θ θ θΨ − = Ψ − − Ψ − ≥  is not restrictive since 
empirical evidence suggests ( ) ( )g gθ θ≥  and it seems reasonable that  voters with the strongest bias for 
party k (voters typeθ ) have a higher probability of voting for party k than voters with the strongest partisan 
bias in favor of party –k (voters type θ ). Consequently, ( )( ) ( )( )k kF Fθ θΨ − ≥ Ψ − . 
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bias in favor of party k changes the pattern of weights assigned by the party to the 
preferences of voters. 
This is so, since a change in ( )G θ θ∀  modifies both, the distribution of the 
partisan bias θ∀ , and the marginal probability of the vote across the electorate. As a 
result of a more dominant partisan distribution, there is an increase in the proportion of 
the expected votes of loyal voters to the party and, therefore, party k increases its 
expected proportion of the votes by designing a platform closer to voters type θ , i.e by 
increasing ki Wt * . Simultaneously, a more dominant partisan distribution reduces the 
proportion of the expected votes for party k from voters with a bias towards party -k, i.e 
reduces ( ) ( )( )kg fθ θ−Ψ − . That is, strong Republican voters support a decrease in ki Wt * , 
however these type of voters are now less effective to influence party k since Republican 
voters deliver a lower proportion of the expected votes in the election 
Lastly, the term ( ) ( ) 0g gθ θ >− <  in (49) is a measure of the extent of the partisan 
dominance if ( ) ( )ˆ    ,G Gθ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤≤ ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦% . The data of the American National Election 
Studies shows that the proportion of individuals regarded as Strong Democrats (by our 
convention ( )g θ ) is higher than the proportion of strong Republicans (or voters type 
( )g θ ).101 That is, the empirical data clearly suggests ( ) ( ){ } 1 0g gθ θ −− ≥ . We use 
this empirical data to guide the interpretation of condition (49). 
                                                 
101 For the period 1952-2004 the survey from ANES provides a 7-point scale measure of the intensity of 
party ID. We can denote θ  from θ ≈ strong Democrats to θ ≈ strong Republicans. The survey suggests 
that the proportion of strong Democrats has represented 19% of the electorate while the proportion of 
strong Republicans the 11%. The difference between strong Democrats- strong Republicans has always 
been non negative (that is ( ) ( ) 0g gθ θ− ≥ ), with an average difference for the period 1952-2004 of 8%. 
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Therefore, the joint interaction of the effects discussed above induces party k to 
take a policy position closer to voters with a strong partisan bias for the party. In the case 
depicted above, ( )2 0k kit Gπ θ∂ ∂ ∂ ≥  therefore ( )* 0kidt dG θ ≥ , which means, that an 
increase in the partisan dominance (equivalently, an increase of ( )    ,G θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈⎣ ⎦ ) 
induces party k to  increase the tax rate of equilibrium over commodity i and, 
consequently, the degree of progresivity of the tax system increases. 
The response of party –k to a change in the distribution of the partisan preference 
is given by: 
( )
{ } ( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
2
kk k k k k k k
k k
i ik
k
i
d dr g F g fdt dt
t G g g
θθ
θ θ
δπ θ θ δ θ θ
θ θ θ
−− − − − − − −
− −−
−
⎧ ⎫Ψ+ϒ −Ψ − +ϒ Δ −Ψ −⎨ ⎬⎩ ⎭∂ ℑ =∂ ∂ −      (50) 
 
The first expression in (50) is positive if ( ) ( )( ) 0kg F θθθ θ− −Ψ − ≤  (that is, if the 
expected proportion of votes for party –k from voters with a partisan bias in favor of 
party –k, exceeds those from voters with loyalties for party –k), since by assumption 
0* ≤−−− kW
it
k
i
k dtdδ , and  because { } 0k k kr π− − −+ ϒ ≥ . Also by assumption, 
0*, ≥∂Ψ∂ −− kWitkiWt θ  and 0*, ≤∂Ψ∂ −− kWit
k
i
Wt θ , consequently the second expression in (50) 
is also positive. In this case, party -k increases the tax rate over commodity i, if there is an 
increase in the partisan dominance of Democrat voters. 
The result mentioned above is intuitive, an electorate with a more dominant 
distribution of Democrat voters, reduces the marginal utility cost from spatial mobility 
for party –k since the probability of winning the election for this party is lower for all 
possible policy platforms. This, induces, even a policy motivated party, to propose a 
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platform that seeks to appeal to a majority of voters in the electorate. Simultaneously, the 
second term in (50) implies that an increase of ( ) ,G θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈ ⎣ ⎦  leads to a process of 
aggregation of voters’ preferences in which Democrat voters are more heavily weighed. 
Party –k can obtain a higher share of the vote by taking a policy position closer to 
Democrat voters because Democrat voters deliver a (marginally) higher proportion of the 
expected votes. Consequently, party –k increases the tax rate of equilibrium over 
commodity i. 
The analysis of variance of the distribution of voters’ partisan preference is of 
related interest to the process of preference aggregation and the formation of fiscal 
policy. We proceed to study the effect on fiscal policy of a mean preserving spread on the 
distribution of the partisan preference. Formally, an increase in the variance of the 
distribution of voters’ loyalties is analyzed through an exogenous change in β  that leads 
unchanged the expected bias of the electorate. To see this represents a mean preserving 
spread of the distribution of the partisan preference, note that a fall in β  spreads the 
domain of θ .By keeping constant the expected bias ( )E θ , the fall inβ  is equivalent to 
an increase in the variance of the distribution of voters’ loyalties. 
Formally, find 
* 2
2 2
0
k k k
i i
k k
i
dt t
d t
β
β
∂ ℑ ∂ ∂ >= − ∂ ℑ ∂ <  subject to 
( ) ( ) 0d g ddEd d
θ
θ θ θ θθ
β β= =
∫ . 
Thus, [ ] ( )2   s.t: 0    k kisign t dE dβ θ β∂ ℑ ∂ ∂ = ⇔ [ ] ( )*  s.t: 0kisign dt d dE dβ θ β = .  
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Hence: 
 
  
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ){ } ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( ) { }
2
                       
 
                
k k k
k
i
k
k k k k
k k
i i
k
k k
k
i
dg f dt
dg f d g Ft dt
dg F dt
θ
θ
θθ
θ θ
θ
θ
θδ θ θ β
θδ θ θ θ θ θβ β
θ δθ θ β
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪Ψ ∂ϒ Δ Ψ − +⎢ ⎥⎨ ⎬∂⎪ ⎪⎢ ⎥⎩ ⎭⎢ ⎥⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪∂ ℑ Ψ ∂⎢ ⎥= ϒ ′Δ Ψ − Ψ − +⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥∂ ∂ ∂⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪∂⎢ ⎥ϒ Ψ −⎨ ⎬∂⎢ ⎥⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦
∫        (51) 
 
We impose the condition ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )0  dE d g gθ β θ θ θ θ θ θ= ⇒ =  on (51), use 
equation (41) and ( )1   ,θ β θ β β θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∂ ∂ = − − ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦  since  ( )1θ ε β β= Δ − , to 
obtain: 
 
    
( )
( ) { } ( )( ) ( )( ){ }
[ ]
2     
1
                                     
k k
k k k k k
k k
i i
k k
ik k
g dr F Ft dt
t
θ θ δπ θ θ θ θβ β β
φδ β
⎧ ⎫∂ ℑ = +ϒ Ψ − − Ψ −⎨ ⎬∂ ∂ −⎩ ⎭
∂ ∂ ∂+ ϒ Δ ∂
      (52) 
 
Where ( )0,  0  1 0θ θ β β< > ∧ − ≥ , while the expression of the second term of (52) is: 
 
        [ ] ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 01
k k
i k k
k k
i i
t d dg f g fdt dtθ θ
φ θ θ θ θ θ θβ β β
⎧ ⎫∂ ∂ ∂ ⎧ ⎫ Ψ Ψ >= Ψ − − Ψ −⎨ ⎬⎨ ⎬∂ <−⎩ ⎭⎩ ⎭
     (53) 
 
Equation (53) represents the electoral motivation for party k to change tax policy 
as a response of a change in β . The overall effect of an increase in the variance of the 
partisan bias on ki Wt *  is decomposed in equation (52). The first term in (52) represents the 
change in the expected welfare of the candidate due to the increase in the variance of the 
partisan distribution. 
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 From (52) it is simple to see that the expression 
( )
( ) { } ( )( ) ( )( ){ }  1 k k k k kg r F Fθ θ π θ θ θ θβ β⎧ ⎫ + ϒ Ψ − − Ψ −⎨ ⎬−⎩ ⎭  reflects a normalized increase 
in the expected proportion of the votes for party k whenβ  falls. The intuition of the 
expression is simple, a mean preserving increase in the dispersion of voters’ partisan 
loyalties increases party’s marginal cost of spatial mobility and therefore, candidate k 
designs a platform that is closer to the ideal policy of the party. 102,103 
The second term, that is 
[ ]
0<
>
∂
∂∂∂ΔΥ β
φδ kikkk t , is the change in the process of 
aggregation of voters’ preferences as a result of a more heterogeneous distribution of the 
partisan loyalties in the electorate. A mean preserving increase in the variance of the 
distribution of voters’ loyalties increase the weight assigned to voters type θ  by 
( ) ( )( )k kig f d dt θθ θ θΨ − Ψ  which induces candidate k to increase ki Wt *  since 
0*, ≥Ψ Wkit
k
idtd θ . Simultaneously, the increase in the variance of voters’ loyalties 
                                                 
102 To see this, note ( ) ( ) 1 0gθ θ β β− ≤ , { } 0k k krπ + ϒ ≥ , ( )( ) ( )( ){ } 0k kF Fθ θ θ θΨ − − Ψ − ≥ , and 
0* ≥Wk
it
k
i
k dtdδ . Therefore, ( )( ) { } ( )( ) ( )( ){ } * 01 Wk
i
k
k k k k k
k
i t
g dr F F dt
θ θ δπ θ θ θ θβ β
⎧ ⎫ + ϒ Ψ − − Ψ − ≤⎨ ⎬−⎩ ⎭
 which 
implies that an increase in the heterogeneity of voters’ loyalties (a fall in β  subject to ( ) 0dE dθ β = ) 
leads to an increase in ki Wt * . 
103 Recall that the marginal cost of the spatial mobility is { }k k kid dtπ δ , if 0kd dπ β ≤  then a  fall of β  
subject to ( ) 0dE dθ β = , increases kπ  which, in turn, increases the marginal cost of the spatial mobility 
for a policy motivated candidate. As a result, the candidate takes a policy platform closer to candidate’ 
ideal tax policy and increases ki Wt * , since by assumption 0k kid dtδ ≥  at ki Wt * . Simultaneously, it can be 
verified that the marginal gain of spatial mobility (the first term in 8) falls due to a reduction of β  subject 
to ( ) 0dE dθ β = . This effect also induces party k to increase ki Wt * . At the optimal condition, the marginal 
gain of the spatial mobility can be expressed in terms of the marginal cost of spatial mobility for candidate 
k. Thus, the two effects of an increase of the variance ( the increase in candidates’ marginal cost and the fall 
in candidates’ marginal gain from of spatial mobility) are expressed in the first term of (52) as a change in 
the marginal cost of spatial mobility for the candidate. 
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increase the weight assigned to voters type θ  by ( ) ( )( )k kig f d dt θθ θ θ− Ψ − Ψ  which 
induces candidate k to reduce ki Wt *  since 0*, ≤Ψ Wkit
k
idtd θ . 
If ( )kF •  is convex then the first effect tends to dominate, and party k aggregates 
more heavily the preferences of voters with partisan bias for party k and discount the 
preferences of voters with loyalties towards party –k.104  Accordingly, party k has the 
electoral incentive to increase ki Wt * . The opposite hold if ( )kF •  is concave enough such 
that the second effect in (53) dominates and party k has an electoral incentive to reduce 
k
i
Wt * . Therefore, for the case of an income elastic commodity i, ( )kF •  is convex, and a 
distribution of preferences given by 0*, ≥Ψ Wkit
k
idtd θ , 0*, ≤Ψ Wkit
k
idtd θ  and 
0* ≥Wk
it
k
idtdδ , the analysis suggest that the response of the policy motivated party k to a 
mean preserving spread on the partisan preference is * 0kidt dβ ≤ . 
In other words, an increase in the variance of the partisan distribution (a fall in β  
subject to ( ) 0dE dθ β = ) increases ki Wt * , while it is easy to verify that ki Wt −*  falls.105 This 
means that an increase of the variance of the distribution of voters’ party identification 
                                                 
104 Recall that a fall in β  implies an increase of the net utility ( )θΨ − , given a pair of tax policies 
,k k− ∈Ρ Ρ Ρ   for voters type θ   since the term θ−   increases. Furthermore, a fall inβ  reduces ( )θΨ −  for 
voters type θ   since the term θ−  falls. Consequently, a fall in β   implies that the vote from the group of 
voters type θ  is more costly (since ( )( )kf θΨ −  falls with a fall in β ). For that reason, the preferences for 
policy of voters θ are less heavily weighed while those of voters type θ  are more heavily weighed (since 
( )( )kf θΨ −  increases with a fall in β ) in the calculus of the party. 
105 A similar expression can be found for the case of party –k such that 0≥− βddt ki , hence party –k 
reduces ki Wt −* . To see this, find: 
( )
( ) { } ( )( ) ( )( ){ } ( )[ ]2      01 k kk k ik k k k k k kk ki i tg dr F Ft dt φθ θ δπ θ θ θ θ δβ ββ β
− −− −− − − − − −
− −
∂ ∂ ∂⎧ ⎫∂ ℑ = +ϒ −Ψ − − −Ψ − + ϒ Δ ≥⎨ ⎬∂ ∂ ∂−⎩ ⎭
   (52’) 
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leads to a polarization of parties’ platforms, that is, the Democrat party increases the tax 
rate (to increase redistribution) and the Republican party reduces the tax rate (to reduce 
redistribution). 
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
In a democracy, representatives are elected to design policies in favor of the 
electorate. However, the actual representation of preferences is the outcome of different 
institutions performing the aggregation of voters’ interests. In this essay, we analyze the 
interaction between the voting behavior of a partisan electorate and the electoral 
competition of policy motivated parties to determine the tax structure and the provision 
of a public good. In this setting, the tradeoff between efficiency and political 
redistribution is explained by a combination of party’s own preferences over tax structure 
and the electoral incentives to redistribute tax burdens in favor of voters who might 
deliver a high proportion of the expected votes. 
That is, tax policy reflects two conflicting incentives: On the one hand a party 
seeks to win the election to implement the ideal policy of the party’s constituency. On the 
other hand, the competition for votes forces the party to design policies that appeal to a 
majority and, hence, the design of policy recognizes a wider set of preferences from the 
electorate. The conflict between the narrow interest of the party and the pluralist 
preferences of the electorate on determining tax policy depends on the electoral 
constraints of the party.106 In this essay we argue that voters’ partisan preferences 
influence parties’ electoral constraints since the share of the vote parties receive in an 
                                                 
106 We have defined the electoral constraints of a party, as the need of a party to design policies with the 
support of a majority to win the election. 
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election is explained (at some extent) by voters’ loyalties. Consequently, the party’s need 
to design policies with the support of a majority falls when the party faces an electorate 
with a high proportion of loyal voters in the electorate.  
Our model of electoral competition allows us to distinguish different sets of 
electoral constraints for parties. If a party faces soft electoral constraints (as a result of a 
high proportion in the electorate of loyal voters to the party) then party’s dominant 
strategy is to select the ideal tax policy of party’s constituency. Redistribution will guide 
the tax policy of a party that represents the interests of low income voters who support 
high taxes and government spending. Similarly, efficiency will dominate the design of 
tax structure if the party represents voters with high income who prefer low government 
spending. 
Evidence from the ANES suggests that the American electorate is divided along 
these dimensions, with Democrat (Republican) followers supporting high (low) spending 
and having low (high) levels of income. Therefore, the tradeoff between the narrow 
interests of parties versus the pluralist preferences of the electorate suggests that soft 
electoral constraints lead to increases on tax and spending under Democrat 
administrations and reductions on tax and spending under Republican governments. A 
growing body of empirical evidence suggests the existence of tax and spending cycles in 
the federal and state fiscal policies in the U.S. Our theory can explain this stylized fact. 
If, conversely, the electoral constraints are binding then parties have the incentive 
to select a tax policy with the support of the electorate to maximize party’s chance to win 
the election. In this case, the tradeoff between redistributive politics and efficiency 
depends on how the party aggregates the preferences of the electorate for tax policy. The 
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pattern of redistribution is guided by the parties’ electoral incentives to maximize the net 
fiscal exchange gains to voters (or group of voters) that deliver a high proportion of the 
expected votes, while parties penalize to those voters with low expected marginal 
proportion of the votes. Our analysis predicts that candidates’ policies do not converge 
since voters’ loyalties induce parties to aggregate the preferences of the electorate 
differently. 
We identify conditions in which a differential commodity tax system will be used 
to redistribute tax burdens in favor of individuals with a partisan bias towards the party. 
That is, the model predicts that under Democrat administrations taxes on income elastic 
goods increase while taxes on income inelastic commodities fall implying that the 
Democrat party has an electoral incentive to propose a commodity tax system in which 
redistribution plays a more prominent role than efficiency on tax design. In contrast, the 
Republican party has an electoral incentive to weigh less heavily redistribution (vis-à-vis 
efficiency). These outcomes are explained by parties’ beliefs that voters with partisan 
loyalties deliver the highest marginal proportion of the expected votes. Evidence, indeed, 
suggests that the choice of the vote is heavily influenced by partisan attachments 
(Republican voters tend to vote for the Republican party) which supports the notion that 
partisan voters could have the highest propensity to vote for the party. 
The theory of elections emphasizes that the observable features of individuals 
(preferences over policy and income) are the main determinants of fiscal outcomes. In 
our framework, if the electoral constraints are binding then parties’ policies reflect more 
closely the preferences of those voters (or groups of voters) that are more effective to 
influence policy makers (parties). We develop a comparative analysis that seeks to 
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capture the relative political influence of voters through the composition of the partisan 
identification of voters in the electorate. Our analysis suggests that under a more 
dominant partisan distribution of Democrat voters (in the case of a high proportion of 
voters identified as Democrats in the electorate), both parties design a tax platform closer 
to the ideal policy of Democrat voters (even when parties do not converge). Thus, a more 
dominant distribution of Democrat voters leads to higher redistribution and spending. 
The analysis of variance of the distribution of voters’ partisan loyalties is also of 
significant interest to the process of preference aggregation and the formation of fiscal 
policy. We analyze the effect on fiscal policy of a mean preserving spread on the 
distribution of the partisan preference. Our model identifies conditions in which an 
increase in the variance of the distribution of voters’ loyalties leads to a polarization of 
parties’ platforms. That is, an increase of the variance of the distribution of voters’ party 
identification leads to the Democrat party to increase the tax rate (to increase 
redistribution) and the Republican party to reduce the tax rate (to reduce redistribution). 
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APPENDIX A.  EXISTENCE OF EQUILIBRIUM FOR THE ELECTORAL 
GAME AND TAX STRUCTURE 
 
In this section we identify conditions for the existence of equilibrium of the 
electoral game. Consider first the voter’s problem. The consumer-voter is assumed to 
choose the most preferred consumption vector in a compact convex set and to vote for his 
dominant political alternative. By assumption, the utility derived from consumption is a 
continuous quasiconcave function and hence a maximizing vector of consumption on the 
feasible set is guaranteed to exist. On the other dimension of the consumer’s decisions, 
the voter chooses among a compact set of alternatives ( either to vote for the party k  or 
its opposition) and clearly a maximizing voting choice also exists for each of the strategy 
policy space of the parties. Therefore the best response correspondences of the voters 
defined by { } 1Hh hb =  are non empty, convex valued and upper hemicontinuous.107  
Now consider the parties’ problem. Let ( ),δ λt  be the corresponding Lagrangian 
for the expected vote function on the restricted policy space as shown in (4). A sufficient 
condition for a maximum on ( ),δ λt  is that the function be concave or equivalently its 
bordered Hessian matrix ( ),Bδ λtH  over the constrained policy space be negative 
semidefinite, that is:  
 
 
        ( ), 0Bδ λ ≤tH                     (A1) 
 
 
For expository purposes assume 2n =  so we can outline the condition (A1) in a 
simple context. For a two commodity economy the condition (A1) can be expressed in 
                                                 
107 Equivalently, the correspondence for the voters with elements *h hCs b∈  has a closed graph and it is a 
compact set. 
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terms of the determinant of the third principal minor for the bordered Hessian matrix for 
the Lagrangian which is defined as ( ),Bδ λtH . First let define ( )BEV tH  and ( )BR tH  as the 
bordered Hessian matrices of the expected votes and revenue functions while the 
corresponding third principal minors are denoted by ( )BEV tH  and ( )BR tH . Therefore the 
sufficient second order condition for the existence of a maximum of (4) evaluated at an 
optimum is given by: 
 
   ( ) ( ) ( )2, 0B B BEV Rδ λ λ λ−= + ≥t t tH H H       (A1’) 
    
To see this, note that by assumption the expected vote function is a concave 
function of taxes then it holds ( ) ( ) ( )22 0B i jj i j ij ji jj iiEV EV EV EV EV EV EV EV EV= − + + − ≥⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦tH  
meaning that the bordered Hessian matrix for the expected votes function ( ) 0BEV ≤tH  is  
negative semidefinite since the second principal minors for the bordered Hessians of the 
expected votes is ( ) ( )2, 0B iEV S EV= − ≤tH .108 Moreover under the assumption that the 
revenue function is quasiconcave then ( ) 0BR ≤tH  is negative semidefinite and its 
determinant is equivalent to ( ) ( ) ( )22 0B i jj i j ij ji j iiR R R R R R R R R= − + + − ≥⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦tH  where iR  is 
the marginal revenue from tax instrument it . 
Finally from the optimality conditions of (4), 0  i i j jEV R EV R i jλ = − = − ≥ ∀ ≠  
is the marginal political cost of relaxing the public revenue constraint which is used on 
the determinants of the Hessian matrices to obtain the result in (A1’). Therefore to obtain 
a maximum of (4) the second order conditions in (A1) require that the bordered Hessian 
                                                 
108 Where the notation used is as follows, i iEV EV t= ∂ ∂  and  ( ) 2ij jiEV EV t t= ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ . 
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from the function of the expected vote on the restricted policy space given by 
,k k cS S S− ∈  be concave.109 We assume that (A1’) holds and then an interior maximum is 
guaranteed to exist which will be represented by the first order conditions of (4).  
Since the constrained maximization problem is a quasiconcave function on the 
policy space (under the satisfaction of A1) and the strategy set is compact and convex 
then the best response correspondences of the candidates cb  for { },c k k= −  are non 
empty, convex valued and upper hemicontinuous. By the Kakutani’s fixed point Theorem 
the best correspondences of the players map into itself and a fixed point is guaranteed to 
exist. The fixed point is the Nash equilibrium of the electoral game.110  
In this essay we will weak even more our theory by assuming that the condition 
(A1) holds with a strict inequality, this is assumed for convenience since it rules out a 
linear segment in the policy space set.111 In the absence of this assumption we would 
have to compare the indirect utility level of an interior maximum with the level of utility 
at the extremes of the policy set. This is inconvenient to do in our model since it would 
force us to make a specific parametric assumption for the indirect utility function.112 To 
                                                 
109 As it is custom in optimization problems involved with taxation, and after the work of Mirrless (1989), 
we need to stress the need to be careful with the interpretations derived from the first order conditions and 
also to point out the fragility of the satisfaction of the second order conditions. With respect the critical 
points in the optimality conditions Mirrless (1989) proved that the first order conditions might not even be 
necessary, this holds if the marginal revenue vector is an extension of the price vector p . In this case the 
constraint qualifications of the constrained optimization problem are not satisfied and it is not valid to solve 
the problem in (4) by the means of a Lagrangian. With respect the second order conditions, Mirrless 
showed that the optimization problems as in (4) might not be a well behaved mathematical problem if the 
objective function in the constrained space is not quasiconcave for the whole range of the domain. 
110 For a more detailed proof of the existence of the electoral equilibrium for concave objective functions in 
the context of the probabilistic voting model see Coughlin (1992) and Enelow and Hinich (1989). See also 
Roemer (2001) for the existence of the Nash equilibrium in a different context to our Downsian electoral 
model. 
111 It is desirable to rule out this possibility because otherwise the first order conditions might not be 
necessary for the optimum. 
112 It also makes more difficult to characterize the notion of single peakedness of preferences for tax 
instruments. A  difficulty that we will choose to avoid here. 
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avoid the former we will assume that the expected vote function on the restricted policy 
space is strictly concave. 
A related point of interest is the issue of convergence of the policies of 
equilibrium for the candidates. We have assumed that the information sets in the game 
and the systems of beliefs of the candidates are the same. Moreover the policy space is 
also the same for both parties and by the assumption (A1) a solution to the parties’ 
problem exists. Therefore the policy platforms at equilibrium will converge and hence 
* * *k k−= =t t t .113,114 The convergence of the policy platforms implies by (5) that the 
expected number of votes at equilibrium is one half of the polity for each party. At this 
equilibrium, the elected party will be the one with the closest Euclidean distance to the 
most preferred position to the majority of voters. Since at equilibrium the policies will 
converge then now we can analyze the selection of the tax structure derived as a result of 
the political competition as the set of tax instruments defined in [ ]1 2, ,....k kk knt t t=t  from 
the government’s (incumbent’s party in power) problem which is characterized by:115 
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The Lagrangian is given by: 
 
{ } ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
, =
l
n H
hl lk l k l k
i i
i h
F t x R
ϕ
δ λ ϕ υ υ λ−
∀ ∈Θ = =
⎡ ⎤− + −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑t t t                  (A3) 
 
                                                 
113 By solving the maximization problem in (4) it can be noticed the equivalence of the solution from the 
first order conditions which imply that * * *k k−= =t t t . 
114 Convergence of the policy platforms at the electoral equilibrium is a general characteristic of the Downs 
model. For formal proofs of convergence see Coughlin (1992), and Roemer (2001). 
115 Clearly solving for the maximization problem of party k will be equivalent to finding the policies at 
equilibrium of the electoral game. 
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The optimality conditions are:116 
 
( )
1 1 *
1
1     0
n n
h
j ij llLj h i
i
li i
t S b x t
X X
= =
=
⎡ ⎤− = − ∀ >⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
∑ ∑
∑                           (A4) 
 
 
Where ( )( )
1 l
lnl jl l l l
j lj
x
b f t Iϕ
αϕ ϕλ = ∈Θ
∂= + ∂∑ ∑  where l l l h h hf F F fυ υ= ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ =  
 lh ϕ∀ ∈  and it represents the probabilistic distribution function within each group of 
voters, lb  represents the politically determined net marginal utility of income, 
h lα α=  lh ϕ∀ ∈  is the marginal utility of income from voter h in group l , λ  is the 
marginal cost associated with relaxing the public revenue constraint (or marginal change 
in parties’ expected votes of having collected the last unit of revenue) while the second 
term represents the sum of the marginal tax contributions as the voter’s income changes 
given by 
1
nl ll l
j jl j
c t x II ϕ =
∂ = ∂ ∂∂ ∑ , and 1
H
h
i i
h
X x
=
= ∑  is the aggregate consumption of 
commodity i . 
The left hand side of (A4) is the proportional reduction in the consumption of the 
ith  commodity along the compensated demand hijS  due to a change in prices j’s for voters 
1,2...h H= . The interpretation of the optimality conditions is as follows: The reduction in 
the compensated demand by the establishment of a tax * 0it >  is smaller; 
(a) The higher is the preference for the consumption of commodity i  by individuals 
whose voting behavior is highly responsive to the policy issues. In other words, the 
                                                 
116 The solution can also be represented as ( ){ }1 1 11 hhn n H ihj ij ij h h ib xt S X X= = =⎡ ⎤− = −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑ ∑  *for 0  1,...it i n> ∀ =  where 
( )
1 1
n H
hh h h h
j j
j h
b f t x Iα λ
= =
= + ∂ ∂∑ ∑ . 
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tax rate *it  at equilibrium will be lower if the commodity i  is primarily consumed 
by individuals with a high hf   lh ϕ∀ ∈ . 
(b) The higher is the expected number of votes delivered by group lϕ ∈Θ . 
(c) The higher is the marginal utility of income of voters in group lϕ ∈Θ , and 
(d) The higher is the marginal propensity to consume the taxed goods by voters in 
lϕ ∈Θ . 
Therefore the, politically determined, optimal tax structure is given by the vector 
[ ]* * *1 ...... nt t=t  which satisfies the set of equations 1,2....i n=  specified in (A3). In 
summary, equations (1), (6) and (A3) characterize the electoral equilibrium for this 
economy. Moreover the tax structure of equilibrium derived by the electoral competition 
is Pareto optimal.117 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
117 Hettich and Winer (1988, 1999) were the first in analyzing the tax structure in the multidimensional case 
derived by a Downsian electoral competition model. Their analysis is different to the one presented here. 
They used the direct utility function in the implicit assumption of the candidates’ expectation of the voting 
behavior. In their work they showed that the tax structure at equilibrium is Pareto optimal. 
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APPENDIX B.  CHANGES IN TAX STRUCTURE DUE TO A TAX RATE 
LIMIT 
 
We proceed to characterize the reaction functions of the government 
( ) ( )2 ,...i n ir t r t  that are derived within the context of electoral competition. The parties’ 
problem if the tax rate limit were approved is: 
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Letting 1it t=  we can obtain the optimality conditions which are given by: 
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Where 
1
hnH H
oh
j j o
h o hj j
xRR x tt t=
⎛ ⎞∂∂= = + ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ ∑  is the marginal revenue from tax on 
commodity j  for 2,3j =  and ( ) ( )2 1 3 1 and r t r t  are the reaction functions derived from a 
government seeking to maximize their expected votes and subject to a tax rate limit, and 
0λ ≥%  is the marginal political cost of relaxing the public revenue constraint. Note that 
the reaction function are not equal to zero, that is, the electoral competition will lead to a 
tax structure such that * *2 2 3 3 and  r t r t≠ ≠ .  
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The second order conditions require that the Hessian for the constrained function 
of the proportion of the expected votes be concave. If (A1) holds then an interior 
maximum is guaranteed to exist and the first order conditions identify the maximizers. 
Totally differentiating the system in (B2) we obtain: 
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changes in the tax rate of commodity two,  
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∂ ∂⎛ ⎞′ ′′= − + + ≤⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠∑ ∑% % % . The determinant of the 
system is given by ( ) ( )2 22 33 2 3 23 32 3 22 0R R R Rδ δ δ δ⎡ ⎤Δ = − + + − ≥⎣ ⎦% % % %%  due to the assumption 
of concavity of the constrained objective function. 
Provided that 0Δ ≠% , the reaction functions 32
1 1
, drdrdt dt  are: 
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As it is shown in (B4) the sign of the reaction function is ambiguous as we don’t 
know the nature of the relationship between the commodities among 1 2 3,  and l l lx x x . That is 
we don’t know the sign of 21 31and δ δ% %  in order to determine 2 1dr dt  and a similar 
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situation holds for 3 1dr dt . Our assumption that cross price effects are zero implies 
0    ji j iδ = ∀ ≠% . In this case the determinant in (B4) is reduced to 
( ) ( )2 22 33 3 22 0R Rδ δΔ = − − ≥% %%  and the reaction functions 32
1 1
, drdrdt dt  are: 
2 1 332
33
1
3 3 1 22
22
1
0    for 0 
0    for 0 
R Rdr
dt
dr R R
dt
δ δ
δ δ
= ≤ ≤Δ
= ≤ ≤Δ
% %%
% %%
                  (B5) 
 
Since 0Δ ≥% , 1 2 30, 0 and 0R R R≥ ≥ ≥  and finally 33 220,  0δ δ≤ ≤% % .  The reaction 
functions in (B5) are the results shown in equation (20). 
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APPENDIX C.  PARTISAN PREFERENCES, ITS DISTRIBUTION AND 
STYLIZED FACTS OF THE ELECTORATE 
 
The evidence from the American National Election Studies (ANES) provides the 
next stylized facts: First, the proportion of the electorate identified with the Democrat 
party (or Democrat voters) is higher than the proportion of voters identified as 
Republicans.118 For the period 1952-2002 the average proportion of Democrats is 52%, 
35% Republicans, around 11% independents and the rest apoliticals. Second, the 
distribution (pdf) and cumulative distribution (CDF) of the partisan preferences clearly 
indicates that the partisan preference is characterized by a bimodal distribution (in  Figure 
3 we show only the distribution for 1964 and 2002).119  
Figure 3.  Distribution of Voters’ Party Identification, 7-Point Scale, 1964 and 2002 
Distribution of Partisan Preferences 1964 and 2002
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Source: The American National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan. Ann 
Arbor, MI. 
                                                 
118 The proportion is measured from the three point scale (where people are asked to identify them selves as 
democrats, independents or republicans) from the period 1952-2004. 
119 Binomal partisan distributions is a general feature of the partisan preference for the period 1952-2004, 
see data ANES. 
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The survey also measures the preferences of voters for government services and 
spending. Individuals are asked to evaluate whether public spending should be cut or 
increased. The survey reveals that for the period 1982-2002, from the group of voters 
who prefer an increase in government services, 42% were identified as Democrats and 
21% as Republicans. Furthermore, from the group of voters who prefer a reduction in 
government services, 16% were identified as Democrats and 43% as Republicans. In 
other words, Democrats along the period from 1982 to 2002 have consistently being 
associated with preferences which support an increase in public spending and services in 
relation to Republicans. The surveys from the ANES also provide information that relates 
the distribution of income and the partisan identification of the respondents. As shown on 
Table 1 (shown below) voters at the low/high ranks of income have a party identification 
with the Democrat/Republican party. 
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Table 1.  Partisan Preference and Distribution of Income 
The information of the table reflects the proportion of voters in each percentile of the distribution of income that has a party identification with 
the Democrat-Republican party. The label Independent implies that the voter does not identify with a party.  For instance, in the year 2000, 62% of 
voters on the 0-16 percentile of the distribution of income, had an identification with the Democrat party. 
Democrats Republicans Independents Democrats Republicans Independents Democrats Republicans Independents Democrats Republicans Independents Democrats Republicans Independents
DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME 
Period 0-16 Percentile 0-16 Percentile 0-16 Percentile 17-33 Percentile 17-33 Percentile 17-33 Percentile 34-67 Percentile 34-67 Percentile 34-67 Percentile 68-95 Percentile 68-95 Percentile 68-95 Percentile 96-100 Percentile 96-100 Percentile 96-100 Percentile 
'52 57 29 4 58 31 8 61 33 5 58 37 5 28 59 13
'54 58 25 7 55 29 11 58 33 7 58 34 6 32 63 5
'60 47 38 7 55 32 11 54 34 11 53 35 10 24 68 8
'64 65 24 9 66 24 9 66 25 8 55 38 6 44 48 8
'68 64 25 9 55 29 13 55 34 11 53 36 11 41 52 6
'72 57 30 10 53 31 16 53 30 15 49 41 10 35 52 13
'76 60 26 13 60 28 12 54 30 15 45 37 18 23 68 9
'80 60 25 11 62 26 11 50 32 16 48 41 10 32 53 13
'84 56 26 15 55 31 12 48 40 10 43 48 8 29 62 9
'88 55 30 12 53 36 10 46 41 11 42 48 9 19 77 2
'92 55 27 16 57 30 11 53 35 12 44 47 9 30 60 10
'96 63 26 10 61 31 8 52 35 11 40 52 7 41 55 4
'00 62 22 14 52 33 13 47 40 13 50 40 10 36 54 10
Mean 58 27 11 57 30 11 54 34 11 49 41 9 32 59 8
variance 23 16 12 17 9 5 32 20 10 37 34 11 56 67 12  
Source: The National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan. Ann Arbor, MI. The proportions might not add to 
100% which reflects that  some groups did not respond to the question. 
*The percentiles appearing here correspond to the following:  
   0-16     17-33     34-67     68-95    96-100  
YEAR  PERCENTILE  PERCENTILE  PERCENTILE  PERCENTILE  PERCENTILE  
1952   none-$1999  $2000-2999  $3000-3999  $4000-9999  $10000+  
1956 none-$1999  $2000-3999  $4000-5999  $6000-9999  $10000+  
1960  none-$1999  $2000-3999  $4000-5999  $6000-14999  $15000+  
1964  none-$2999  $3000-4999  $5000-7499  $7500-14999  $15000+  
1968  none-$2999  $3000-5999  $6000-9999  $10000-19999  $20000+  
1972  none-$3999  $4000-5999  $6000-11999  $12000-24999  $25000+  
1978  none-$5999  $6000-10999  $11000-19999  $20000-34999  $35000+  
1982  none-$6999  $7000-12999  $13000-24999  $25000-49999  $50000+  
1986  none-$8999  $9000-14999  $15000-34999  $35000-74999  $75000+  
1990  none-$9999  $10000-16999  $17000-34999  $35000-89999  $90000+  
1992  none-$9999  $10000-19999  $20000-39999  $40000-89999  $90000+  
1996  none-$11999  $12000-21999  $22000-49999  $50000-104999  $105000+  
2000  none-$14999  $15000-34999  $35000-64999  $65000-124999  $125000+ 
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APPENDIX D.  PROPERTIES OF THE ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM: 
EXISTENCE 
 
In this section we identify conditions for the existence of equilibrium of the 
electoral game. Consider first the voter’s problem. The consumer is assumed to choose 
the most preferred consumption vector in a compact, convex set and to vote for his 
dominant political alternative. By assumption the utility derived from consumption is a 
continuous, quasiconcave function and hence a maximizing vector of consumption on the 
feasible set is guaranteed to exist. On the other dimension of the consumer’s decision, the 
voter chooses among a compact set of alternatives (i.e., either to vote for party k  or party 
-k) and clearly a maximizing voting choice also exists for each of the strategy policy 
space of parties. Therefore the best response correspondences of voters defined by { }h hb ∀  
are non empty, convex valued and upper hemicontinuous.120  
Now consider parties’ problem. Assume first that the policy space is a compact 
convex set then a sufficient condition for a maximum of ( )RDk PP ,π  { }RDk ,=  is that 
the function of the probability of winning the election for party k is concave, or 
equivalently, the Hessian matrix ( ) { }RDkRDk ,for     0, =≤PPHπ  over the constrained 
policy space is negative semidefinite. 
 
 
 
                                                 
120 Equivalently, the best response correspondence for the voters { }h hb ∀  has a closed graph on a compact 
convex set. 
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 That is:121  
    ( ) { }RDkRDk ,     0, =∀≤PPHπ        (D1) 
 
Equation (D1) represents a sufficient second order condition for a maximum to 
exist in the parties’ electoral competition problem. We assume that (D1) holds and then 
an interior maximum is guaranteed to exist which will be represented by the first order 
conditions (equation 29). Since the maximization problem in (29) implies the 
maximization of a quasiconcave function on the policy space (under the satisfaction of 
(D1), and the strategy set is compact and convex then the best response correspondences 
of candidates kb  for { }RDk ,=  are non empty, convex valued and upper 
hemicontinuous. By the Kakutani’s fixed point Theorem the best correspondence of a 
party maps into itself and a fixed point is guaranteed to exist. The fixed point is the Nash 
equilibrium of the electoral game.122 In this essay we assume that condition (D1) holds 
with strict inequality. This is assumed for mathematical convenience. In the absence of 
this assumption we would have to compare the indirect utility level of an interior 
maximum with the level of utility at the extremes of the policy set. This is inconvenient 
                                                 
121 As it is custom in optimization problems involved with taxation, and after the work of Mirrless (1989), 
we need to stress the need to be careful with the interpretations derived from the first order conditions and 
also to point out the fragility of the satisfaction of the second order conditions. With respect the critical 
points in the optimality conditions, Mirrless (1989) identified situations in which the first order conditions 
might not even be necessary, this holds if the marginal revenue vector is an extension of the price vector p . 
In his analysis the tax problem considered was a constrained maximization problem and in that case if the 
marginal revenue vector is an extension of the price vector p  the constraint qualifications of the 
constrained optimization problem is not satisfied. Therefore, it is not valid to solve the problem in (31) by 
the means of a Lagrangian. With respect the second order conditions, Mirrless showed that the optimization 
problems as in (31) might not be well behaved mathematical problems if the objective function in the 
constrained space is not quasiconcave for the whole range of the domain. Nevertheless, Diamond and 
Mirrless (1971) identify sufficient conditions in which a critical point leads to the finding of the optimal tax 
system. 
122 For a detailed proof of the existence of the electoral equilibrium for concave objective functions in the 
context of the probabilistic voting model see Coughlin (1992) and Enelow and Hinich (1989). See also 
Roemer (2001) for the existence of Nash equilibrium in a different context to our Downsian electoral 
model. 
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to do in our model since it would force us to make a specific parametric assumption for 
the indirect utility function. To avoid the former we will assume that the function of the 
probability to win the election is strictly concave. 
In summary, under quasiconcavity of consumers’ preferences over their the 
feasible commodity set, (D1), and for the policy space set being a compact, convex set 
then the electoral equilibrium is guaranteed to exist for the n -dimensional problem. A 
particular case of interest is the existence of an electoral equilibrium when the function of 
the probability of the vote { }RDkF k ,for    =  is convex on the net gain from the joint 
effect of policy positions and the partisan bias ( )θΨ − . The sufficient condition in (D1) 
implies that ( ) { }RDkRDk ,     0, =∀≤PPHπ , note that   
( ) { }RDkitt RDkkikik ,     0    for     0 ,*22 =∀≤⇒∀≤∂∂ PPHππ  and consequently the 
condition (D1’) (shown below) guarantees the satisfaction of the sufficient second order 
condition (D1): 
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Where the first term of the right hand side of (D1’) is non positive since by 
assumption ( )RDk PP ,π  is concave and hence 0'≤Υ k , the second term is non negative 
since 0'' ≥kF   under the assumption that the probability of vote is a convex function and 
0≥Υ k , while the third term is non increasing since 022 ≤∂Ψ∂ kit  if the fiscal exchange 
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gains depict a concave function. Therefore condition (D1) and (D1’) can still be satisfied 
under a convex probability function of the vote over the net gain from the joint effect of 
policy positions and partisan bias ( )θΨ − , if the function of the probability to win the 
election ( )RDk PP ,π  is a concave function of the tax vector { }RDkk ,   =∀t . Hence the 
condition (D1’) represents a sufficient condition that guarantees the existence of the 
electoral equilibrium when kF is convex. 
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APPENDIX E.  PROPOSITION 3: ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM AND 
TAX DIVERGENCE 
 
Proposition 3. Let  0 1 0 1)  , , : 0 0i θ θ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤∀ ∈ < ∧ >⎣ ⎦  have ideal policies 
10 ** θθ
ii tt ≥ leading to:    
 i)    ( ) ( )0 1θ θΨ − ≥ Ψ − * *,D Ri it t∀ . 
0 * 1 *, ,
) 0 0c c
i i
k k
i it t
ii t tθ θ∂Ψ ∂ ≥ ∧∂Ψ ∂ ≤  for { },c D R= , 
( ) ( )) , ,D D R D D Riii υ υ∧Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ  are concave on taxes. 
If DF  and RF  are concave on Ψ  then * *D Ri it t≤ , if DF  and RF  are convex * *D Ri it t≥  
and for bimodal cumulative distributions * *D Ri it t>< . 
Proof 
By the first order condition ( )* argmax ,D D D Rπ∈t Ρ Ρ  therefore 
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Hence: 
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dt t g f d
dt
θ
θπ θ θ θ
Ψ∂ ∂ = −Ψ − =∫  implies: 
( )( )
( )( )
,R R R
R R
i
i
f
t
E
t E f
σ θ
θ
⎡ ⎤∂Ψ− −Ψ −⎢ ⎥∂⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ⎣ ⎦=⎢ ⎥∂ ⎡ ⎤−Ψ −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
        (E2) 
 
Case I  Let DF  and RF  be concave. 
As ( ) ( )0 0 1 * *,   ,D Ri it tθ θ θ→ −∞ Ψ − ≥ Ψ − ∀  ( )( ) ( )( )0 1D Df fθ θ⇒ Ψ − ≤ Ψ −  
hence ( )( ) ( )( ){ }0 0D Df E fθ θ⎡ ⎤Ψ − − Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦ . Moreover, by assumption 
{ }0 * *, 0D Di iD Di it tt E tθ ⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ − ∂Ψ ∂ ≥⎣ ⎦ . Similarly, as  1 ,θ → +∞  ( )( ) ( )( )0 1D Df fθ θΨ − ≤ Ψ −  
⇒  ( )( ) ( )( ){ }1 0D Df E fθ θ⎡ ⎤Ψ − − Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦  while { }1 * *, 0D Di iD Di it tt E tθ ⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ − ∂Ψ ∂ ≤⎣ ⎦ . 
Consequently, ( )( ) , 0D D
i
f
t
σ θ⎡ ⎤∂ΨΨ − ≤⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦ . In addition, since ( )( )( ), Dg fθ θ +Ψ − ∈ℜ  then 
( )( ) 0DE f θ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦  and  ( )( ) , 0D D
i
f
t
σ θ⎡ ⎤∂ΨΨ − ≤⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦  imply (by E.1) that 0
D
iE t⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ ≥⎣ ⎦  at *Dit .  
Now consider party R. As ( ) ( )0 0 1 * *,   ,D Ri it tθ θ θ→ −∞ −Ψ − ≤ Ψ − − ∀  since 
( ) ( ) ( ), ,R R R D D Ds sG Gθ υ υ θ−Ψ − = − +t t . By concavity of RF , ( )( ) ( )( )0 1R Rf fθ θ−Ψ− − ≥ −Ψ −  
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⇒  ( )( ) ( )( ){ }0 0R Rf E fθ θ⎡ ⎤−Ψ − − −Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦  and { }0 * *, 0R Ri iR Ri it tt E tθ ⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ − ∂Ψ ∂ ≥⎣ ⎦ . Now, 
as 1 ,θ →+∞  ( )( ) ( )( )0 1R Rf fθ θ−Ψ − ≥ −Ψ −  ⇒  ( )( ) ( )( ){ }1 0R Rf E fθ θ⎡ ⎤−Ψ − − −Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦  
while { }1 * *, 0R Ri iR Ri it tt E tθ ⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ − ∂Ψ ∂ ≤⎣ ⎦ . Consequently, ( )( ) , 0R R Rif tσ θ⎡ ⎤∂ΨΨ − ≥⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦ . By 
(E.2), 0RiE t⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ ≤⎣ ⎦  at *Rit . 
Therefore, 0DiE t⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ ≥⎣ ⎦   at *Dit , and 0RiE t⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ ≤⎣ ⎦  at *Rit  implies * *D Ri it t≤  since 
the concavity of ( ) ( ), ,D D R D D Rυ υ∧Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ  imply ( )θΨ −  and ( )θ−Ψ −  are, respectively, 
concave in *Dit  and *Rit   . 
 
Case II  Let DF  and RF  be convex. 
Let ( ) ( )0 0 1 * *,   ,D Ri it tθ θ θ→ −∞ Ψ − ≥ Ψ − ∀  and by convexity of DF , 
( )( )0Df θΨ − → +∞  ⇒  ( )( ) ( )( ){ }0 0D Df E fθ θ⎡ ⎤Ψ − − Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦  and by assumption 
{ }0 *, 0Di Dki itt E tθ ⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ − ∂Ψ ∂ ≥⎣ ⎦ . Moreover, as  
( )1 1,θ θ→ +∞ Ψ − →−∞ ⇒ ( )( ) ( )( ){ }1 0D Df E fθ θ⎡ ⎤Ψ − − Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦  while 
{ }1 *, 0DiD Di itt E tθ ⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ − ∂Ψ ∂ ≤⎣ ⎦ . Consequently, ( )( ) , 0D Dif tσ θ⎡ ⎤∂ΨΨ − ≥⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦ . By (E.1), 
( )( ) , 0D D
i
f
t
σ θ⎡ ⎤∂ΨΨ − ≥⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦ , and ( )( ) 0DE f θ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦  imply 0DiE t⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ ≤⎣ ⎦  at *Dit . 
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For party R, as ( ) ( )0 0 1 * *,   ,D Ri it tθ θ θ→ −∞ −Ψ − ≤ −Ψ − ∀  since 
( ) ( ) ( ), ,R R R D D Ds sG Gθ υ υ θ−Ψ = − +t t  ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0 1 0   0R R Rf f fθ θ θ⇒ −Ψ − ≤ −Ψ − ∧ Ψ − →  
⇒  ( )( ) ( )( ){ }0 0R Rf E fθ θ⎡ ⎤−Ψ − − −Ψ − ≤⎣ ⎦ . By assumption, { }0 *, 0RiR Ri itt E tθ ⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ − ∂Ψ ∂ ≥⎣ ⎦ . 
Moreover, as  1 ,θ → +∞  ( )( )1 Rf θ−Ψ − →+∞  ⇒  ( )( ) ( )( ){ }1 0R Rf E fθ θ⎡ ⎤−Ψ − − −Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦  
while { }1 *, 0RiR Ri itt E tθ ⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ − ∂Ψ ∂ ≤⎣ ⎦ . Therefore, ( )( ) , 0RR R if tσ θ⎡ ⎤∂Ψ−Ψ − ≤⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦ . By (E.2), 
( )( ) , 0RR R
i
f
t
σ θ⎡ ⎤∂Ψ−Ψ − ≤⎢ ⎥∂⎣ ⎦  and ( )( ) 0DE f θ⎡ ⎤Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦  imply 0RiE t⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ ≥⎣ ⎦  at *Rit . 
Therefore, by the concavity of ( )θΨ − , 0DiE t⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ ≤⎣ ⎦   at *Dit , and 0RiE t⎡ ⎤∂Ψ ∂ ≥⎣ ⎦  at *Rit  
implies that at equilibrium * *D Ri it t≥ . 
 
Case III  Let DF  and RF  be a binomial probability cumulative density function. 
Under a binomial cdf ( )( ) 0, <>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
Ψ∂−Ψ D
i
DD
t
f θσ  and ( )( ) 0, <>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
Ψ∂−Ψ− R
i
RR
t
f θσ . 
Hence, ∧<
>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
Ψ∂ 0D
it
E 0<
>⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡
∂
Ψ∂
R
it
E  therefore * *D Ri it t>< . 
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APPENDIX F.  PROPERTIES OF THE ELECTORAL EQUILIBRIUM: 
SPATIAL MOBILITY 
 
In this section we analyze whether parties’ fiscal policies converge/diverge. To do 
so we review briefly some of the findings of the literature. For a two party game in which 
candidates seek to maximize their probability of winning (the Downs model), under 
perfect information on voters’ most preferred policy positions, for the uni-dimensional 
policy space, all voters vote, then the Downs model suggests that parties will converge 
towards the mean of the policy positions, see Downs (1957) and more recently Roemer 
(2001). Under the case of parties’ imperfect information on voters’ preferences, the 
Downsian candidates converge to a policy that maximizes some measure of the expected 
vote ( a, politically, aggregated welfare function), see Hinich, Ledyard and Ordeshook 
(1973) and Coughlin (1992). For applications of the n-dimensional electoral game to the 
tax design problem in which parties converge see Hettich and Winer (1997, 1999). 
Roemer (2001) critiques the Downs model by observing that the property of 
convergence does not reflect the stylized fact that parties’ policy positions diverge in the 
U.S (the empirical evidence of divergence in parties’ fiscal policies is presented in the 
literature review of this essay). Hinich and Ordeshook (1970) shows that allowing 
individuals to abstain from voting and considering the case in which the candidates seeks 
to maximize the expected vote, then the property of convergence of the Downsian policy 
positions is not guaranteed.123 Roemer (2001) shows that for policy motivated candidates, 
unidimensional policy, and parties’ perfect information of voters’ preferences for policy 
preferences ( for the case of the Wittman electoral equilibrium) then convergence to the 
                                                 
123 In particular the property of convergence depends on the pattern of abstentions and the variance of the 
distribution of the ideal policy positions of the voters. 
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median position is just one of the possible outcomes that are compatible with the political 
equilibrium. The median voter outcome can be upset (even in the unidimensional policy 
space) if the most preferred policy positions of both candidates are at the left or the right 
of the median policy position. Alesina and Rosenthal (1997) argues that in the Wittman 
equilibrium the candidates will not convergence even in the unidimensional case under 
imperfect information on voters’ ideal policy positions. 
In short, the Downsian model that abstracts from including the partisan preference 
(as a factor that interacts with the issue voting in determining the vote) concludes that 
parties’ policies convergence, even in the presence of imperfect information on the voting 
behavior. The prediction of convergence holds for the n -dimensional case as long as we 
assume that all individuals vote in this economy. We proceed to analyze how our model 
deviates from the prediction of convergence once we include the interaction of policy 
issues and partisan preferences in determining the voting behavior. Before proceeding to 
the issue of convergence let consider proposition 4, which says that under assumption 
(D1), the optimality conditions from (29) are sufficient for finding the electoral 
equilibrium. On what follows we denote party D as party k and party R as party –k.  
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Proposition 4. Let assumption (D1) from Appendix D holds and policy vectors 
[ ] [ ]* * * * * *, ,k k k k k ks sG G− − −= ∧ =Ρ t Ρ t  satisfy ( )* * * * *: 0 c c c c c cs i iG t tπ× ∂ ∂ = ∀t t for { },c k k= −  
then   
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
* * *
* * *
 , ,    ,
, ,   ,
k k k k k k k k
k k k k k k k k
π π
π π
− − −
− − − − −
≥ ∀ ∈
≥ ∀ ∈
Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ
Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ
  
Where P  is the set of the policy space. Hence * *k k−∧Ρ Ρ belongs to a pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium. 
Proof 
 (Sufficiency) Let 1 0,k k k∈Ρ Ρ P  and ( )0,1ι ∈ ,by concavity of ( )( )k kπ Ψ P  it holds 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )1 01k k k k k kιπ ιπ ι πΨ ≥ Ψ + − ΨP P P , where ( ) kkk 01 1 PPP ιιι −+=   thus: 
 
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0 1 0 0 1 0(k k k k k k k k k kπ ι π π πι
Ψ + − − Ψ ≥ Ψ − ΨP P P P P P  
( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ( )( )0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0
(k k k k k k
k k k k k klimι
π ι π π π πι→
Ψ + − − Ψ = Ψ ≥ Ψ − Ψ′P P P P P P P
 
For 0 *k k=P P  it holds ( )( )* 0k kπ Ψ =′ P  thus ( )( ) ( )( )* 1k k k kπ πΨ ≥ ΨP P  
( )1 0,1k k ι∀ ∈ ∧ ∈P P . Similarly for 1, 0,,k k k− − −∈Ρ Ρ P , ( )0,1ι ∈ , and concavity of 
( )( )k kπ − −−Ψ P  it holds that ( )( )* 0k kπ − −Ψ =′ P  evaluated at kk −− = *,,0 PP   implies 
( )( ) ( )( )* 1,k k k kπ π− − − −−Ψ ≥ −ΨP P . ( )1, 0,1k k ι− −∀ ∈ ∧ ∈P Ρ .Therefore * *,k k−Ρ Ρ  constitute 
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium.124 
 
                                                 
124  Note that an alternative sufficient condition for an electoral equilibrium that has received attention in 
the literature is to assume that ( ),c k kF −Ρ Ρ  is concave for { }, -c k k= . This assumption guarantees 
( ) ( )*k k k kιφ φ≥Ρ Ρ , by the definition of the probability of winning the election 
( )[ ] ( )[ ]*2 1 2 1k k k kw dw w dwρ ρφ φ−∞ −∞− ≥ −∫ ∫Ρ Ρ  ⇔  ( ) ( )*k k k kιπ π− − − −≥Ρ Ρ  ( )0,1k kι ι− −∀ ∈ ∧ ∈Ρ Ρ . 
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With respect the question whether parties converge or diverge in our model with 
voters’ loyalties, we must notice that the distribution of the partisan preferences modifies 
voters’ probability to vote for either candidate for a given set of policy positions of the 
parties. A voter with a strong partisan preference for candidate k (a voter with a large 
value for 0θ < ) will have a higher probability to vote for party k than to vote for party –k 
if both candidates propose the same tax policies. A similar case stands for a voter with a 
large 0θ > , who will have a higher probability of voting for party –k if both candidates 
propose the same policies. From the optimality conditions, it is clear that a party will 
weigh differently (more heavily/less heavily) the preferences of those individuals with 
strong partisan preferences in favor of the party when the function kF  is 
convex/concave. Hence a sufficient condition for convergence of the policy positions is 
that the probability of the vote is a uniform cumulative distribution.125 
 
Proposition 5. Let  assumption (D1) from Appendix D be satisfied and assume 
the probability of voting is a continuous uniform distribution. At equilibrium parties’ 
policies converge. 
Proof 
Let (D1) holds and policy vectors and let [ ] [ ]* * * * * *, ,k k k k k ks sG G− − −= ∧ =Ρ t Ρ t  
satisfy ( )* * * * *: 0 c c c c c cs i iG t tπ× ∂ ∂ = ∀t t for { },c k k= − . Hence * *k k−∧Ρ Ρ  belongs to a 
pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Policies ( )* * * * *: 0 c c c c c cs i iG t tπ× ∂ ∂ = ∀t t  for { },c k k= − ,  
imply ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) 00 =Ψ−Ψ−∧=Ψ−Ψ −−∫∫ θθθθθθ θθθθ ddtdfgddtdfg kiki kk . By 
                                                 
125 Another condition that would guarantee convergence is 1β = . 
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assumption, ( )•cF  for { },c k k= −  is a uniform cumulative distribution, therefore 
( )( ) ( )( )( ) [ ]θθθξθθ , 0, ∈∀>=−Ψ−=−Ψ −kk ff  where =ξ constant. Consequently, 
( ) ( ) 0=Ψ=Ψ −∫∫ θθθθ θθθθ ddtdgddtdg kiki  at *k k−= = ∈Ρ Ρ P P . Parties’ policies converge 
towards *P . 
 
Parties’ policies will not converge if the marginal probability of the vote changes 
with voters’ partisan type. This result is shown in proposition 6. 
 
Proposition 6. Let  ( )kkc −PP ,π  { },c k k= −  be concave on taxes, let the 
probability distribution function ( )( ) ( )( )0 1 0 1 0 1    , , :c cf f cθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤Ψ ≠ Ψ ∀ ∧ ∈ ≠⎣ ⎦ . 
If ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
k k
k k
i i
g f d g f dt t
θ θ
θ θθ θ θ θ θ θ−∂Ψ ∂Ψ− ≠∂ ∂∫ ∫P P  
k k−∀ = ∈Ρ Ρ P , at equilibrium 
parties’ policies will diverge. 
Proof 
The argument is by contradiction. Suppose at equilibrium * * *k k−= =Ρ Ρ Ρ  and 
( ) ( ) ,k kf fθ θ θ θ θ− ⎡ ⎤− ≠ ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦  leads to ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
k k
k k
i i
g f d g f dt t
θ θ
θ θθ θ θ θ θ θ−∂Ψ ∂Ψ− ≠∂ ∂∫ ∫P P . 
By assumption * * *  : 0 c c c ci it tπ∃ ∂ ∂ = ∀t  for { },c k k= − , by proposition 4 the policy 
position *ct  is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and it is satisfied * * *k k−= =Ρ Ρ Ρ . Since 
policies converge ( ) ( )* * 0k kυ υ υ−Δ = − =Ρ Ρ  then ( ) ( )* *k k k ki it tυ υ− −∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂Ρ Ρ  at 
* * *k k
i i it t t−= =  i∀  which implies **  PP kikki tt −− ∂Ψ∂=∂Ψ∂ . Moreover 
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( ) ( )* *   k k k kF f F fθ θ−∂ ∂Ψ = − ∧ ∂ ∂Ψ = −P P  since ( ) ( )*θ υ θ θΨ = Δ − = −Ρ , and 
( )θ θ−Ψ = . 
The first order condition * 0i
k k
i ttφ− −∂ ∂ =  and **  PP kikki tt −− ∂Ψ∂=∂Ψ∂  imply  
( ) ( ) ( ){ }* *
*
0
i i
k k k k k k
i it kt i
t t g f f dt
θ
θφ φ θ θ θ θ− − −∂Ψ∂ ∂ −∂ ∂ = − − ≠∂∫ P  and * * 0i i
k k k k
i it t
t tφ φ− −∂ ∂ ≠∂ ∂ =  
meaning that * 0i
k k
i ttφ∂ ∂ >  or * 0ik ki ttφ∂ ∂ <  which contradicts the notion that * *k =Ρ Ρ  
belongs to the Nash equilibrium strategies for candidate k .  
 
 
Parties’ policies will converge if * * *  : 0 c c c ci it tπ∃ ∂ ∂ = ∀t  for { },c k k= − , 
( )( ) ( )( )0 1 0 1 0 1    , , :c cf f cθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤Ψ ≠ Ψ ∀ ∧ ∈ ≠⎣ ⎦ .  and if simultaneously  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
* *
k k
k k
i i
g f d g f dt t
θ θ
θ θθ θ θ θ θ θ−∂Ψ ∂Ψ− =∂ ∂∫ ∫P P . This is a singular (not general) 
condition when the marginal probability of the vote changes across voters’ partisan 
identification.  Evidence from the ANES suggests significant variations of ( )g θ  across 
voters’ type and over time. These variations require a complex pattern of changes in the 
marginal probability of the vote, when evaluated at voters’ partisan preference, to 
guarantee that parties’ marginal proportion of the expected votes will be equal at  
* *k k−=Ρ Ρ . This is unlikely to become a regular condition of the electoral equilibrium. 
Therefore, if ( )( ) ( )( )0 1 0 1 0 1    , , :c cf f cθ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤Ψ ≠ Ψ ∀ ∧ ∈ ≠⎣ ⎦ , convergence is a 
singular condition of the electoral equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX G.  PARTISAN DOMINANCE AND PARTIES’ 
PROBABILITY OF WINNING THE ELECTION 
 
Proposition 7. Consider two cumulative distributions of party identification 
( ) ( ),G Gθ θ%  such that ( )G θ%  partisan-dominates ( )G θ . Therefore: 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) ,   , , , ,  ,k k k k k k k kG G G Gθ θ θ θ θ π θ π θ− − −⎡ ⎤≤ ∀ ∈ ⇒ ≥ ∀ ∈⎣ ⎦ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ% %   
Proof. 
By definition of the expected proportion of the votes 
( ) ( ) ( )( ),k k k kg F dθθφ θ θ θ− = Ψ∫Ρ Ρ . Integrating by parts kφ  under partisan 
distributions ( )G θ  and ( )G θ%  we obtain:  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 0k k kg F d g F d f G G dθ θ θθ θ θθ θ θ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤Ψ − Ψ = Ψ − ≥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫ ∫ %%  since it is 
satisfied ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( ), , 0k k k k kG G G Gf f fθ θ θ θθ θ θ= = ⇒ Ψ = Ψ = Ψ ≥t t t t t% %  
for given policy vectors ,k k− ∈Ρ Ρ Ρ  and since by assumption ( ) ( )G g dθθθ θ θ= ∫% %   and 
( ) ( )G g dθθθ θ θ= ∫ . such that ( ) ( ) ,G Gθ θ θ θ θ⎡ ⎤≤ ∀ ∈ ⎣ ⎦% . The probability to win the 
election is a non decreasing function of ( ),k k kφ −Ρ Ρ , therefore 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )k kg F d g F dθ θθ θθ θ θ θ θ θΨ ≥ Ψ∫ ∫%  implies 
( )( ) ( )( ), , , ,  ,k k k k k k k kG Gπ θ π θ− − −≥ ∀ ∈Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ Ρ% . 
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APPENDIX H.  VOTING  CALCULUS 
 
As mentioned before, the individuals’ vote reflects a complex calculus of parties’ 
platforms, voters’ partisan attitudes, individuals’ perceptions over candidates, a 
retrospective (prospective) view of parties’ performance, sociotropic (when the vote is 
influenced by a collective orientation of voters) and pocketbook voting (see Fiorina1997). 
We extend the analysis of Coughlin (1984, 1990a, 1992) and assume that the voting 
behavior is explained by parties’ policies, voters’ partisan attitudes and voters’ 
perceptions over the characteristics of candidates. 
To simplify, we follow Coughlin (1992) and assume parties do not know with 
certainty the voters’ perception over candidates’ characteristics. Let the partisan attitude 
of voter h be hθ , while ( )yG ksk k ,,tυ  and ( )yG ksk k ,, −− −tυ  are, respectively, the utilities 
for voter h when parties k and –k select policies ksGk ,t  and ksGk −− ,t , and khhk −,,ζζ  
reflects an unknown preference relation of voter h over the candidates’ sociological 
features (religion, gender, ethnic background). Therefore, voter h will vote for party k if 
( ) ( ) ( ) hkkhhkskkskhh yGyG kk ζζθυυθ −>−−=−Ψ −−− − ,,,,, tt , individual h votes for 
party -k if the inequality is reversed, and voter h is indifferent if ( ) hkkhhh ζζθ −=−Ψ −, . 
We assume hkkhh ζζζ −=Δ −,  is a random variable with [ ] 0=Δ hE ζ . Let  kf  be the 
probability distribution function over ( )θ−Ψ h . Therefore, the probability that a voter h 
with a partisan attitude hθ  and pair of policies ,k k−Ρ Ρ  votes for candidate k is 
( )( )∫ −Ψ∞−= hh hhkhk dfθ ψψPr . 
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